Architectures based on Oblivious RAM for Enhancing User Privacy and their Applications to Genome Processing by Karvelas, Nikolaos
Architectures based on
Oblivious RAM for Enhancing
User Privacy and their
Applications to Genome
Processing
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.)
genehmigte Dissertation von Nikolaos P. Karvelas aus Athen
Tag der Einreichung: 17. Mai 2018, Tag der Prüfung: 28. Juni 2018
Darmstadt — D 17
1. Gutachten: Prof. Dr. Stefan Katzenbeisser
2. Gutachten: Prof. Dr. Marc Fischlin
Fachbereich Informatik
Security Engineering
Architectures based on Oblivious RAM for Enhancing User Privacy and their Applications to
Genome Processing
Genehmigte Dissertation von Nikolaos P. Karvelas aus Athen
1. Gutachten: Prof. Dr. Stefan Katzenbeisser
2. Gutachten: Prof. Dr. Marc Fischlin
Tag der Einreichung: 17. Mai 2018
Tag der Prüfung: 28. Juni 2018
Darmstadt — D 17
Bitte zitieren Sie dieses Dokument als:
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-75737
URL: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/7573
Dieses Dokument wird bereitgestellt von tuprints,
E-Publishing-Service der TU Darmstadt
http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de
tuprints@ulb.tu-darmstadt.de
Die Veröffentlichung steht unter folgender Creative Commons Lizenz:
Namensnennung – Keine kommerzielle Nutzung – Keine Bearbeitung 4.0 International
Deutschland
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Erklärung zur Dissertation
Hiermit versichere ich, die vorliegende Dissertation ohne Hilfe Dritter nur mit den angegebenen
Quellen und Hilfsmitteln angefertigt zu haben. Alle Stellen, die aus Quellen entnommen wurden,
sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Diese Arbeit hat in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner
Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen.
Darmstadt, den 17. Mai 2018
(Nikolaos P. Karvelas)
I
Zusammenfassung
Das ständig wachsende Bedürfnis nach Schutz digitaler Daten hat die Entwicklung einer Vielfalt krypro-
graphischer Primitiven als Folge, die die Privatheit der Nutzer garantieren sollen. Nichtsdestotrotz wurde
sehr früh deutlich, dass der bloße Schutz des Dateninhalts in vielen Szenarien nicht ausreicht, da die Art
und Weise in der auf die Daten zugegriffen wird sehr wichtige Information verrät, die zum Reverse-
Engineering von Programmen und zum kompletten Zusammenbruch der Nutzernprivatheit führen kann,
wenn Nutzer ihre Daten auf entfernten Server auslagern.
Um dieses Problem zu lösen, hat die kryprographische Gemeinschaft mehrere Primitiven vorgeschlagen,
unter welchen Oblivious RAM (ORAM) ein sehr prominenter Ansatz ist, der die Privatheit der Daten auf
entfernten Server garantiert. Das dominanteste Forschungsmodel ist das ein Client/ ein Server, welches
einerseits für die abstrakte Betrachtung des Problems notwendig ist, andererseits aber wegen der starken
Beschränkungen für praktische Probleme schwer anwendbar ist.
In dieser Arbeit entwickeln wir ORAM-Architekturen, welche diese Problematik adressieren und wir
verallgemeinern diese Untersuchung. Insbesondere schlagen wir Lösungen vor, die mehreren Klienten
erlauben, ihre Daten auf entfernten Server zu speichern und Teile ihrer Daten miteinander oder selektiv
mit dritten Parteien zu teilen. Dementsprechend stellen wir die Studie der „Partially SharingMulti-Client
ORAMs“ vor und präsentieren konkrete Instanzen davon. Um die Sicherheit unserer Konstruktionen zu
beweisen, war es notwendig, ein neues Framework zu entwickeln, welches uns die Möglichkeit gibt, über
die Sicherheitsgarantien solcher komplexen Architekturen zu argumentieren. Darüberhinaus haben wir
ein sehr versatiles Framework für ORAM-Sicherheit entwickelt, welches deutlich strenger, als die aktuell
benutzten ist, während es gleichzeitig viel einfacher als das von Goldreich und Ostrovsky vorgeschlagene
Framework ist. Unter diesem Licht sind wir der Meinung, dass unser Framework hilfreich für die Durch-
führung von Sicherheitsbeweisen in neuen ORAM-Konstruktionen sein kann.
Um die Anwendbarkeit unserer Architekturen zu zeigen, haben wir sie implementiert und für die Lösung
des Problems „Privacy Preserving Genomic Studies“ eingesetzt, welches unsererMeinung nach eine sehr
wichtige Rolle in der weiterenDigitalisierung unserer Gesellschaft spielenwird. Mit unseren neuentwick-
elten Techniken können wir verschlüsselte, sequinzierte Genomdaten mehrerer Klienten speichern, auf
sie zugreifen, sie aktualisieren und sie weiter durch Nutzung von „Secure Computation“ Techniken ver-
arbeiten, um eine Vielfalt von Tests durchführen zu können, die sich von einfachen DNA-Fingerprinting
zu komplexeren Genomeweit Assoziierungs Studien erstrecken.
II
Abstract
The all increasing need for data protection has given raise to a plethora of privacy preserving cryp-
tographic techniques that address this issue. Early on however, it was made clear that in many cases,
simply protecting the contents of the data is not enough: The way encrypted data is accessed can leak
important information that spans from reverse-engineering of programs, to totally breaking the privacy
of users, once they store it on remote servers.
To answer this question, the cryptographic community developed various solutions among which one of
the most prominent is Oblivious RAM (ORAM), which guarantees data privacy in remotely outsourced
private data. Yet, the dominant model under consideration is that of one client and one server, which al-
though necessary as a means of abstractly dealing with the general problem, still has limited applications
in real-world scenarios.
In this work, we develop ORAM architectures that address this problem and generalise the above study.
In particular, we propose solutions that allow multiple clients to store their private data on remote servers
and either share with each other parts of their data, or selectively give access to parts of their data to third
parties. This way, we introduce the study of “Partially Sharing Multi-Client ORAMs” and give concrete
instantiations of such ORAMs. Proving that our constructions are secure, required the development of a
new framework that allows for arguing on the security of such complex architectures. To this extent, we
developed a versatile framework for ORAM security that is more rigorous than the frameworks used in
practise today and at the same time far easier to use than the original Goldreich-Ostrovsky framework.
Under this light, we believe that our new framework will prove itself to be very useful also in showing
security for ORAM constructions that will be developed in the future.
In order to show the applicability of the architectures we developed, we implemented and applied them
to a problem domain that we believe will be of great significance in the following years. In particular, we
address the problem of privacy preserving genomic studies. Using our newly developed techniques, we
can store, access and update encrypted sequenced genomes of multiple clients, and by employing secure
computation techniques, we can further process the outsourced data for a variety of tests ranging from
simple DNA fingerprinting to more complex Genome Wide Association Studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Although privacy has been an integral part of human societies ranging from the classic antiquity [Bur00]
to modern times, the notion of privacy as a human right appeared only a little longer than a century ago
in Warren and Brandeis’ influential article [WB90], at a time that technological advancements seemed to
make the invasion to the private sphere of individuals possible. In today’s digital society, the protection of
each individual’s privacy stands again in the centre of our physical society’s focus, as the society attempts
to define anew and to preserve its citizens’ freedom.
The digital revolution that has taken place in the last decades has brought with it radical changes in
the ways that individuals perceive and handle their privacy. The solutions to every-day problems that
have been offered open handedly by computer systems constantly connected with each other, and the all
increasing need for more speed, efficiency, and an exciting ‘user experience’ have brought with them
an overwhelming burden on the user’s privacy. To mitigate this problem and to answer the sceptics’
concerns, the cryptographic community offered solutions mainly in a twofold way: As individual cryp-
tographic tools (such as encryption schemes, proofs of knowledge, etc.) that can be directly applied to
existing solutions, and as architectures designed with security and privacy in mind, that combine a va-
riety of cryptographic primitives. The latter are usually referred to as Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETs), and in the past years they have been a new field of intense research which has proposed solutions
that achieve anonymous communication, private access and private processing of outsourced data. As
such, PETs can play a significant role in the protection of user privacy, and thus the development of such
technologies is of great importance for the further steps of both our digital and physical societies.
However, the development of such technologies is not a trivial task. The design of such PETs faces many,
synergistically occurring challenges: For one, the data stored in remote servers spans to sizes of several
Terabytes which under encryption results in a blowup in the size of the encrypted data. This in turn has
as consequence, heavy communication and computation overheads once this data needs to be processed
‘under encryption’. At the same time, it is at the moment unclear how these outsourced data will be used
in the future and which queries will be performed on it. Take for example the case of privacy preserving
processing of outsourced data, a scenario that involves queries to remote databases. It is not improbable
that in such a scenario the need will arise for performing complex statistical queries on outsourced data,
which in turn can potentially result in information leakage and privacy loss. Thus, a practical PET should
be designed in a way that it can support and protect any query in order to adapt to future advances of data
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processing. Since cryptographically protected data will likely be stored only once, the form of protection
should not be tailored to a specific query type but should be as flexible as possible, in order to be able
to cope with future queries, while the data owner should be able to update the outsourced data in a way
that does not yield privacy compromises. Finally, an ideal PET solution should be able to hide the type
of the query from the involved parties, which in many cases can be inferred by the mere observation that
certain parts of the data have been accessed more frequently than others.
In the past years, many solutions have been proposed that deal with each of the above problems individu-
ally. The computational cost of encryption schemes has been dramatically shrunk, with solutions such as
the AES-NI [INT] set of instructions or the employment of efficient public key encryption schemes such
as the ones based on elliptic curves. The flexibility and support of future queries can be achieved by using
recently developed and highly efficient protocols for secure multiparty computation [Fur+17], while hid-
ing the type of the query can be achieved by using privacy-preserving building blocks such as searchable
encryption [WWC16] or privacy-preserving protocols such as private information retrieval [Cho+] or
oblivious RAM [Gol87].
Current cryptographic methods for secure computation however are tailored towards small and mid-size
computational problems, while problems such as genomic processing which today is predominantly done
through tests looking for Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) (i.e., checking whether a certain sym-
bol occurred in the genome at a given position) require very large inputs. It is foreseeable (and desirable)
that more complex statistical tests will enter the arena [PM+99; Lau+13] – especially as for example SNPs
do not explain to the full extent heritable diseases like autism [Cur+11; Seb+07]. Furthermore, associ-
ation studies where genetic and physiological data are combined pose a great challenge in biostatistics
and therefore PETs should support these applications as well. Analysis across several genomes must be
possible to investigate inheritable traits. Again, autism is an example, where genomic heterogeneity and
so-called copy-number variation are known to be disease-related [Abr08]. Additionally even twins can
be distinguished [JSA11] based on their respective phenotype which reveal complex, systems-biological
effects. It is thus to expect that the inputs of such problems will be so large that secure computation
techniques alone will not be able to handle them efficiently.
Therefore, it becomes clear that theway these technologies can bemoulded in order to be later synthesised
in a solution that holistically addresses all the challenges of privacy enhancing technologies has still not
been answered. We do this in this work by answering the following question in a positive way:
Can we build a privacy enhancing technology that provides strong security guarantees and can be
applied to contemporary data-intensive problems?
In order to address the above question, we first focus on the way that Random Access Machines function,
since the way a program accesses specific memory registers depending on its inputs can leak impor-
tant information not only about the program itself, but also about the inputs. Suppose for example that
a client outsources his private digital data in the form of small encrypted datablocks to an untrusted
server. Without loss of generality, we can assume that some datablocks will be of greater interest than
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others for the client. As a result, these datablocks will be accessed more frequently, something that the
server can observe independently of the fact that the datablocks are encrypted. From this observation
alone, the server can deduce important information not only about the client’s query, but also about the
data itself. Consider for example the case where a client stores encrypted electronic health records to a
remote server: If the server knows that a particular datablock holds data about a specific disease, and
observes a client accesses that datablock more frequently than others, then the server can deduce with a
certain probability that the client suffers from that particular disease without having to actually know the
unencrypted contents of the client’s datablocks.
To address the above security problems, Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) is one of the most
prominent cryptographic primitives that can be applied in order to mitigate the above information leak-
age. Goldreich introduced the ORAM primitive in his seminal work [Gol87], motivated by the problem
of software protection. There, hiding a program’s access patterns should make the program’s reverse
engineering impossible. Since its introduction, ORAM has received great attention from the crypto-
graphic community, and not undeservedly: Building a computing machine that delivers the correct result
of a computation while being oblivious to its every step is a fascinating endeavour that could eventu-
ally guarantee data privacy both during storage as well as during processing. As a result, a plethora
of constructions have been developed and intensely optimised. ORAM technologies have found their
way in a multitude of applications including secure processors [Maa+13], privacy preserving filesys-
tems [WST12], and privacy preserving storage of electronic health records [Maf+15]. Observe here,
that since ORAM is a Random Access Machine, it offers both read and write capabilities and this way,
the flexibility one gains from using this primitive outperforms that of other technologies such as Private
Information Retrieval (PIR), which supports only read operations.
Using the ideas presented in state-of-the-art ORAM solutions, we develop in this work new ORAM so-
lutions that enhance user privacy in a multitude of ways. To do this, we first provide a novel framework
for proving the security of ORAM constructions. We first demonstrate our new framework’s potential by
proving the to-date most efficient ORAM construction (namely Path-ORAM [Ste+13a]) secure – some-
thing that in Path-ORAM’s original proposition was done at a rather high-level. Our new framework
allows us then to develop and prove secure two new ORAMs.
In our first construction, we are motivated by the problem of fully outsourcing the retrieval and storage of
data to untrusted parties. Thus, our first solution Proxy-ORAM operates on encrypted data in every step
of the protocol, as opposed to classical ORAM solutions, where particular steps (such as the ‘reshuﬄing’
of hierarchical constructions, or the ‘eviction’ of tree-based constructions) have to be performed on plain
data. This way, we give the ability to an untrusted third-party to access only parts of the ORAM and
retrieve the result in encrypted form, while the owner of the data does not need to be constantly online.
We further couple this ORAM construction with Secure Two-Party Computation (STC), and we achieve
a PET that guarantees full privacy of data, not only during computation but also during its retrieval.
In our second construction, we deal with a different problem. Most existing ORAM constructions focus
on a one client-one server setting, which although very interesting and useful for theoretical purposes,
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it is rather limiting when it comes to real world applications. The reason for this is that in most inter-
esting scenarios many clients are involved. Furthermore, although research on multi client ORAMs has
been already underway for several years, most of the solutions proposed thus far deal primarily with the
problem of client anonymity, i.e., concealing from the server who is the client accessing the ORAM. The
problem that has been however neglected is that of information leakage due to data accesses between
clients in such a multi-client environment.
In this work, we close the above gap by initiating the study of Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAMs
(PSMC-ORAMs). We extend our new ORAM framework in a way that it can describe and rigorously
prove secure an ORAM architecture that supports multiple clients storing their private data on the same
server and partially share data with each other. Our architecture guarantees access pattern hiding not
only between every client and the server, but also between the clients.
Once we have established the necessary theoretical background and proposed our ORAM constructions
that achieve the privacy requirements for a modern PET, we apply our solutions to a contemporary data
intensive and privacy sensitive problem. An ideal field to demonstrate the potential of our PETs is that of
genomic privacy. In the past years, the rapid developments in genome processing have made it possible to
process the human genome and store it digitally. The applications of such a technologywill most probably
have the potential to eliminate most of today’s life threatening diseases. These advancements however
do come at a cost which if not taken care of can reverse the technological utopia into a sociological
nightmare. The reason for this is exactly the sensitivity of genomic data. Take for example the case
where a human genetics laboratory performs a pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for, e.g., autism or
Altzheimer’s disease and the correlated presence of a specific mutation or combination thereof. Knowing
that these diseases are associated with specific parts of the human genome [Seb+07; Dab+10] the mere
fact that these certain parts of the genetic data are accessed in the parental genomes already leaks privacy-
sensitive information such as the fact that an implantation is to occur, who the parents are, and most
importantly that the parents wonder about their own susceptibility to a disease. Ideally, all these facts
should be hidden from the (commercial) entity that stores the genomic data.
One would think that since secure computation based solutions are mature enough to handle mid-size
problems such as genome processing based on SNPs, they should have already found their way in the
industry to some extent. Yet, this is not the case, as most of the research on genomic data today is
done on unencrypted data that is ‘protected’ and considered ‘secure’, simply because it is kept behind
Demilitarised Zones (DMZs). We argue that this is not adequate and secure enough protection for highly
sensitive data such as genomic data. In fact, a legal framework that will protect the data is already
underway, and thus it is not hard to imagine that in the near future, legislation will be in place that will
enforce the adoption of privacy preserving technological solutions.
In this work, we test our solutions by adapting them to the problem of privacy-preserving genomic data.
We thus obtain solutions that are flexible to support future query types, are applicable to fully sequenced
genomes and allow to hide the nature of the performed test. To this end, we store the sequenced genome at
a server in encrypted form using the ORAMs that we developed. In a subsequent query phase the stored
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data can be accessed and utilised in a secure computation. By separating secure storage from the query
phase, we achieve full flexibility to adapt to future queries. We achieve efficiency by only requesting
as input to the secure computation phase those parts of the genomic string that are actually necessary
to perform the computation and not the entire genomic sequence – while hiding the queried positions
themselves. This enables query times that are sublinear in the length of the genomic sequence. Finally,
due to the use of an ORAM, the party storing the genome is fully oblivious on the data accessed during
a query; he only sees the amount of data accessed, but not its location in the genome.
Thesis Outline
We begin in Chapter 2 by reviewing recent advancements in ORAM solutions and genomic studies thus
obtaining an overview of the current state-of-the-art solutions, and motivating the problems dealt with in
this thesis. In Chapter 3, we present the necessary mathematical and cryptographic building blocks that
will be used in this work. We present homomorphic encryption systems that will be used throughout the
course of the thesis, and present Stefanov et al. Path-ORAM [Ste+13a]. Finally, we briefly go through
Yao’s garbled circuit solution for Secure Two-Party Computation.
Our new ORAM framework is presented in Chapter 4. We introduce our novel and flexible ORAM
definition, and define ORAM security by means of a security game inspired by the IND-CPA game for
encryption schemes. We then show that our new definition is equivalent to the simulation based security
definition of Garg et al. [GMP16], and conclude the chapter by using our new framework in order to
describe Path-ORAM [Ste+13a] and prove it secure.
In Chapter 5 we introduce our first ORAM construction, Proxy-ORAM. This solution, allows a client to
store encrypted data on a remote server and give partial access to third parties. The latter can access this
data without revealing to the server any information except for the amount of accesses performed, while
the third party sees the data only in encrypted form.
Chapter 6 deals with the study of Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAMs, i.e., ORAM Architectures that
allow multiple clients to store their data on a server and share between them parts of their data. We
provide the necessary theoretical background for such a study by extending the framework introduced in
Chapter 4, and present Blurry-ORAM, the first instantiation of a Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM.
In Chapter 7, we apply our ORAM architectures to the problem of Genomic Studies. For this, we com-
bine Proxy-ORAM with Yao’s Garbled Circuit Solution for Secure Two-Party Computation. This way,
we provide a solution that allows a third party to access parts of a client’s sequenced genomes in a privacy
preservingmanner, and then use Yao’s Garbled Circuits in order to perform a variety of tests on encrypted
data and learn only the end result of the computations. Consequently, we use Blurry-ORAM to store en-
crypted sequenced genome of multiple clients, and using the partial-sharing attribute of this architecture
we can perform Genome Wide Association Studies in a privacy preserving way. We implement both
approaches, and the experimental results we present in this chapter.
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 8, with open problems and ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Privacy Enhancing Technologies have been a very active field of research that has been studied exten-
sively in the past decades. Moreover, the field of genomic privacy has also received ceaseless attention in
the last years, primarily due to the grave importance that protection of genomic data will most probably
play in the digital society of the future. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that presenting
even the majority of the results of the two aforementioned research fields would be a task well outside
the scope of this work. We do however give a brief overview of some important results that motivate
the constructions and solutions that will be presented later in this work, namely the basic core of ORAM
constructions and works on privacy preserving genomic studies.
2.1. Oblivious RAM
Due to its abstract and generic nature, describing an ORAM on a high level can be challenging. For
reasons of simplicity, as well as due to its use in this work, we will describe ORAMs in a client-server
setting: A client outsources his encrypted private datablocks to a remote server and wants to access his
data, revealing to the server nothing more than the amount of blocks stored and the number of accesses
performed. With these in mind, we briefly describe in the following, the main ORAM families as they
have developed historically. At the same time, we propose a categorization of the various ORAMs in
respect to the notions of multi-client and parallelization characteristics.
2.1.1. Basic Constructions
Square-Root Solution
The original solution of Goldreich in [Gol87; GO96] works as follows: The client’s N blocks (denoted
as ‘real’) are stored in encrypted manner on the server’s so-called ‘Permuted Memory’, and under a
permutation only known to the client. Additionally a smaller buffer able to hold
p
N blocks, called
‘Shelter’ is used originally filled up with ‘fake’ (or ‘dummy’) blocks1. In order to access one datablock,
1 Each of these blocks is of the same size as a real datablock, is filled with ‘0’, and encrypted under the same semantically
secure encryption scheme used to encrypt the real blocks
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the client first scans the entire ‘Shelter’. If the datablock was found in the shelter, then the client gets a
random datablock from the ‘PermutedMemory’. Otherwise, the client gets the correct datablock from the
‘Permuted Memory’. After the datablock has been read or written, the client puts it back to the ‘Shelter’,
and re-randomises the entire Shelter. After
p
N access, the Shelter will be filled with real datablocks,
which in an interactive step are then obliviously emptied to the Permuted Memory, by using e.g. sorting
networks, a process which is called a ‘reshuﬄe’. This process results in an amortized computation and
communication cost of O(
p
N log2 N).
Hierarchical ORAMs
In order to avoid the high communication costs of the Square-Root solution’s reshuﬄe step, Goldreich
and Ostrovsky introduced in [GO96] also the notion of Hierarchical ORAMs. There, the client’s N
real datablocks are stored on the server, along with an equal amount of ‘fake’ datablocks, in a pyramid-
like structure of logN levels. Each level is represented as a hash table, consisting of a level dependent
number of fixed sized buckets, to which datablocks are assigned. In order to retrieve one datablock from
the ORAM, the client downloads and decrypts one bucket from every level, as indicated by the level’s
hash table. In one of those buckets the client is guaranteed to find the datablock he was querying for,
while for the server the accesses look totally random. After the client has finished his query, he writes the
datablock back into the first level’s bucket: If the query was a read operation, the client writes back the
datablock re-encrypted, while in case of a write operation, he writes back an encryption of the updated
datablock. Once the buckets of a level are filled, a ‘reshuﬄe’ operation takes place: The level’s buckets are
obliviously emptied to the next level, in such a way that any correlation between the datablocks accessed
on the two levels is destroyed. This results in an amortised access overhead ofO(log3 N), while the client
needs to accommodate constant local storage.
In the years that followed, the hierarchical solution met many optimisations, and many variants of the
original scheme were proposed. Most notably, the solution of Pinkas and Reinman [PR10] used Cuckoo
hashing and gained a logarithmic factor in the communication complexity. However, it was shown to
suffer from a privacy leakage, which was not further addressed. Subsequent works [WSC08; WST12]
replaced the hash table with a Bloom filter. A query for a datablock runs in a similar way as before, but
instead of looking at the hash table in order to see if the datablock is on the level and downloading the
corresponding bucket, the client now consults the corresponding Bloom filter and downloads either the
real datablock (if it was found on that level) or a fake one, thus saving a logarithmic communication factor
per query. The reshuﬄe is also simplified: after two levels are merged, one only needs to re-randomise
the elements and build a new Bloom filter.
Tree-based ORAMs
The ORAM landscape changed rapidly with the introduction of tree-based ORAMs. The first such
scheme was proposed by Shi et al. [Shi+11]. The core idea is to map each real datablock to a leaf of
a binary tree data structure. Reading a datablock is done, by scanning the path to the leaf where the
datablock is mapped to, and while doing this, rearranging all datablocks found in the path so that as
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Figure 2.1: Simplified example of Path-ORAM access: The datablock ‘c’ is found along the path
to leaf number ‘5’ (left); then datablock ‘c’ is remapped to leaf number ‘2’, and
moved to the common ancestor of paths to leaves ‘2’ and ‘5’, which is closer to the
leaf level (right).
many datablocks as possible are pushed closer to the tree’s leaf level, in an operation called ‘eviction’.
This approach achieved a worst-case communication overhead of O(log3 N) while maintaining constant
client storage.
The idea behind Shi et al. construction, was further explored by Stefanov et al. [Ste+13a] where the
eviction procedure was simplified, resulting in the Path-ORAM construction which constitutes today’s
state-of-the-art ORAM architecture. Again here, each datablock is mapped randomly to a leaf of the
tree, an after the datablock has been found, its position is randomly remapped. This time however, the
datablock is placed on the common ancestor of the paths leading to the old and the new leaves, and that
is closer to the leaf level (a graphical representation of this procedure can be found in Figure 2.1). This
scheme achieves a communication overhead ofO(log2 N), with the client needingO(logN) local space.
In fact, it is Path-ORAM’s practical efficiency that made it the perfect candidate in the construction of
the secure processor of Maas et al. [Maa+13].
Hybrid and other ORAMs
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the efficiency of the various ORAM constructions
depends on a multitude of parameters. Thus, combining ideas from various ORAM schemes, in a series
of works, Stefanov et al. [SS13a; SSS12; SS13b] proposed schemata, where the client’s data is distributed
among a number of servers in a partitioning-like paradigm. Each of these partitions stores the client’s
datablocks using the square-root or the hierarchical solution. Assuming that the client has less storage
restrictions than the ones originally imposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky, these hybrid architectures
result in practically efficient solutions, since the database is split into several smaller ones, which can be
more efficiently and in parallel accessible.
In a similar manner, however not using the partitioning-framework, Goodrich et al. [Goo+12a] devise
an ORAM that achieves constant amortised communication costs however by burdening the client with
local storage of size O(N1/c), for some c ≥ 2. Finally, Dautrich and Stefanov [JSS14] proposed an
ORAM that exploits the fact that clients tend to perform many accesses in a short time after long times
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of idleness, i.e., ‘bursts’. This results in a very efficient ORAM however again under heavy demands on
the client’s local storage. [WCS15].
2.1.2. Multi-Client ORAMs
ORAMs arose from the need to protect against software piracy, and as such, ORAM research was mostly
concerned about themodel of a processor reading andwriting to itsmemorymodule (amodel very similar
to having a client accessing his private data to a remote server). For most modern systems or scenarios
however, such a setting is either over-simplifying or even obsolete, and thus the notion of multi-client
ORAMs came to light where a dataset that is accessible by a number of clients is considered. In such
a setting, the mere existence of a multitude of clients gives rise to many interesting privacy questions,
which have been dealt with in a number of works, and which we will briefly recall in the following.
The first and main question regarding multi-client ORAMs is if they exist in the first place, i.e., if an
ORAM construction can be built, which guarantees that different clients that have access to the ORAM,
can share between them the ORAM state which gets updated after every access. A positive answer to this
question came from the construction of Goodrich et al. [Goo+12b], which is based on the hierarchical
solution. Using the Cuckoo hashing technique, the authors showed that the ORAM’s state could be
communicated between the clients in a private way, yielding a so-called stateless ORAM. However, this
came at the expense of the clients’ memory, who for N outsourced datablocks had to dedicate O(Nν)
memory for some fixed constant ν > 0.
In a parallel and independent work, Williams et al. [WST12] solved the same problem by introducing the
notion of a period-based stateless ORAM, by employing a server-stored and encrypted ‘log’ of accesses
which is shared and consulted by the clients during every access. The main purpose of this log was to
allow parallel access during one period. The solution was again based on the hierarchical ORAM, this
time however in its more efficient Bloom filter variant from [WSC08], which allowed for the first instance
of a privacy preserving parallel filesystem.
Another interesting problem arising once multiple clients are allowed to access the same ORAM is client
anonymity, which can be seen as the inability of the server and other clients to link a client to a specific
operation on a datablock. This problem was addressed by Backes et al. in [Bac+16], where the proposed
solution employs two non-colluding servers in a hierarchical based ORAM and achieves security against
malicious adversaries.
The last and for this thesis most relevant security question regarding multi-client ORAMs, is the infor-
mation leakage arising when multiple clients share only parts of their data with each other. Pioneering
the idea of an ORAM that allows such a partial sharing of data in the presence of multiple clients, Franz
et al. [Fra+12] introduced an ORAM that allows delegation of rights from a data owner to other clients.
The main idea is that every datablock stored on the server is encrypted with a different key, which the
data owner hands over to the client, in order to delegate read or write access rights to that client for the
particular datablock. Using this approach however, the data owner has to be constantly online in order to
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perform this costly operation since the client does not know all the keys in order to perform an ORAM
reshuﬄe. Being based on the square-root solution, this solution further suffers from high communication
costs not only during the reshuﬄe operation but also during reading or writing datablocks.
In a more recent work Maffei et al. [Maf+15] addressed the above problem in a more holistic way: the
authors assumed the existence of multiple clients and proposed a solution that provides strong security
guarantees against malicious adversaries. First, the access patterns are hidden from the server. Secondly,
the integrity of the data is protected against a malicious server and against malicious clients. Most im-
portantly, the clients are guaranteed to be able to read only the entries that they have access to. Being
based on the highly efficient Path-ORAM construction [Ste+13a], this solutions enjoys also high effi-
ciency, alongside its strong security guarantees. However, this solution does not consider the potential
information leakage that can be inferred by datablocks shared between multiple clients. In particular,
even when the clients can only access the datablocks for which they have permissions, still by merely
observing the changes in the recursively stored position map, they can see exactly which datablocks have
been accessed by other clients. In a similar manner, the existence of the a stash which is shared by all
the clients, can learn important information such as if in a particular bucket a real or a fake datablock is
stored.
2.2. Genomic Data
We begin by recalling some basic facts on genomic sequencing that will help us better understand the
privacy problems associated with it. The human genome is a set of nucleotides structured in two com-
plementary polymer chains, with the four nucleotide bases of the polymer chain being adenine, cytosine,
guanine and thymine, represented by A, C, G, T respectively. In order to determine the exact raw se-
quence of a human DNA, various techniques have been developed in the past years, including illumina
dye sequencing, pyrosequencing or single molecule real time sequencing. The raw sequence is then
further analysed by being aligned to the so-called reference genome which is considered to be a typical
representation of our specie’s genome. The result of this procedure is a set of approximately 3.2 billion
characters, stored in the Sequence Alignment Map (SAM) file. Out of this set of characters, only around
0.5% differs between various individuals and seems to be significant in uniquely identifying a specific
individual. Thus, the way that a human genome is stored, is by identifying these positions (loci) which
form the most common DNA variation and are called SNP. Once a person’s DNA has been sequenced
and analysed, it can be stored and be used for further tests that range from simple paternity and ancestry
tests, to Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analyses (i.e., the study of repetitive DNA patterns associated with
higher mutation rate than other DNA parts) and to Genome Wide Association Studies, the latter being
studies ran among multitudes of different genome sequences, and whose aim is to determine (among
other) which parts of the DNA are responsible for particular diseases.
DNA can be easily seen as a person’s most private and sensitive data, as it does not contain only in-
formation about the particular individual, but also about the individual’s predecessors, relatives and
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descendants. Thus, early on after the breakthrough results in Biology that allowed the digital sequenc-
ing, storing and processing of human DNA, cryptography based solutions were developed that allowed
the enhancement of security and privacy for this highly sensitive set of data. Early works focused on pro-
cessing short DNA fragments and were tailored towards simple queries: for example, [TKC07] showed
how to run queries in the form of finite state machines on DNA sequences, which was subsequently im-
proved in [BA10; Fri09; WR13]. Unfortunately due to their computational complexity, these approaches
are only applicable to small fragments of DNA strings and not to the entire genome. Further, they are
tailored towards very specific queries, which can be represented as finite state machines.
Similarly, works that allow to search for patterns in strings, such as [GHS10; HT10; KM10], can be
applied to the problem domain. Nevertheless, again the solutions are limited to very specific search
queries and incur an overhead that is linear in both the size of the genome and the search pattern. Solutions
tailored to perform specific forensic tests efficiently have been proposed as well [Bru+08; KM10]. Only
a couple of works targeted efficient private queries on fully sequenced genomes: [Bal+11a] focused on
targeted tests for paternity, personalized medicine applications and genetic compatibility; technically,
they employ secure set intersection protocols, which are extremely efficient but only work for simple
queries. Finally, [ARH13] proposed an architecture based on homomorphic encryption which is flexible
with respect to the query, but leaks the type of test performed to the involved parties. Still, they lack
the capacity to learn and answer important ‘fuzzy’ (statistical) questions – namely to act in concert with
biostatistics. Note, that all of these approaches apply to digitally represented and sequenced genomic
data; they can be amended by privacy-preserving genomic sequencing techniques [Che+12].
In [Ayd+13] a solution was proposed, that hides the identities of clients, as well as the nature of the
tests performed when the clients store their SAM. For every query the server has to go through the whole
database, thus the solution suffers from high computational costs. In [Hum+15] de-anonymisation attacks
were examined, that showed that due to phenotypical correlations, user privacy is severely compromised
if no cryptographic techniques are employed in order to order to protect the data.
Baldi et al. [Bal+11b] addressed the problem of privately searching in a whole sequenced human
genome, by means of Private Set Intersection, a primitive which has been further optimized in the past
years [PSZ14; Kis+17]. However, this solution can deal only with a specific type of query in the genome,
and lacks the general applicability that we want to achieve.
Recently, Demmler et al. [Dem+17] proposed an ingenious solution of performing whole genome vari-
ant queries into large databases that store the genomic data of multiple clients in a privacy preserving
way. The core idea of their construction is to ‘secret-share’ databases that store the genomic data of
multiple clients and run the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson [GMW87] for secure multi-party computation.
Although this scheme is very efficient and protects the user identity and the type of the queries performed,
it does not allow any database updates. We argue that this is an important feature of any solution that
promises privacy of genomic databases, since it is known that genome changes throughout the life of a
client, and this will have to be accounted for, for any reasonable studies of biostatistics.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
Once a cryptographic primitive or protocol has been introduced, arguing about their security guarantees
is not a trivial task. Thus, it is not a surprise that it took the research community almost 40 years in order to
make the transition from the ‘cat-and-mouse’ security arguments of the early days of cryptology (where
a primitive was considered secure, as long as none of the known attacks against it was successful) to the
modern age of provable security. Today, security proofs are done by means of mathematical reductions:
Assuming that a specific problem P is hard to solve for any powerful machine while the security of the
cryptographic primitive C under consideration can be easily broken, we construct an efficient algorithm
that turns an instance of C into an instance of P , and hence by efficiently solving C , the algorithm solves
P which in turn yields a contradiction. Yet the original ‘cat-and-mouse’ approach has not been entirely
abandoned, since in many cases the attacks considered are not simply the ones developed in the past years,
but include all the attempts made by mathematicians of all known history to solve particular problems.
One such example is the factoring problem, for which no efficient algorithm is known to exist since
Euclid’s first proof of the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic [Euc56]. Nevertheless, today’s provable
security is the only way we can reasonably argue about a scheme’s security. Most importantly, probably
the best indicator for the success of provable security is the fact that once a scheme is proven secure, the
real world attackers mainly target the error-prone implementations of the scheme (e.g. [Adr+15]) and
almost never the scheme’s mathematical building blocks.
With the above thoughts in mind, in this chapter we will go through the necessary notions that will help
us not only build complex cryptographic protocols, but also show that these protocols are secure against
polynomial time probabilistic adversaries.
3.1. Basic Tools and Cryptographic Primitives
Let N be the set of positive integers. For a finite set X , the notation x $← X indicates that x is selected
uniformly and at random from X . For a probability distribution S, the notation x ← S indicates that x is
sampled according to S. We say that a function f : N→ R is polynomially bounded if and only if there
exists a polynomial p and an n0 ∈ N such that: for every n ≥ n0 it holds that f (n) ≤ p(n), in which
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case we will just write f = polyn. We say that a function ε : N→ R is negligible, if and only if for every
polynomial p, there exists an n0 ∈ N such that ε(n) ≤ 1p(n) for every n ≥ n0; in this case we will just
write ε= negl(n).
In the rest of this work λ ∈ N will denote the security parameter, and ⊥ will be used as a special
symbol denoting an empty bitstring of finite length. PPT stands for ‘probabilistic polynomial time’,
and by ‘algorithm’ we will mean a uniform family of circuits; therefore ‘Probabilistic Polynomial Time
(PPT) algorithm’ will stand for ‘uniform family of poly-sized Boolean circuits with randomness’. Given
a security game, or experiment, the output 1will denote success (winning condition), while 0will denote
failure (loss condition).
Definition 1 (Encryption Scheme).
An encryption scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) that
satisfies the following conditions:
1. On input 1λ, the key generation algorithm KeyGen outputs a pair of bitstrings (e, d).
2. For every pair (e, d) in the range of KeyGen(1λ), and for every m ∈ {0,1}∗, the encryption and
decryption algorithms, Enc and Dec respectively satisfy the following:
Prob[Dec(d,Enc(e,m)) = m] = 1.
Definition 2 (Public-Key and Secret-Key Encryption Schemes).
Let E= (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme as of Definition 1, that on input 1λ outputs a pair
of keys (e, d). We say that E is a private-key encryption scheme, if for every encryption-decryption key
pair (e, d) we have that e = d , and we say that E is a public-key encryption scheme otherwise.
Definition 3 (GameIND-CPAA,Enc (λ)).
Let E= (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, λ a security parameter and A an adversary for the
encryption scheme. The computational indistinguishability of ciphertexts game under adaptive chosen
query attack GameIND-CPAA,Enc (λ) proceeds as follows:
1. (e, d)← KeyGen(λ);
2. First CPA learning phase: for i = 1, . . . ,q1 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a message mi;
b) C encrypts mi using Enc;
c) A receives Enc(mi);
3. Challenge phase: A chooses two messages m0 and m1;
4. C flips a random secret bit b
$← {0,1} and encrypts mb;
5. A receives Enc(mb);
6. Second CPA learning phase: for j = 1, . . . ,q2 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
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a) A chooses a message m j;
b) C encrypts m j using Enc;
c) A receives Enc(m j);
7. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game iff b = b′.
Definition 4 (IND-CPA).
An encryption scheme E= (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) has indistinguishable ciphertexts under chosen plaintext
attack (or, it is IND-CPA-secure) if and only if for any PPT algorithm A with oracle access to Enc there
exists a negligible function negl such that:
ProbhGameIND-CPAA,Enc (n) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(λ).
Intuitively, an encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure if no computationally bounded adversary can reli-
ably distinguish between the encryption of two plaintexts of his choice with probability non-negligibly
better than guessing, even if allowed to adaptively learn polynomially many other encryptions.
In our constructions, we will be considering many clients storing their encrypted data on a remote server.
One of the necessary requirements for user privacy in these settings will be that data encrypted under
different keys should not reveal anything about the keys. This property is captured under the notion of
key indistinguishability, which was introduced by Bellare et al. [Bel+01a] by means of a security game,
where an adversary is given two public keys generated by an encryption scheme’s KeyGen function, and
an encryption of a message under one of those two keys, chosen at random. The encryption scheme is said
to provide key indistinguishability if no adversary can correctly guesses the key under which the message
has been encrypted. In more the detail, the key indistinguishability property is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (IK-CPA).
Let E= (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme. Let b ∈ {0,1} and k ∈ N. Let A be an adversary
that runs in two stages. The IK-CPA-b game for a security parameter λ, Gameik-cpa-b
E,A (λ) is as follows:
1. (pk0,sk0)
R← KeyGen(λ); (pk1,sk1) R← KeyGen(λ);
2. (x , s)← A(find,pk0,pk1)
3. y ← Encpkb(x);
4. d ← A(guess, y, s)
5. Return d
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The advantage of A is defined as
Adv
ik-cpa-b
E,A (λ) = Prob
h
Gameik-cpa-1
E,A (λ) = 1
i
− Prob
h
Gameik-cpa-0
E,A (λ) = 1
i
.
The scheme E is said to be IK-CPA secure if Advik-cpa-b
E,A (λ) is negligible in λ, for any PPT adversary A,
The way a series of numbers can be proven to be pseudorandom is critical in most modern cryptographic
solutions. We thus recall the definition of a pseudorandom number generator in the following.
Definition 6 (PRNG).
Let ` be a polynomial such that `(n) ≥ n+ 1 ∀n ∈ N. A pseudorandom number generator, or PRNG
with expansion factor `(.) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm G = G` such that given as input
a bitstring s of length n, (the seed), outputs a bitstring G(s) of length `(n); and for any PPT algorithm
D:
Prob D(r) = 1− Prob D(G(s)) = 1 ≤ negl(n), where r $← {0,1}`(n), s $← {0,1}n, and the
probabilities are over the choice of r and s, and the randomness of D.
Bloom filters [Blo70]
A Bloom Filter is a randomised data structure storing a set of elements S = (s1, . . . , sn) and which
returns true with probability 1 if an element is a member of S. If however, s /∈ S the Bloom filter
returns false with probability p and true with probability 1− p. A Bloom filter is usually implemented
as an array B of m bits, initialised to the 0-string, together with a total number of ξ hash functions
{h j}ξj=1 : {0,1}∗→ [m], such that for every element s ∈ S it holds that B[h j(s)] = 1 for all j = 1, . . . ,ξ.
Testing if an element s is in the Bloom filter amounts to verifying that B[h j(s)] = 1 for every j = 1 . . . ,ξ.
Although estimating the Bloom filter false positive ratio seems to be a trivial task at first, thorough
analyses in the past years [CRJ10; Bos+08], have shown that this is not the case, and one must be careful
when arguing about the probability of a false positive when employing these data structures.
3.2. Finite Group Based Cryptography
For a natural number p, the set of congruence classes relatively prime to the integers modulus p is
arguably the easiest example of a multiplicative, finite Abelian group, denoted as (Z∗p, ·).
For finite Abelian groups, the decisional Diffie Hellman problem can be reduced to the Discrete Loga-
rithm problem (for a group G = 〈g〉 of order m and an element y ∈ G, find y , given g y ), and is defined
as follows:
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Figure 3.1: Continuous (left) and discrete (right) Elliptic curve, and their respective addition law
(here noted with ‘[+]’)
Definition 7 (Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) Problem).
Let G = 〈g〉 be a group of order m. Given a tuple (ga, g b, g c) for some a $← Zm, b $← Zm, and c $← Zm
or c = ab, decide if c
$← Zm or c = ab.
Another interesting, yet more involved example of finite Abelian groups is that of Elliptic Curves. For a
formal treatment of Elliptic Curves we refer to [Sil16], while here we only restrain ourselves to a high
level and intuitive approach that will help us later describe the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85] on
this algebraic structure.
An elliptic curve over a finite field1 K which is not of characteristic 2 or 3 (i.e., the smallest n such that
n · 1K = 0K) is the set of solutions of the generalised cubic equation Y 2 = X 3 + aX + b, with a, b ∈K
and a point at infinity set to the identity 0E. The group operation for two points of an elliptic curve E, P
andQ is another point Z of the curve, viewed as the point of intersection of the line passing though P and
Q, and the curve. For any points it must hold that P +Q+ Z = 0E, and for the two points P = (xp, yp),
Q = (xq, yq) we can calculate Z = (xz, yz) as xz = µ2 − xq − xp and yz = yp + µ(xz − xp) with the
slope µ between X and Y being (yq − yp)/(xq − xp) if P 6= Q and (3x2p + a)/(2yp) if P = Q. For an
example of a graphical representation of this operation in the continuous and discrete case of an elliptic
curve we refer to Figure 3.1.
3.2.1. Homomorphic Encryption
For two groups (G1,op1) and (G2,op2), a group homomorphism is defined as a function φ : G1→ G2,
such that for all x , y ∈ G1 it holds that φ(op1(x , y)) = op2(φ(x),φ(y)). As we shall see shortly,
there exist various encryption schemes whose encryption function Enc actually are homomorphisms
between the plain- and ciphertext domains, and thus allowmanipulation of the underlying plaintexts while
1 a field is an algebraic structure on a set K, equipped with two operations op1,op2, such that (K,op1) is an Abelian
group with identity 0K and (K \ {0K},op2) is an Abelian group with identity 1K, and the distributive law holds.
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operating on ciphertexts. In fact, we will make heavy use of these encryption schemes and their respective
homomorphic properties throughout this work, since these properties will allow us to perform a variety
of operations on encrypted data, such as re-randomising encrypted data with or without knowledge of the
encryption key, changing the secret key without firstly decrypting the ciphertext (a process called ‘proxy
re-encryption’) or computing on encrypted data.
ElGamal Encryption Scheme [Gam85]
The ElGamal encryption scheme is a public key homomorphic encryption scheme that has revolutionised
modern cryptography. When instantiated with the multiplicative group of integers modulo n, it works
as follows: For a security parameter λ, KeyGen(λ) chooses a safe prime p, finds a generator for Z∗p,
selects a random group element a which will server as the secret key sk, and sets as public parameters
the set (p, g, ga) where g is a group generator and ga is the public key pk. For a message m ∈ Z∗p, the
encryption algorithm Encpk(m) chooses a random element y
$← Z∗p and outputs (A,B) = (g r ,m · ga·r).
The decryption algorithm Decsk(Encpk(m)) outputs the plaintext as m= B · A−a.
When instantiated using Elliptic Curves, the ElGamal encryption schemeworks as follows: For a security
parameter λ, KeyGen(λ) sets an Elliptic Curve E over a field Fq for a prime q, selects a point P of order
N , selects a random element a ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1} which will server as the secret key sk, and sets as
public parameters the set (E, P, xP) where xP is the public key pk. Further a publicly known, one way
and easily invertible function f : m 7→ Pm is used, that maps a random message m to a unique point
of the elliptic curve. For a message Pm, the encryption algorithm Encpk(Pm) chooses a random element
y
$← {1, . . . ,N−1} and outputs (A,B) = (yP, y xP+Pm). The decryption algorithm Decsk(Encpk(Pm))
outputs the plaintext as m= B − aA.
The ElGamal encryption scheme is semantically secure under the DDH assumption and is multiplica-
tively homomorphic, i.e., Decsk(Encpk(m) · Encpk(m′)) = m ·m′.
Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval Encryption [BCP03]
For a security parameter λ, KeyGen(λ) chooses a λ-bit safe-prime modulus N = pq (i.e. p = 2p′ + 1,
q = 2q′+1 for two distinct primes p′,q′) and picks a random element g ∈ Z∗
N2
of order pp′qq′, such that
g p
′q′ mod N2 = 1+ kN , for k ∈ [1,N − 1]. The plaintext space is ZN and the algorithm outputs the
public parameters (N , k, g). The key generation algorithm KeyGen(N , k, g) outputs a random element
a ∈ Z∗
N2
as secret key and the element h = ga mod N2 as public key. The encryption algorithm
Encpk(m) picks a random pad r ∈ ZN2 and outputs the ciphertext
(A,B) = (g r mod N2,hr(1+mN) mod N2).
The decryption algorithm Decsk(A,B) outputs the plaintext as
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m=

B(Aa)−1 − 1 mod N2−1 mod N .
The Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval (BCP) encryption scheme is semantically secure under the DDH as-
sumption and is additively homomorphic, i.e., Decsk(Encpk(m) · Encpk(m′)) = m+m′.
ElGamal Proxy Re-Encryption [BBS98]
Proxy reencryption allows a semi-honest proxy to transform a ciphertext, generated by a party Awith her
public key, into an encryption under the public key of another party B. The proxy can do so by means of
a re-encryption key for B given by A. Ivan and Dodis [ID03] showed that ElGamal-like schemes (such
as the BCP scheme) are in fact proxy re-encryption schemes: Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) denote the
ElGamal encryption scheme and let (c1, c2) be an ElGamal ciphertext with c1 = g r and c2 = mg ra
of a message m under the public key ga for some cyclic group generator g , secret key a, and random
exponent r . Consider a “secret sharing” of the key a = x1 + x2 into two random exponents x1 and x2.
Then, x1 becomes the “re-encryption key” and x2 the new decryption key: Given an encryption (c1, c2)
under the public key ga, (c1, c2 · c−x11 ) yields an encryption under g x2 .
A Homomorphic Hash Function
Once we have established the existence of homomorphic encryption schemes, we ask ourselves, if there
also exist hash functions that have the homomorphic property in the sense that operating on the hash val-
ues of two different messages, translates into operating on the messages themselves. Indeed the Chaum
van Heisjt Pfitzmann hash function (CvHP) hash function [CHP92], is such a homomorphich hash func-
tion and works as follows: Given two primes p and q such that p = 2q+1, two elements α and β , α 6= β
of order q and such that the Discrete Logarithm problem in the group 〈α〉 generated by α is difficult,
the message m ∈ Z∗p is ‘split’ into m1 and m2 (m1,m2 ∈ Z∗q) and the hash function h : Z∗q ×Z∗q 7→ Z∗p
is computed on m as h(m1,m2) = αm1βm2 . For another message m′ ∈ Z∗p, split into m3 and m4
(m3,m4 ∈ Z∗q), the hash function’s homomorphic property allows us to compute the hash of the mes-
sages’ addition by computing h(m1 + m3,m2 + m4) = αm1+m3βm2+m4 . Collision resistance follows
from the Discrete Logarithm problem.
3.3. Basic Cryptographic Protocols
3.3.1. Path-ORAM
As we have seen in Chapter 2, in the past years a multitude of ORAM constructions has been proposed.
Out of the various tree-based ORAMproposed, the Path-ORAM construction of Stefanov et al. [Ste+13a]
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is one that has revolutionised the ORAM research. We will make heavy use of this ORAM construction
in this work, and so we briefly describe it in the following.
Using a semantically secure encryption scheme E, in Path-ORAM a client stores N encrypted datablocks
(referred to as ‘real’ datablocks), each of B bits in a binary tree structure of N leaves (and thus dlog2 Ne
levels). Each node is capable of holding a total of Z datablocks, and typically for an ORAM, so-called
‘fake’ datablocks are stored in each node, in case the node is not filled up with real datablocks. Each
fake datablock is an encryption of padded ‘0’s that have the same length as real datablocks. Since each
tree node can hold up to Z datablocks, for N real datablocks, Z(2N −1)−N fake datablocks are stored
in the structure. Each real datablock is mapped to a leaf of the tree, and this mapping is stored in a
private structure called ‘position map’ on the client side2. Whenever the client wants to read (or write)
one of his datablocks, say blocki , he downloads the whole path (and all the datablocks found along it)
from the root node to the respective leaf. Path-ORAM soundness guarantees that the client will find
the desired datablock in one of the nodes along this path, with high probability. Once the path has
been downloaded, the client chooses randomly a new leaf, re-maps the retrieved datablock to this leaf,
and places the datablock in the node closest to the leaf, which is the common ancestor of the retrieved
datablock’s previous and new mappings, if there is enough space in its buckets. Otherwise the datablock
is moved to higher and higher levels (where the highest level is the one holding the root node), until
a node with enough space is found. It can happen that the only common ancestor of the two leaves is
the root node – in fact, this event occurs with probability 1/2 during every remapping. Thus, the root
may quickly get filled up with datablocks, in which case a small auxiliary storage called a ‘stash’ is
used to store the datablock instead, which is shown to grow only logarithmically (in the amount of the
datablocks stored in the tree). We stress here that the size of the stash affects the soundness and not
the security of Path-ORAM, since overflowed datablocks would have to be discarded, and thus never be
found again. Furthermore, for every real datablock replaced in the path’s node, a fake datablock is put in
its position and all datablocks in every accessed node are re-randomised. The datablocks found stored in
the stash from previous accesses are also examined if they can be evicted from the stash and placed in
the downloaded path. The resulting path is then uploaded to the server while the stash (due to its small
size) is stored directly on the client.
3.3.2. Oblivious Transfer
An oblivious transfer protocol (OT) is a protocol in which a sender transfers one of multiple messages
to a receiver, but it remains oblivious as to which piece has been transferred. At the same time, the
receiver can select the message that he wants to retrieve. Here, we will only use 1-out-of-2 OTs, where
the sender inputs two l-bit strings m0,m1 and the receiver inputs a bit c ∈ {0,1}. At the end of the
protocol, the receiver obliviously receives mc such that neither the sender learns the choice c, nor the
receiver learns anything about the other message m1−c . OT protocols require asymmetric cryptography
2 This requires private storage linear in the amount of datablocks. However, as pointed out in [Shi+11], this structure can
be recursively stored in smaller Path-ORAMs until a small size is attained.
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andwere assumed to be very costly in the past. However, in 2003 Ishai et al. [Ish+03] presented the idea of
OT Extension, which uses a small number of OTs (called the base OTs) in order to obtain a large number
of OTs by use of cheap symmetric cryptographic operations. This way, the computational costs of OTs
for most interesting applications of Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) are significantly reduced.
3.3.3. Secure Two-Party Computation with Yao’s Garbled Circuits
Yao’s garbled circuits protocol, proposed in the 1980s [Yao86], is the most well-known secure two-party
computation protocol, secure in the semi-honest model. The protocol is run between two parties PA, PB
and operates on functionality descriptions in form of Boolean circuits over binary Boolean gates. To
securely evaluate a functionality f (x , y) over their private inputs x and y , both parties agree on a circuit
C f (x , y), which can be seen as the machine code for the protocol.
During protocol execution, one party becomes the circuit generator (the garbling party), the other the
circuit evaluator. The generator initialises the protocol by assigning to each wire wi in the circuit two
random labels w0i and w
1
i of length n (the security parameter), representing the respective Boolean values
0 and 1. For each gate the generator computes a garbled truth table. Each table consists of four encrypted
entries of the output wire labels wγo. These are encrypted according to the gate’s Boolean functionality
g(α,β) using the input wire labels wαl and w
β
r as keys. Thus, an entry in the table is encrypted as
Ewαl (Ewβr
(wg(α,β)o )).
After their creation, the garbled tables are randomly permuted and sent to the evaluator, who, so far,
is unable to decrypt a single row of any garbled table due to the random choice of the wire labels. To
initiate the circuit evaluation, the generator sends its input bits x in form of his input wire labels to the
evaluator. Moreover, the wire labels corresponding to the evaluator’s input y are transferred via an OT
protocol, with the generator being the OT sender, who inputs the two wire labels, and evaluator being the
OT receiver, who inputs its input bits of the computation. After the OT step, the evaluator is in possession
of the garbled circuit and one input label per input wire. With this information the evaluator is able to
iteratively decrypt the circuit from input wires to output wires. Once all gates are evaluated, all output
wire labels are known to the evaluator. In the last step of the protocol, the generator sends an output
description table to the evaluator, containing a mapping between output label and actual bit value. The
decrypted output is then shared with the generator.
We refer to [LP09] for a detailed description as well as a rigorous security proof assuming passive ad-
versaries. To automatically turn an arbitrary function into an STC protocol, one can use the compiler
of [Hol+12], which takes the description of a function in ANSI C and produces a Boolean circuit, that
can be passed to an STC framework such as [Hua+11] to obliviously compute the desired function.
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Chapter 4
A New ORAM Framework
Lax security proofs for ORAMs have been the norm in the past years, although the security model intro-
duced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky constitutes one of the most rigorous and mature security definitions
in the field of cryptography. In this chapter, we close the gap between the strict definition of Goldreich
and Ostrovsky and the high-level security proofs that have appeared in the literature in the past years, and
establish the necessary theoretical background that will allow us to study and argue about the security
and privacy guarantees of the constructions that we will develop. We do this by addressing the following
question.
Can we bridge the gap between Goldreich and Ostrovsky’s formal ORAM definition, and the rather
informal approach of ORAM definitions used in the literature, in a way that still maintains a certain
degree of mathematical rigour while at the same time being simple and flexible to use?
We answer the above question in a positive way, by providing a framework which is very flexible in de-
scribing ORAM constructions, and yet allows us to rigorously define ORAM security and argue about it
using game-based techniques. In fact, we will make heavy use of this framework in the following chap-
ters, where we will introduce complex ORAM architectures. Through our new framework we will be
able to argue about the security and privacy guarantees in a formal, yet very intuitive way.
Published Content
The results from this chapter first appeared in [GKK17], which is a joint work with Tommaso
Gagliardoni and Stefan Katzenbeisser. The development of the framework was done by myself and
Tommaso Gagliardoni, and the ORAM security definition has thus also appeared in [Gag17].
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4.1. ORAM Definition
On a high level, an Oblivious RandomAccess Machine (ORAM) is a machine for which the sequences of
accessing its memory locations are indistinguishable for any two inputs of equal length and equal running
time. The existence of such machines was first examined by Goldreich in his seminal work [Gol87], and
the model of computation was later formally defined by Goldreich and Ostrovsky in [GO96], while the
first constructions of such architectures were proposed.
Formally defining an ORAM is a demanding task. In fact, Goldreich and Ostrovsky’s work, although it
provided a rigorous and necessary background for any ORAM architecture, has rarely been used by the
community as ameans of proving the security of ORAMconstructions. Due to the heavily involved nature
of Goldreich andOstrovsky’s model, the community (in most of the cases we are aware of) resorted to less
complex and more ‘intuitive’ models which however have not always been mathematically sound. This
has led to cases where whole families of ORAM constructions have been shown insecure, as [KLO12].
Unfortunately, the situation did not improve significantly after these revelations, and even recently, Nayak
et al. [Nay+16] proved that ORAMs previously though to be secure, like C-ORAM [MMB15] and Chf-
ORAM [MBM15], have serious security flaws.
To resolve this situation, we believe that a more versatile ORAMmodel has to be introduced. Our aim is to
find a balance between the heavy formalism of Goldreich and Ostrovsky’s model, and the oversimplified
models which have been gradually established in the ORAM community. We do this in this chapter,
where we present an ORAM model that can describe every ORAM architecture that we are aware of.
We consider two PPT Turing machines that share a common communication tape Ξ: a client C and a
server S. The client is in possession of private data, split in a fixed number of datablocks. Each such
datablock is an area of the client’s memory and is associated with a unique identifier id which can be
efficiently computed by the client using constant amount of space. This can be done in a variety of ways.
However, for ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we will assume in the following that for a
set of N datablocks, each datablock’s identifier is a number between 1 and N . This way, we will consider
that each client’s datablock consists of the actual data (which is of size B bits), and the identifier of size
logN bits1. Thus, we will consider each client’s datablock being of a total size of D = B + logN bits.
By blocki we will denote the datablock consisting of B bits of data, and logN bits for the identifier i.
The client stores each datablock blocku (usually encrypted under a semantically secure encryption
scheme) in a data structure that we will call the server’s database DB. Note here, that by ‘database’, we do
not impose any structure or any operations on the server’s memory, and thus this ‘database’ should not
be confused with other organized storage structures such as relational databases. Our only requirement
is that the server stores the datablocks using a logical schema which is imposed by the client. The client
1 One might wonder, why the bits needed for the identifier should be dependent on the number of datablocks stored.
In reality this is not the case, since one could simply ask for a constant number of b bits (e.g., the output of a hash
function) for the identifier and avoid this dependency. However, we believe that making this confinement helps intuitively
understanding themodel, although this trade-off does not signigicantly reduce themathematical rigour of our description.
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stores his datablocks on the server’s database, and accesses them for reading or writing by means of data
requests, which we define in the following.
Definition 8 (Data Request).
A data request to a database S.DB of size N is a tuple dr= (op, i,data), where op ∈ {Read,Write}, i ∈
{1, . . . ,N}, and data ∈ {0,1}B is a datablock (data can also be ⊥ if op= Read).
ORAM is an interactive protocol between the two machines, and thus each data request results in infor-
mation being written on the client’s and the server’s shared communication tape. Since an ORAM is
a multi-round interactive protocol, we will consider com as a discrete function of the protocol’s round
1,2, . . ., and can thus define the communication transcript at a specific round of the protocol which we
will further use to define the server’s view.
Definition 9 (Communication Transcript).
A communication transcript comt at round t of the protocol is the content of the communication channel
Ξ at round t of the protocol’s execution.
Definition 10 (View of the Server).
Let ≤ denote a partial order over the set of communication transcripts A = {com1,com2, . . . ,comT}
for an ORAM protocol of T rounds, i.e., for any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, comz ∈ A the following holds:
1. For any comi ∈ A, comi ≤ comi .
2. For any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, if comi ≤ com j and com j ≤ comi , then comi = com j .
3. For any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, comz ∈ A, it holds that if comi ≤ com j and com j ≤ comz , then
comi ≤ comz .
The server’s view is the union of all communication transcripts from round 1, to T : View= ∪Tt=1comt .
Depending on the ORAM construction, various cryptographic primitives might be needed to fully de-
scribe each architecture (for example the hierarchical ORAM of [GO96] utilises a symmetric encryption
scheme and hash functions, while the tree ORAM of [Ste+13a] utilises a symmetric encryption scheme
and a pseudorandom number generator). However, every ORAM construction that we are aware of, uses
a secret- or public-key encryption scheme under which every datablock of the client is encrypted. We
will thus assume this encryption scheme as the minimal requirement in our ORAM definition. We as-
sume that the server’s database originally contains only ‘0’, and for N client’s datablocks, the server’s
database is capable of holding N c encrypted client datablocks, for some constant c > 1. During an ini-
tialization phase, the client uploads his datablocks to S; how this initial upload is done does not need to
be defined here, since there are many ways of how this can be accomplished. The most intuitive way of
performing this, is having the client making a series of ‘Write’ operations. Once S.DB is initialized, the
client accesses his datablocks by performing data requests. After each such data request, the client’s and
the server’s states as well as the communication transcript are updated. Having these in mind, we can
now define ORAM by means of the following definition.
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Definition 11 (ORAM).
Let N˜ ∈ N,M ≥ D and E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a secret-key encryption scheme2 mapping M -
bit plaintexts to B-bit ciphertexts. An ORAM ORAME with parameters (D, N˜ ,E) is a pair of two-party
interactive randomised algorithms, (ORAM.Init,ORAM.Access), such that:
• ORAM.Init(λ,N)→ (C,S) in the following way:
1. λ is the security parameter, N < N˜ ;
2. k← KeyGen(1λ) is generated by C;
3. S includes a database S.DB= (block1, . . . ,blockN˜ );
• ORAM.Access(C,S,dr)→ (C′,S′,com) in the following way:
1. C issues a data request dr;
2. C and S communicate through Ξ and produce the communication’s transcript com;
3. After execution of dr, the internal state of C is changed to C′, and the internal state of S is
changed to S′.
Until now we have abstractly defined ORAM as a protocol ran between the two machines, C and S, and
have not mentioned anything regarding an ORAM’s security and soundness. We will define ORAM
security in Section 4.2. Regarding the ORAM soundness we will avoid delving into great depths in
order to define it, as we focus more on the security aspects of ORAM. We attempt however a high-level
overview of ORAM soundness. Practically the main invariant for an ORAM architecture in order to be
sound (or complete), is that the client can always find the datablock he is looking for. Again we stress
that different ORAM constructions might have additional requirements or restrictions depending on the
scenario and usage – for example in the case of Path-ORAM, the client’s stash should never overflow,
however the main invariant remains the same in all constructions.
In any ORAM construction, after every access, the client changes the server’s database internal state, in
a way that the server cannot extract any information about the state itself. This is usually done by some
encrypted information which is available only to the client. Thus, a minimal soundness condition is that
particular information is ‘accessible’ by the client. Since we want to include in this ‘accessibility’ any
way that a particular piece of information is made available to the client, we will say that an element x
is accessible by a machine M (e.g., the client) if M can simulate the constant oracle Ox(.) 7→ x . With
these in mind, we define the minimal ORAM soundness conditions as follows.
Definition 12 (Minimal ORAM Soundness Conditions).
An ORAM construction ORAME has minimal soundness if the following hold:
1. for any (λ,N), if (C,S)← ORAM.Init(λ,N), then the secret key k from Def. 11 must be accessible
by C;
2 For ease of exposition, we analyse here only the case of ORAM equipped with a secret-key encryption schemes. However,
the same ideas can be applied in defining an ORAM using public-key encryption scheme.
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2. for any dr= (op, i,data), if (C′,S′,com)← ORAM.Access(C,S,dr), then:
a) if the secret key k is accessible by C, then k is also accessible by C’;
b) if op= read and S.DB(i) = block, then block.Data must be accessible by C’;
c) if op= write and S′.DB(i) = block, then block.Data= data.
Note that in the above definition we do not state anything regarding the accessibility of the server to
the key k or to any other information. After all, a soundness definition takes into account only honest
behaving parties, and in such case, since the server is there only to access logical addresses of his memory
as indicated by the client, the soundness is maintained. What happens if the server starts to deviate from
the protocol, is a property examined by the security of the protocol, and which we will investigate in the
next section.
4.2. ORAM Security
Historically seen, ORAM architectures are usually complex and as such it is intuitive to first define their
security against the more relaxed semi-honest adversaries [Gol04]. In this threat model, the adversary A
is a PPT machine that has complete control over the communication channel and over the inputs of the
protocol that is under attack. However, A does not alter the contents of the communication channel, since
this would jeopardise the protocol’s soundness. In the case of ORAMs, A tries to deduce information
about the client’s accesses, by monitoring the protocol’s transcript and by possibly making accesses
himself. Thus, without loss of generality one can assume that in a single client setting, the adversary is
the server. The information that can be leaked to the adversary might, for example, include how often the
client accesses a specific datablock, if particular datablocks are more important than others (because they
have been accessed more often), or even a deduction of a behavioural pattern, e.g., after a certain number
of accesses to specific datablocks, the client logs out of the system. We can thus define the adversary that
we will take into account in the rest of this work, as follows.
Definition 13 (ORAM Adversary).
An ORAM adversary A is a PPT algorithm which has complete control of S, as long as the ORAM’s
soundness is preserved.
In order to abstractly describe what such ORAM adversaries can do, the notion of access patterns was
introduced. On a high level, an access pattern consists practically of all the changes on the server’s
database, and all the information exchanged between the client and the server during the course of each
protocol’s round (in the literature sometimes also referred to as adversarial views) after a client’s call to
ORAM.Access. We now define the notion of access pattern more formally.
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Definition 14 (Access Pattern).
Given an ORAM client C, a server S, and a data request dr, the access pattern ap(dr) is the tuple 
S.DB,com,S′.DB

, where (C′,S′,com)← ORAM.Access(C,S,dr).
An ORAM is considered secure if during the client’s accesses no information about the client’s inputs
is leaked to the server. One way of arguing about the inexistence of such leakage is by showing that
the access patterns induced by the same number of data requests are computationally indistinguishable
for anyone but the client. This formulation reminds of the definition of semantic security for encryption
schemes [Gol04] and as such, we will consider here an adaptive game-based indistinguishability notion
played between the adversary and the client. The adversary sends two data requests to the client; the
client chooses one of them and executes it. The adversary (having complete control of the network, as
well as the server’s database) sees the induced access pattern and tries to find out which of the two data
requests was executed, and wins if he found the correct one. This is formally described by the following
indistinguishability game.
Definition 15 (GameAP-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ)).
Let ORAM = (ORAM.Init,ORAM.Access) be an ORAM construction, λ a security parameter and A an
ORAM adverary. The computational indistinguishability of access patterns game under adaptive chosen
query attack GameAP-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) proceeds as follows:
1. A chooses N ≤ N˜ ;
2. (C,S)← ORAM.Init(λ,N);
3. First CQA learning phase: for i = 1, . . . ,q1 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request dri;
b) C executes ORAM.Access on dri;
c) A receives ap(dri);
4. Challenge phase: A chooses two data requests dr0 and dr1;
5. C flips a random secret bit b
$← {0,1} and executes ORAM.Access on drb;
6. A receives ap(drb);
7. Second CQA learning phase: for j = 1, . . . ,q2 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request dr j;
b) C executes ORAM.Access on dr j;
c) A receives ap(dr j);
8. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game iff b = b′.
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Definition 16 (Access Pattern Indistinguishability Under Adaptive Chosen Query Attack).
An ORAM construction ORAM has computationally indistinguishable access patterns under adaptive cho-
sen query attack (or, it is AP-IND-CQA-secure) if and only if for any ORAM adversary A:
ProbhGameAP-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(λ).
4.2.1. Equivalence to the Simulation Model and Advantages
Traditionally in the ORAM literature, security has been considered in terms of indistinguishability of
access patterns but in a non-adaptive fashion. That is, the adversary chooses two different data requests
tuples of the same length, and has to distinguish between the access patterns produced by the client exe-
cuting one of the two, chosen at random. Our model has the advantage that it also considers adversaries
who play this game changing adaptively their sequences of data requests.
In a concurrent and independent work Garg et al. [GMP16], introduced another, simulation-based se-
curity definition. Their definition states that for any ORAM adversary, it must be computationally hard
to distinguish between the access pattern distributions produced by a real client and by a simulator pro-
ducing bogus transcripts, even if the adversary is allowed to choose adaptively the data requests to be
executed by the real client. Although this definition provides strong security guarantees, still it is not
simple enough in order to be used in complex ORAM constructions like the ones we will introduce in
the following. Yet, we show that our novel definition is equivalent to the simulation-based notion given
in [GMP16], according to which no computationally bounded adversary can distinguish between the
interaction with a real client and the interaction with a simulator that produces bogus transcripts. Our
security notion AP-IND-CQA is therefore at least as strong as all other security notions for ORAM in-
troduced to date, but it has the advantage of being game-based (and hence easier to deal with in security
reductions).
Definition 17 (Access Pattern Simulability Under Adaptive Chosen Query Attack).
An ORAM construction ORAM has simulable access patterns under adaptive chosen query attack (or,
it is AP-SIM-CQA-secure) iff for any classical ORAM adversary A the following two distributions are
computationally indistinguishable:
1. ap(dr← A);
2. ap(dr
$← { ‘read’,‘write’ } × {1, . . . ,N } × {0,1}D).
Proposition 1.
An ORAM construction ORAM is AP-SIM-CQA secure iff it is AP-IND-CQA secure.
The idea of the proof is to go through a hybrid argument in the same way that shows IND-CPA security
for encryption schemes to be equivalent to Real-or-Random security (see for example [Bel+97]).
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Proof. The proof closely follows the reduction for equivalent notions of IND-CPA security found
in [Bel+97]. As a first step, we rephrase Definition 17 in terms of a security game – the two result-
ing definitions of AP-SIM-CQA security are obviously equivalent.
Definition 18 (GameAP-SIM-CQAA,ORAM (n)).
Let ORAM = (ORAM.Init,ORAM.Access) be an ORAM construction, n a security parameter and A an
ORAM adverary. The computational simulability of access patterns game under adaptive chosen query
attack GameAP-SIM-CQAA,ORAM (n) proceeds as follows:
1. A chooses N ≤ N˜ ;
2. (C, §)← ORAM.Init(n,N);
3. C flips a secret random bit b
$← {0,1};
4. A repeats (adaptively) the following, for i = 1, . . . ,q:
a) A chooses a data request dri;
b) if b = 0, then C sets dr := dri;
c) else if b = 1, then C sets dr
$← { ‘read’,‘write’ } × {1, . . . ,N } × {0,1}D;
d) C executes ORAM.Access on dr;
e) A receives ap(dri);
Finally, A outputs a bit b′, and wins the game iff b = b′.
Definition 19 ((Game-Based) Access Pattern Simulability Under Adaptive Chosen Query Attack).
An ORAM construction ORAM has simulable access patterns under adaptive chosen query attack (or, it is
AP-SIM-CQA-secure) iff for any classical ORAM adversary A:
ProbhGameAP-SIM-CQAA,ORAM (n) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(n).
Then, we prove Proposition 1 by double implication.
Lemma 4.2.1.1 (AP-SIM-CQA =⇒ AP-IND-CQA).
Proof of Lemma 4.2.1.1. Let AIND be an ORAM adversary such that
Prob
h
GameAP-IND-CQA
AIND,ORAM
(n) = 1
i
=
1
2
+ ν(n),
for a non-negligible function ν. We will use AIND in a black-box way to construct another ORAM
adversary ASIM, able to break the AP-SIM-CQA security of ORAM, against the assumption.
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At the beginning, ASIM runs AIND, which starts GameAP-IND-CQA
AIND,ORAM
by choosing n and N . At the same
time, ASIM starts GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
with the same parameters.
During the first IND learning phase, whenever AIND performs a CQA query dri , ASIM responds to
such a query by forwarding it to its SIM (Real-or-Random) challenger, and then forwarding toAIND the
related access pattern. When AIND performs its challenge query of the form (dr0,dr1), ASIM flips a
random bit b∗ $← {0,1}, forwards apb∗ to the SIM challenger, and then forwards to AIND the related
access pattern. Then, during the second IND learning phase, ASIM behaves like in the first challenge
phase, by forwarding the queries to its SIM challenger and returning the access patterns toAIND. Finally,
when AIND outputs a bit b′, if b′ = b∗ then ASIM outputs 0, otherwise ASIM outputs a random bit.
The reduction works for the following reason: let us assume that b = 0, i.e., the SIM challenger was a
honest ORAM client C. Then, during the whole reduction, ASIM successfully simulated a real client for
AIND, in an AP-IND-CQA game where the secret bit was b∗. By assumption, AIND guesses correctly
such bit with probability at least 12 + ν(n). In that case, also A
SIM wins, so:
Prob

GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
(n) = 1
b = 0≥ 12 + ν. (4.1)
On the other hand, if b = 1 (i.e., the SIM challenger was simulating fake access patterns) we cannot say
anything on AIND’s success probability, because for the whole time it has played in a malformed game.
But we can say that, even ifAIND fails, ASIM still succeeds with probability ≥ 12 − " for a negligible ":
Prob

GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
(n) = 1
b = 1≥ 12 − ". (4.2)
Thus, combining 4.1 and 4.2, the reduction’s overall success probability is:
Prob

GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
(n) = 1

≥ 1
2
+
ν
2
− ",
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.2.1.2 (AP-IND-CQA =⇒ AP-SIM-CQA).
Proof of Lemma 4.2.1.2. Let ASIM be an ORAM adversary such that
Prob

GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
(n) = 1

≥ 1
2
+ ν(n),
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for a non-negligible function ν. We will use ASIM in a black-box way to construct another ORAM
adversary AIND, able to break the AP-IND-CQA security of ORAM, against the assumption. The proof
uses a hybrid argument on the number q of queries performed by ASIM during GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
.
More in detail: AIND runsASIM, which starts GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
by choosing n and N . At the same time,
AIND starts GameAP-IND-CQA
AIND,ORAM
with the same parameters, and also chooses an index j
$← {1, . . . ,q } uni-
formly at random. WheneverASIM performs a query with a data request dri ,AIND does the following:
• For the first j−1 queries,AIND executes dri using his own oracle in the first CQA learning phase,
and responds with ap(dri).
• At the j-th query, AIND does the following:
– samples at random dr∗ $← { ‘read’,‘write’ } × {1, . . . ,N } × {0,1}D;
– sets dr0 := dr j and dr1 := dr∗.
– performs his AP-IND-CQA challenge query (dr0,dr1), and responds toASIM with ap(drb).
• Starting from the ( j+1)-th query,AIND ignoresASIM’s data requests, and always responds with
access patterns produced by freshly generated random data requests using his own oracle in the
second CQA learning phase.
Finally, when ASIM outputs a bit b′, if b′ = 0 then AIND outputs 0, otherwise AIND outputs a random
bit. We show that:
Prob
h
GameAP-IND-CQA
AIND,ORAM
(n) = 1
i
≥ 1
2
+
ν
2q
.
The hybrid argument goes as follows. For i = 0, . . . ,q consider a sequence of intermediate hybrid games
GameHYB-i
ASIM,ORAM, where Game
HYB-i
ASIM,ORAM is defined as the usual Game
AP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
by executing through the
SIM (Real-or-Random) oracle only the first i data requests output by ASIM, and executing random data
requests afterwards. Notice that:
• GameHYB-q
ASIM,ORAM
coincides with GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
, and
• GameHYB-0
ASIM,ORAM coincides with Game
AP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM
in the case that b = 1.
Moreover, the following hold:
• the output b′ ofASIM in the above reduction coincides with the output ofASIM inGameHYB-(i+1)
ASIM,ORAM
if b = 0, while
• the output b′ ofASIM in the above reduction coincides with the output ofASIM inGameHYB-i
ASIM,ORAM
if b = 1.
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At this point, as j was chosen uniformly at random in {1, . . . ,q }, we can write the advantage of AIND
in GameAP-IND-CQA
AIND,ORAM
(n) by use of the triangular inequality as follows:
Prob

AIND outputs 1
b = 1− ProbAIND outputs 1b = 0=
1
q
q−1∑
i=0

Prob
h
ASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-i
ASIM,ORAM
i
− Prob
h
ASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-(i+1)
ASIM,ORAM
i
=
1
q

Prob
h
ASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-0
ASIM,ORAM
i
− Prob

ASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-q
ASIM,ORAM

=
1
q

Prob
h
ASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-0
ASIM,ORAM
b = 1i− ProbASIM outputs 1 in GameHYB-q
ASIM,ORAM

≥
1
2q

advantage of ASIM in GameAP-SIM-CQA
ASIM,ORAM

=
ν
2q
which concludes the proof.
The combination of Lemma 4.2.1.1 and Lemma 4.2.1.2 concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
4.3. Application to Path-ORAM
An important building block for one of our constructions is Path-ORAM [Ste+13a] by Stefanov’s et al.
In [Ste+13b] a detailed proof of Path-ORAM’s soundness is given. However, a full formal proof of Path-
ORAM’s security is not provided, and is rather presented on a relatively high and informal level. Using
our new formalism, we have been able to provide Path-ORAM’s first formal security proof. Here, we
describe on a high level how Path-ORAMworks, and refer to [Ste+13a] for more implementation details.
We then describe Path-ORAM using our new formalism, and give an overview of its full security proof,
while for details of the latter we refer to [Gag17]
Using our new formalism, we give here a full description of PathORAM (which from now on we denote
as Path-ORAM). We set λ to be the security parameter, used by the encryption scheme E, and N the
maximum number of ‘real’ datablocks that C wants to store. As we have seen already, in Path-ORAM, S
stores a total of N˜ datablocks, which are linear in N and thus N ≤ N˜ . Observe here, that unlike N˜ , N
can be dictated by the adversary in the security game. With Z , we will denote the maximum number of
datablocks that can be stored in every tree node. This parameter is architecture dependent and guarantees
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the protocol’s soundness: the smaller Z is, the higher the probability that C will have to use his stash. As
it has been (also experimentally) shown in [Ste+13a], setting Z = 5 is usually sufficient for the stash to
remain small. However, we treat here Path-ORAM abstractly, and thus we do not need to fix Z , since any
nonzero value should work in theory. By T we denote the minimum number of bits that are needed to
index all the ‘real’ N datablocks. Observe at this point that without loss of generality, we can assume
that indexing all N˜ datablocks stored on S is not needed, as every ‘fake’ datablock can be indexed by a
fixed bitstring (like for example 0k). D is the bitlength of the datablocks data used in the Path-ORAM
implementation, and it is thus architecture-dependant. M is the total bitlength of a datablock (i.e., the
data plus the index) and is thus also architecture-dependant. The encryption scheme E must be able to
work with M -bit plaintexts. B is the size of a ciphertext produced by the encryption scheme E, and hence
the total size of an encrypted datablock. Thus, the size of S’s tree storage memory is at most BN˜ bits.
Algorithm 1: Path-ORAM.Init(λ,N)
1 C generates a secret key k← KeyGen(1λ);
2 set T = dlog2Ne; (notice T ≤ K);
3 C initialises a lookup table (the position map) of the form
 
(1, r1), . . . , (N , rN )

, where ri are
T -bit values generated by truncating the first T bits of G’s output;
4 The server’s database DB is stored in a binary tree of height T , with leaves Leaf0, . . . ,Leaf2T−1,
such that:
• each node of the tree stores up to Z datablocks;
• every datablock of every node is initialized to Enck(0K‖0D).
Definition 20 (Path-ORAM).
For fixed parameters D, N˜ ∈ N, let K = dlog2N˜e, Z ∈ N, M = D + K , B ≥ M . Let G be a PRNG as
from Definition 6 outputting K-bit values, and E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a SKE with M -bit plaintexts
and B-bit ciphertexts. We define an ORAM construction called Path-ORAM= Path-ORAME,G as a set of
two interactive protocols Path-ORAM.Init(λ,N), and Path-ORAM.Access(op, i,data) as described in
Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively, between two PPT machines C and S.
Using our new security framework, we are able to prove the security of Path-ORAM. For a detailed proof
we refer to [Gag17].
Proposition 2.
Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA SKE according to Definition 4, and let G be a PRNG as
from Definition 6. Then, Path-ORAM instantiated using E and G is an AP-IND-CPA secure ORAM.
Proof. (sketch) By assuming the existence of a PPT adversary A that wins the IND-CQA game of Def-
inition 15 with non-negligible advantage, a PPT algorithm D is constructed that breaks the encryption
scheme’s semantic security. For the full details of the proof we refer to [Gag17], while here we simply
give an overview of how D works. In our reduction, D simulates a Path-ORAM client C who plays against
A who in turn simulates the semi-honest Path-ORAM server. Crucial in our reduction is the fact that D
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Algorithm 2: Path-ORAM.Access(op, i,data)
1 C reads from his position map ri and sends it to S;
2 S sends to C the path DPath from the root of the tree to Leaf ri ;
3 remap (i, ri) to (i, r ′i ) in the position map of C, where r ′i is a fresh pseudorandom T -bit value
(generated by truncating the first K − T bits of G’s output), obtaining C′;
4 for every datablock block in DPath, C′ do /* using k, C′ decrypts the datablock
obtain j ∈ {0,1}K, and the data data j ∈ {0,1}D; */
5 Deck(block)→ ( j‖data j) ∈ {0,1}M ;
6 if j == i then
7 if op== ‘read’ then
8 C′ reads data j;
9 end
10 else if op== ‘write’ then
11 C′ sets data j = data;
/* block is updated, so that Data(block) = data */
12 end
13 end
14 bswap = 0;
15 C′ re-encrypts block // re-randomisation;
16 Node = FindCommonAncestor (DPath, Leaf ri , Leaf r j );
/* find in DPath the common parent node Node between Leaf ri and Leaf r j,
closer to the leaf level */
17 for every datablock block′ in Node do
18 Deck(block
′)→ ( j′‖data′);
19 if j′ == ‘FAKE’ then
20 COPY(block, temp_block);
21 MOVE(block′, block);
22 MOVE(temp_block, block);
23 bswap = 1;
24 end
25 Re-encrypt datablock;
26 end
27 if bswap = 0 then
28 if Node 6= ROOT then
29 Set Node in one level higher (i.e., the Node’s parent);
30 GoTo Step 17;
31 end
32 else
33 Store block in the Stash;
34 end
35 end
36 end
37 C′ sends UPath to S;
38 S updates S.DB with UPath;
39 S′← S;
40 return com = (ri,DPath,UPath) ;
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keeps a plaintext version of the server’s database S.DB throughout the game, something that is allowed, as
D is a simulator of C and thus does not need to adhere to the same restrictions (e.g., regarding his private
storage) as the typical ORAM client C.
The simulation starts by A choosing the number of real datablocks N , the size of the node, Z and the secu-
rity parameter λ. D executes ORAM.Init, without creating the encryption scheme’s secret key, initialises
his position map, and uses this position map in order to populate the respective Path-ORAM binary tree
with N leafs. This tree however is kept locally in plain, ‘mirroring’ the server’s database. D starts playing
the IND-CPA game against the encryption scheme for the same security parameter λ chosen by A. For
this, D obtains oracle access to Ek, for the unknown secret key k. D now using his encryption oracle,
encrypts all the datablocks of his plaintext tree without changing their position within the tree, thus ob-
taining the encrypted version of the Path-ORAM tree. At this point, D can fully simulate the Path-ORAM
client: Every time D receives a data request from A, D first adds the respective leaf of path, as well all the
encrypted datablocks found in this path from his encrypted tree to com. D then updates his position map
and moves all the datablocks in the path of the plaintext tree accordingly. Using the encryption oracle, D
encrypts every datablock of the updated plaintext path, and adds the newly encrypted path to com, which
he sends to A.
In the challenge phase, A sends the tuple (dr0,dr1) to D. A sets ma = (ia|data) for a ∈ {0,1}, with
data being retrieved by looking for the identifier ida in the plaintext tree. This way, A executes the IND
challenge using (m0,m1), and receiving back c = Ek(mb) for the secret bit b. D now chooses a random
bit b∗, and executes drb∗ , however implanting c as an updated datablock during the execution of drb∗ .
After this, D continues simulating C in the second CQA phase as before, waiting for A to output his bit b˜.
If b˜ = b∗, then D outputs b∗, otherwise he outputs a random bit.
Calculating the total probability that D wins in the IND-CPA game, using A by means of the above dis-
cussion, we get that D’s advantage is non-negligible in λ which is a contradiction, thus concluding the
proof.
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Chapter 5
Proxy-ORAM
Laying the theoretical foundation of an ORAM framework in the previous Chapter, allows us now to
construct an ORAM that is crafted in a way that a client can securely store his encrypted data on a
remote server, and allow third parties to privately access (i.e., as far as the server is concerned) parts of
the data. Further, parties retrieving the data should see in all the steps of the protocol only encrypted
data. Thus, in this chapter we will deal with the following question.
Can we build an ORAM that allows a third party to partially access a client’s outsourced data?
We give a positive answer to the above question, by presenting the first ORAM construction, that under
the assumption that all involved parties are semi-honest and non colluding, achieves at the same time
several goals. First and foremost, the client who has outsourced his private data, gives only temporary
and partial access to his data to a third party. By ‘temporary’ we mean that the data is accessible by the
third party only for one round of the protocol. At the same time, the client does not need to be constantly
online in order to perform any computation or communication intensive operation (such as a reshuﬄe).
In fact, the only time the client needs to be online, is in order to give a temporary access token to the
third party. The third party sees only the requested data and only in encrypted form. Finally, during the
accesses, none of the involved parties learns anything more than the number of accesses performed.
Published Content
The results from this chapter first appeared in [Kar+14], which is a joint work with Andreas Peter,
Stefan Katzenbeisser, Erik Tews and KayHamacher. The development of the architecture was jointly
done between myself, Andreas Peter and Stefan Katzenbeisser, and the security proofs were done
by myself.
Our ORAM architecture is based on the hierarchical ORAM solution (cf. Chapter 2.1.1) and consists of
three major entities: the client, the aforementioned third party – to which we will from now on refer as
the investigator, and the storage service. The storage service is considered as a specialised service which
consists of the actual data store, called the cloud, and a separate non-colluding entity, in the following
referred to as the proxy, that assists in computational tasks throughout the ORAM’s initialisation and
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the Proxy-ORAM architecture: The client issues a re-encryption key to
the proxy, and a secret key as the access token to the investigator (steps 1 and 2).
The investigator issues an ORAM request to the cloud, and the ORAM operations
are performed between the cloud and the proxy (step 3). The cloud sends proxy
re-encrypted datablocks to the investigator (step 4).
access. Because of this heavy usage of the proxy server, we named our architecture Proxy-ORAM (for
a graphical overview of the architecture, cf. to Figure 5.1). Splitting databases into two non-colluding
servers is a wide-spread approach in current research, proved to be very promising as for instance shown
by Boneh et al. [Bon+13] and Applebaum et al. [App+10].
We achieve giving temporary and partial access to the client’s data by using proxy re-encryption as
an access control mechanism: The client issues and sends to the investigator a secret key as an access
token. The re-encryption key for the investigator’s token is sent to the proxy by the client. This way,
the encryption of the stored datablocks can be transformed to an encryption that is accessible by the
investigator. By temporary access, we mean here that the investigator can only access a datablock once
from the server. This way (and as long as all parties are semi-honest and non colluding) nothing can be
done without the client’s former approval.
By employing the two (non-colluding) servers, and using homomorphic encryption, we achieve complete
outsourcing of all computation and communication intensive steps (such as the ‘reshuffing’) that are
present in most ORAM constructions. This way, our architecture allows delegation of access rights,
being a completely autonomous storage. In contrast to [Fra+12], it does not require the client to be
constantly online.
5.1. Building Blocks
Complying with our ORAM framework description from Chapter 4.1, we assume that the client’s data
is stored encrypted in small datablocks of fixed size, B bits. Typically for an ORAM construction, fake
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datablocks must also reside in the ORAM. Assuming that the client stores N real datablocks, in this
construction we add another N fake datablocks. To each fake datablock i we assign a unique, random
identifier idifake, making sure that there are no collisions between the fake and real identifiers, and assume
further that each identifier has size b bits. Each fake datablock contains random data; when encrypted it
must be indistinguishable from an encrypted real datablock. Fake and real datablocks are stored encrypted
on the cloud in an dlog2 Ne level pyramid-like structure. In our architecture, the encrypted datablocks
are initially uploaded to the last pyramidal level (i.e., a level that can hold all initially uploaded data).
After a datablock has been accessed, it is always placed on the first pyramid level. If the first level does
not have enough space, then the level is recursively emptied to lower ones, until enough space has been
created on the first level – a process that is traditionally called a ‘reshuﬄe’.
In order for the client to find the datablock he wants, he must first find the level on which the datablock
currently resides and then the datablock’s exact position within that level. Finding the right level is done
by utilising Bloom filters: Each pyramidal level is associated to a Bloom filter, whose contents (i.e., the
individual filter bits) are kept encrypted on the proxy and which is built interactively between the cloud
and the proxy, whenever a level is reshuﬄed. Within each level, each datablock’s virtual address on the
server’s database is formed by means of a unique, yet mutable ‘index’, which is identifier-dependent. We
shall refer to this datablock’s ‘index’ in the following, as index. Thus, once the level where the datablock
currently resides has been identified, the investigator retrieves it from that level, using the datablock’s
index.
Since we do not want to involve the client at all during the creation of the encrypted Bloom filter, the
latter has to be created interactively between the cloud and the proxy in a way that does not leak any
information about the datablock identifiers stored. One way of doing this is by utilising a hash function
that operates on shares, such as the Chaum-van Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function (cf. Chapter 3.2.1). One
share lies by the proxy, and the other share is stored encrypted alongside with the encrypted datablock.
The datablock’s index follows a similar design: It has to be updateable after every access, and efficiently
and interactively computable by the investigator and the proxy. Thus, one share for the indexwill be stored
encrypted alongside with the encrypted datablock, while the other will be stored on the proxy.
From the above discussion, it becomes evident that along every encrypted block we have to store more
information. In particular, we store two encrypted shares and each datablock’s index. This data structure
we will call a ‘packet’ and we define it in the following.
Definition 21.
Let E be a semantically secure, re-randomisable, homomorphic encryption scheme with security param-
eter λ, (skid,pkid), (skbf,pkbf), (skdat,pkdat) three secret- public- key pairs, andK a homomor-
phic hash function such that K : {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗ 7→ {0,1}λ. We call a packet of the datablock with
identifier id, the tuple
(c1, c2, c3, c4) =
K(IDshare0,IDshare1),Epkid(IDshare1),Epkbf(BFshare1),Epkdat(dat)

,
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where c1 is the datablock’s index, c2 and c3 are encrypted shares for computing the datablock’s index
and c4 is the encrypted data.
5.2. The Protocol in Detail
5.2.1. Initialisation and Authorisation
Initialization and Upload
Before the client uploads his encrypted datablocks to the cloud, he creates an equal amount of fake data-
blocks and assigns a unique identifier (avoiding collisions) to every datablock (real and fake). The client
then initialises the system parameters issuing the shares IDshare0, IDshare1, BFshare0, BFshare1,
and creating the encryption scheme’s keys: (skid,pkid) which is used for encrypting all the identifier
shares of the datablocks (the c2 part of the datablock’s packet), (skbf,pkbf)which is used for encrypting
the packet’s Bloom filter share (the c3 part of the datablock’s packet), (skdat,pkdat) which is used for
encrypting the datablock’s data (the c4 part of the datablock’s packet), and (skbf′,pkbf′) for encrypt-
ing the Bloom filter contents. For every datablock (real and fake) the client then creates the datablock’s
corresponding packet (see Definition 21). The client distributes the keys and the shares to the parties
as follows: The cloud receives the secret key skbf′, while the proxy receives the shares IDshare0 and
BFshare0, as well as the keys skid and skbf. An overview of the keys and shares distributed to the
various parties can be found in Table 5.1.
The client then uploads all real and fake packets in random order to the cloud, who stores them on the
last level of the pyramid, while all levels above are initialized and left empty. Finally, the client sends
the list of the fake ids to the proxy. Once the packets have been uploaded, a Bloom filter creation (see
Section 5.3) is initiated between the cloud and the proxy, resulting in the Bloom filter for the last level,
which is then stored encrypted on the proxy.
Authorization
At the beginning of an access session in which the investigator wants to read encrypted datablocks from
the cloud, the client creates a new temporary key pair (sktemp,pktemp) which will function as the
access control mechanism. The investigator then receives from the client the authentication token, which
consists of the shares IDshare0, IDshare1, BFshare1, and the secret temporary key sktemp. From
then on, all messages exchanged between the investigator and the proxy, and between the investigator
and the proxy, will be proxy re-encrypted. Observe that even after the decryption, the investigator only
sees encrypted data. For ease of exposition however, and without loss of rigor, in the following we will
avoid using expressions such as ‘a proxy re-encryption of a proxy re-encrypted message’, and will always
refer to one proxy re-encryption, thus not mentioning again the key pair (sktemp,pktemp).
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IDshare0 IDshare1 BFshare0 BFshare1 skid skbf skbf
′
Client • • • • • • •
Investigator • • •
Cloud •
Proxy • • • •
Table 5.1: Overview of the values known to all parties. IDshare0, IDshare1: Shares for comput-
ing the current index of the datablock, BFshare0, BFshare1: Shares for determining the
Bloom filter positions for the datablock; skid: secret key to decrypt a packet’s encrypted c2
part; skbf: secret key to decrypt a packet’s encrypted c3 part; skbf′: secret key to decrypt
encrypted Bloom filter bits;
5.2.2. Access
Read and Write Operations
Like classical ORAMs, Proxy-ORAM supports two operations, Read and Write. At the end of a Read
or Write operation, the investigator puts back on the top level of the cloud’s pyramid two packets: the
real one and a fake one. In case of a Read, the investigator simply re-randomises the elements c2, c3, c4
of the downloaded real packet, while in case of a Write he additionally replaces c4 of the real packet
with an encryption of the new data. Regardless of the operation performed, the packet’s index c1 is
updated. Since c4 is a semantically secure encryption of the datablock’s data, and thus a re-randomised
ciphertext is indistinguishable from a fresh encryption, we can focus from here on only on the case of a
Read operation. Note that, due to this property, neither the proxy nor the cloud can distinguish a Read
from a Write.
The pseudocode for the access protocol is given in Protocol 3, the steps of which we describe here.
The investigator’s query for a datablock with identifier id runs through every ORAM level and works as
follows: If the level is empty then there is nothing to be done. If the level is not empty, then the investigator
first receives the id of a fake packet to be found on that level from the cloud (step 4). This way, the
investigator is guaranteed to retrieve a datablock from the cloud. After this initial step, the investigator
interactively with the proxy computes the Bloom filter positions corresponding to the datablock he is
querying for, assuming that it resides on that level (steps 7 to 13). First, the investigator blinds his
share for the Bloom filter, BFshare1 with a randomly chosen value (taking care that for each of the
ξ different hash values a different blinding value is chosen) and sends this blinded share to the proxy.
The proxy then, using his share for the Bloom filter, creates the Bloom filter positions for the given
identifier. These values are then sent by the proxy back to the investigator, who removes the blindings
and now knows which positions of the encrypted Bloom filter he should ask for. The investigator then
requests the encrypted Bloom filter contents of these positions from the proxy. The investigator now
blinds the encrypted Bloom filter contents (each with a different blinding value) and sends them to the
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Protocol 3: Proxy-ORAM.Access(id)
define ξ the number of hash functions used for the Bloom filter;
1 blockfound= 0;
2 for i = 1 to dlog2 Ne do
3 if level i is not empty then
4 idfake← GetFakeIDfromCloud;
5 bf_flag= 1;
6 for j = 1 to ξ do
7 v
R← {0,1}∗;
8 B_part = Blind(BFshare1, v);
9 Send B_part to Proxy /* the proxy will now compute all Bloom filter
positions */;
PROXY:
10 B_full = Combine(Blinded(BFshare1,BFshare0);
11 Send B_full to Investigator/* all positions are now blinded */;
INVESTIGATOR:
12 B = Unblind(B_full);
13 EBF← GetEncryptedBFpositionFromProxy(B);
14 v
R← {0,1}∗;
15 Blind(EBF,v);
16 SendToCloud(EBF);
17 EBF′ = GetBlindedDecryptedBFContentsFromCloud;
18 B← Unblind(EBF′);
19 if B == 0 then
20 bf_flag= 0;
21 if bf_flag== 0 or blockfound== 1 then
22 RetBlock = GetFromCloud(index(idfake));
23 else
24 RetBlock = GetFromCloud(index(id));
25 (⊥, c f2 , c f3 , c f4 ) = CreateFakepacket(packet(idlastlevelfake ));
26 (⊥, c r2, c r3, c r4) = Rerandomise(packet(id));
/* the indices c r1 and c
f
1 will be built in the next reshuffle between the
cloud and the proxy */;
27 Send idlastlevelfake to cloud;
28 UploadToCloudInRandomOrder((⊥, c f2 , c f3 , c f4 ), (⊥, c r2, c r3, c r4));
CLOUD:
29 Mark all fakeids as ‘used’;
30 Mark idfake received from investigator as ‘unused’;
31 if level1 has enough space then
32 Create level0;
33 ORAM.Reshuﬄe(level0,level1);
34 else
35 ORAM.Reshuﬄe(level1,level2);
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cloud (steps 13- 16). The latter decrypts the blinded and encrypted Bloom filter contents, and sends
them back to the investigator. The investigator now removes the blindings and learns if the datablock
is on that level or not (steps 19 and 20). If the datablock is not on the level or it has been found on a
previous level, then the investigator retrieves from the cloud the fake datablock from this level which is
certainly there, otherwise, the investigator retrieves the real datablock he was looking for (step 24). Once
the datablock has been found, the investigator continues to access the remaining levels of the pyramid,
this time however asking in the last step directly for the fake datablock. Observe here, multiple versions
of the same datablock are expected to be found in various levels of the structure, however the newest
version will always be found on the level closest to the top of the pyramid.
On completion of accessing every pyramidal level, the investigator generates a fake packet by computing
the elements c2, c3, for the idfake retrieved from the last ORAM level and forming c4 by encrypting ‘fake’
data like for example ‘0B’ (step 25). The investigator then re-randomises the elements c2, c3 and c4 of
the real packet he retrieved and sends the idfake he got from the last level to the cloud (steps 25 to 28).
The cloud stores idfake on a list of fake identifiers that are available on the first level and marks all the
fake ids that he gave throughout the query as ‘used’, so that they are not re-used in subsequent queries
(steps 29 to 30). Finally the investigator sends the real and the fake packets in random order to the cloud.
The cloud creates the indices for the two packets interactively with the proxy in the following way: If
the cloud does not have enough space to hold the two elements in the first level, then a Reshuffle is
triggered, during which the freshly added elements and the ones that were already in the first level are
shuﬄed, merged with the first level and their indices are updated. Otherwise, if there is enough space
for the two elements to be stored in the cloud’s first level, the two packets to be added are considered
as a ‘level 0’ and are reshuﬄed with the elements of the first level (steps 31 to 35). Thus the indices of
the two packets are generated, their order is randomly permuted and a new Bloom filter for ‘level 1’ is
created. These operations are described in detail in the ‘Reshuflle’ operation, which is run between the
cloud and the proxy, and which we describe in detail in the following.
5.2.3. Reshuﬄe
Once a level is entirely filled with packets, it is emptied recursively to the next one, until a level is reached,
which does not overflow after its previous level is emptied into it. In order to maintain access pattern
hiding, the datablocks have to be obliviously reshuﬄed while they are pushed into the new level. Typi-
cally in hierarchical ORAM constructions [GO96; WSC08; Goo+12b; Goo+12a; WST12] the oblivious
reshuﬄe phase is performed by means of oblivious sorting, which can be performed between the client
and the server by using sorting networks, or other efficient sorting techniques [Goo14; Goo11a; Goo11b]
that require very little memory usage from the client. In our scenario however, we do not want to involve
the client (or the even the investigator) at all during this communication intensive procedure – in fact, as
we have seen, the only client involvement is handing over to the investigator the authorization token. We
achieve this goal by splitting our Reshuffle into two distinct phases that run solely between the proxy
and the cloud: First, the Bloom filter creation phase, where the Bloom filter for the deepest level of the
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Protocol 4: Proxy-ORAM.Reshuﬄe.BFCreation(levell−1,levell)
define λ the security parameter ;
define ξ the number of hash functions used for the Bloom filter;
define bfsize= b(λ, |levell |) ;
PROXY:
1 Discard Bloom filter of levell−1;
2 Discard Bloom filter of levell ;
3 for every key in Bloom filter keys do
4 Discard key;
5 key← {0,1}λ;
CLOUD:
6 for every idfake in levell−1 do
7 Mark idfake ‘not used’;
8 Move idfake to levell ;
9 L← levell−1;
10 L← levell ;
11 L′← ;;
12 (tsk,tpk)← KeyGen(1λ) /* key pair for proxy re-encryption */;
13 for every packet in L do
14 c′3← ProxyReEncrypttpk(packet.c3);
15 L′← c′3 /* now L′ contains all BFshare1 proxy re-encrypted */;
16 Send L′ and tpk to Proxy;
PROXY:
17 L∗← ;;
18 for every Share in L′ do
19 bfposition= COMBINE(Share,BFshare0);
20 bfposition= Decskbf(bfposition) /* now cloud can decrypt */;
21 L∗← bfposition;
22 Send L∗ and tpk to Cloud;
CLOUD:
23 BLOOMFILTERl[bfsize];
24 for every i in BLOOMFILTERl do
25 i = Encpkbf′(0);
26 for every bfposition in L∗ do
27 bfposition= Dectsk(bfposition);
28 BLOOMFILTERl[bfposition] = Encpkbf′(1);
29 Send BLOOMFILTERl to Proxy;
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two levels being reshuﬄed is created, and then the update phase, during which the packets of the two
levels are merged, leaving the smaller of the levels empty. In details the reshuﬄe operation from level
l − 1 into level l works as follows:
Phase 1: Bloom filter Creation.
In the first reshuﬄe phase, the current Bloom filters of levels l −1 and l are destroyed and a new Bloom
filter for level l is created. The operation is interactively performed between the proxy and the cloud,
who compute the positions of the Bloom filter that need to be set to ‘1’, without being able to identify the
datablocks in the two levels. We describe the protocol here, and for more details we refer to the protocol’s
pseudocode, illustrated in Protocol 4.
In the first step, the proxy destroys the Bloom filters of both levels l and l − 1, as well as the keys used
for computing the Bloom filters. Then, the proxy creates new random keys for the Bloom filter of level l
(lines 1 to 5). In the next steps, the cloud marks all the fake identifiers from level l − 1 as ‘not used’ and
moves them to the available fake identifiers of level l (lines 6 to 8).
The cloud now creates a list that contains all the packets from levels l−1 and l . Furthermore, he creates
a temporary pair of random keys (tsk,tpk) for the encryption scheme used to encrypt the packets’ c3
part. This key pair will be used to proxy re-encrypt c3 of all packets to be reshuﬄed in the following.
For every packet (c1, c2, c3, c4) present on the list, the cloud uses proxy re-encryption to transform c3 =
Encpkbf(BFshare1) into an encryption under the public key tpk+ pkbf (lines 13 to 15), and sends the
resulting encrypted list and the key tpk to the proxy.
The proxy can now compute the Bloom filter positions that will be set to ‘1’ in the new Bloom filter
for level l . For every packet to be inserted in level l , the proxy computes the ξ Bloom filter positions,
using the share BFshare0 which is known to him. Taking advantage of the proxy re-encryption property,
the proxy transforms the encryption into an encryption under the public key tpk by removing the skbf
dependency (lines 18 to 21). The proxy finally sends the resulting list of elements back to the cloud.
Observe that this list now contains all the Bloom filter positions that must be set to ‘1’, and each of them
can now be decrypted by the cloud since the latter knows tsk.
The cloud initialises a Bloom filter of size bfsize, with all values set to Encpkbf′(0). For every element
of the received list, the cloud decrypts the elements received in the previous step, and sets the Bloom
filter positions to a ‘fresh’ encryption of ‘1’, Encpkbf′(1) (steps 26 to 28). Finally, the cloud sends the
resulting encrypted Bloom Filter to the proxy and discards the key pair (tsk,tpk).
Phase 2: Update.
In this second phase, the packets stored on levels l − 1 and l are merged into level l . All the packets are
re-randomised and randomly permuted, while a new random index is computed for each one of them.
This procedure is illustrated in Protocol 5. Firstly, all packets currently stored on level l−1 are moved to
level l . Then, the cloud creates a new pair of temporary proxy re-encryption keys (tsk,tpk). For every
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Protocol 5: Proxy-ORAM.Reshuﬄe.Update(levell−1,levell)
CLOUD:
1 All packets from levell−1 are moved to levell ;
2 (tsk,tpk)← KeyGen(1λ);
3 for every packet in levell do
4 packet.c1 =⊥ /* remove previous c1 */;
5 packet.c2 = ProxyReEncrypttpk(packet.c2);
6 packet.c3 = ProxyReEncrypttpk(packet.c3);
7 packet.c4 = ProxyReEncrypttpk(packet.c4);
8 Send levell and tpk to the proxy;
PROXY:
9 for every packet in levell do
10 packet.c1 = COMBINE(packet.c2,IDshare0);
11 packet.c1 = Decskid(packet.c1) /* remove skid dependency */;
12 packet.c1 = ReRandomize(packet.c1);
13 packet.c2 = ReRandomize(packet.c2);
14 packet.c3 = ReRandomize(packet.c3);
15 packet.c4 = ReRandomize(packet.c4);
16 levell = RandomlyPermute(levell);
17 Send levell to the cloud;
CLOUD:
18 for every packet in levell do
19 packet.c1 = Dectsk(packet.c1)/* results in new random plaintext index */;
20 packet.c2 = Dectsk(packet.c2)/* remains encrypted under pkid */;
21 packet.c3 = Dectsk(packet.c3)/* remains encrypted under pkbf */;
22 packet.c4 = Dectsk(packet.c4)/* remains encrypted under pk */;
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packet stored on this newly merged level, the cloud first removes c1 and transforms the parts (c2, c3, c4)
into encryptions under the public key tpk. The cloud then sends the transformed parts (c2, c3, c4) of each
packet to the server, along with the public keys tpk to the proxy (steps 3 to 8).
For every packet in the received level, the proxy uses his share IDshare0 with the packet’s encrypted
share c2, in order to create the packet’s new index c1. The newly created packet index is now encrypted
under tpk. Using skid as a re-encryption key, the proxy removes this key’s dependency from each
packet’s c1 This results in a c1 that can be decrypted by the cloud. Finally, the proxy re-randomises
all obtained elements (c1, c2, c3, c4) for every packet, permutes the updated packet list, and sends this
updated and permuted list back to the cloud (steps 9 to 17).
The cloud now decrypts the index c1 of every received packet using the secret key tsk and removes the
tsk dependency from the parts (c2, c3, c4) from all the packets. The result of this process is a randomly
permuted list of packets with fresh indices.
5.3. Analysis
For Proxy-ORAM to fulfill the minimal soundness conditions from Definition 12, two key factors have to
hold. For one, a false positive must occur in the Bloom filter only with very small probability, otherwise
the investigator will retrieve another datablock than the one he was asking for. Since, as we will see,
Bloom filter false positives pose also an important security threat, it suffices to adjust the Bloom filter
size, so that the probability of a false positive occurrence is negligible in the security parameter.
Of equal importance for the soundness of Proxy-ORAM is the existence of fake datablocks in every
level. This is achieved by having the fake identifiers stored on the cloud, and marking them as ‘used’ and
‘unused’. The question that arises, however, is if there are always enough fake identifiers available for
every level. We prove that this is always the case:
Proposition 3.
In every query there are always enough fake ids for the proxy to provide from every level.
Proof. (sketch) The proof is done by an induction in the number of fake datablocks available in every
level. Observe that during the initialisation, all real and (the equally many) fake datablocks along with
the fake identifiers are stored on the last level of the cloud. Thus, during the investigator’s first access,
a fake identifier (and its respective datablock) is guaranteed to be found on that level. Assume now that
during the n-th access, the investigator found a fake identifier in every level. Observe that as soon as a
level gets full (and thus has also exhausted all its available fake identifiers), a reshuﬄe for that level and
the subsequent level is triggered, leaving the second of the reshuﬄed levels with fresh fake identifiers,
and the first reshuﬄed level empty as detailed in Protocol 4. Recalling that during every access, only the
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non-empty levels are considered, we have that in the n+1-th access, the investigator will be able to find
a fake identifier in every level, that he will examine.
Proposition 4 (Proxy-ORAM Correctness).
If the probability of a false positive occurrence in the Bloom filter is negligible in the security parameter
λ, Proxy-ORAM is sound according to Definition 12, i.e., for every query, the ORAM server (cloud)
returns only the correct datablock, except with negligible probability.
Proof. (sketch) For a query of the packet with identifier id, the investigator goes through all ORAM
levels and queries each one’s Bloom filter. If the packet resides on level l , then the Bloom filter indicates
it and the investigator retrieves from the cloud the packet with identifier index(id), except with negligible
probability, which occurs in the case of a Bloom filter false positive. Otherwise he retrieves a fake element
by asking for the packet with the fake id idfake (retrieved from the cloud), which is guaranteed to reside on
the level. After the investigator has retrieved the packet he wanted, he asks only for fake packets. Thus,
after going through all ORAM’s levels, the investigator retrieves the packet he was querying for and this
datablock only, as the other datablocks are fake datablocks.
Proposition 5.
Proxy-ORAM storing N real datablocks and B datablocks on its first level, has amortised communication
and computation cost of O(logN) for the cloud and proxy.
Proof. By Proxy-ORAM’s description, we have that reshuﬄing levels i−1 and i involves the exchange of
O(2i) datablocks between the cloud to the proxy. As we have seen, reshuﬄe is a recursive procedure, and
thus it can potentially trigger reshuﬄes in higher levels. Let C(i, j) denote the total amount of datablocks
moved and computed upon by the proxy (or the cloud) at level i during the j-the access. Suppose that the
first ORAM level can hold B datablocks, and observe that between j and 2 j accesses, level i (for some
i ≤ dlog2 2 je) will have been reshuﬄed 2dlog2 2 je−i times, out of which 2dlog2 2 je−i−1 level i will be half-
full (i.e., will have Bi−1 datablocks) and 2dlog2 2 je−i−1 level i will be full (i.e., will have Bi datablocks).
Thus, after N accesses the total amount of datablocks communicated and computed upon between the
proxy and the cloud will be
T (N) =
log2 N∑
i=1
log2 N∑
j=1
C(i, j) =
log2 N∑
i=1
log2 N∑
j=1
2dlog2 2 je−i−1

B + 1
2B

4 j

B
2
i
≤

B + 1
2B

log2 N
log2 N∑
j=1
Bi ≤ B2+log2 N log2 N ≤ cN log2 N for some c > 1,
which means that T (N) ∈ O(N log2 N), and thus the amortised cost for accessing one block is in
O(log2 N).
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5.4. Security
Before proving Proxy-ORAM’s security formally, we give the intuition of the fact that Proxy-ORAM pro-
vides access pattern hiding, assuming that the proxy and the cloud are semi-honest and do not collude.
The basic idea behind Proxy-ORAM’s security has to do with the fact that the various components are
shared between non-colluding parties. The proxy holds the encrypted Bloom filters, but cannot decrypt
them. Although he sees the positions of the Bloom filters accessed, this does not give him any informa-
tion, under the assumption that cryptographically secure hash functions are used for building the Bloom
filter, that these keys are renewed in every reshuﬄe, and every datablock (real or fake) in every level is
accessed only once before the level is reshuﬄed, Observe further that, although the proxy has both skid
and skbf which would allow him to decrypt c2 and c3 of every packet respectively, during the course of
all protocols, the proxy only sees these elements proxy re-encrypted, thus losing his ability to decrypt
them.
As far as the cloud is concerned, observe that the knowledge of the secret key skbf′ used to decrypt the
Bloom filter contents does not jeopardise the system’s security. Indeed, during the access, the cloud sees
only blinded Bloom filter contents that he has to decrypt. Furthermore, although during the Bloom filter
creation phase the cloud sees the plaintext Bloom filter contents, he cannot correlate the ids to positions,
since he does not have any shares for this. Finally, the cloud sees which fake id could have potentially
been asked from the investigator, but again this does not give him any information, because the cloud
cannot create the respective fake packet (and thus the fake index c1).
The existence of the Bloom filter, however, can potentially be a source of insecurity (as also pointed out
in [KLO12]). Take for example the following case: Suppose that a Bloom filter false positive occurs, and
hence the investigator retrieved an incorrect datablock from level i. Then, it might happen that in his next
query, the investigator will ask for exactly the same Bloom filter positions in level i, something which
would have never been the case if the correct datablock had been previously found. In fact the datablock
would have been now found on the first level, and at level i the investigator would ask for a fake datablock.
Clearly, both the proxy and the cloud will notice this immediately, and thus the access pattern privacy
of the architecture would have been broken. Thus, the Bloom filters have to be large enough, so that the
probability of a false positive is negligible in the security parameter.
With the above observations in mind, we can now proceed with proving Proxy-ORAM’s security more
formally. For an architecture such as Proxy-ORAM, which is based on a variety of cryptographic primi-
tives, proving its security formally would have been a very challenging task. Using our new framework
from Chapter 4 however, the proof of security is done in a very simple and straightforward way. First,
we identify all the cryptographic components used in the architecture, and then bind them all together in
the IND-CQA game by further defining each component’s security in a game-based manner.
We summarise and recall here the various security guarantees that we need for the security of Proxy-
ORAM. Firstly, the encryption scheme used in Proxy-ORAM must be re-randomisable by knowledge of
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the public key. This is a property achieved by most asymmetric homomorphic encryptions schemes, and
is vital in Proxy-ORAM’s security since the cloud and the proxy see only encrypted messages which have
to be re-randomised in order to destroy any correlation between them, as they are moved from one level
to the other during the reshuﬄe procedure.
The encryption scheme used in Proxy-ORAM must also provide indistinguishability of blinded encryp-
tions. Clearly this property is of grave importance, since in the course of the protocols, many encrypted
messages (such as the Bloom filter contents during the access protocol) are blinded, and then encrypted.
We model this property by means of the following game.
Definition 22 (GameIND-CBAA,E (λ)).
LetE= (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Blind) be a semantically secure homomorphic encryption that allows blind-
ing of ciphertexts, λ a security parameter and A a PPT adversary for the encryption scheme. The
computational indistinguishability of blinded ciphertexts game under adaptive chosen message attack,
GameIND-CBAA,E (λ), is played between A and a challenger C and proceeds as follows:
1. C generates the key pair (pk,sk)← E.KeyGen(λ), and hands the public key pk to A;
2. First learning phase: for q1 times (polynomially many times in λ), A selects (adaptively) a message
mi , encrypts it using pk, issues ci and asks a blinding oracle O for a blinding of ci;
3. Challenge phase: A issues two ciphertexts (c0, c1);
4. C flips a random secret bit b
$← {0,1}, and blinds cb
5. A receives the blinded encryption cb;
6. Second learning phase: Similarly to the first learning phase, for q2 times (polynomially many in
the security parameter) λ, A selects (adaptively) a message mi , encrypts it using pk, issues ci and
asks O for a blinding of ci;
7. At the end, A outputs a bit b′;
A wins the game if and only if b = b′.
Definition 23 (Indistinguishability Under Adaptive Chosen Blinded Attack).
A public key encryption scheme E has computationally indistinguishable blinded ciphertexts under adap-
tive chosen query attack (or, it is IND-CBA-secure) if and only if for any PPT adversary A the following
holds: ProbhGameIND-CBAA,E (λ) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(λ).
In many steps of the Proxy-ORAM protocol, an encrypted message has to be proxy re-encrypted. As we
have seen in Section 3.2.1, the core idea of this procedure is to produce a new temporary public-, private-
key pair, and using the new private key in order to alter the public key under which a given ciphertext
is originally encrypted. The original scheme from [BBS98] was further improved in [Ate+06], where
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(among others) the non-collusion requirement was removed. However since we already assume non-
collusion between the proxy and the cloud, the basic ideas from [BBS98] suffice. In Proxy-ORAM,
proxy re-encryption is needed in various steps, such as the authorisation step at the very beginning, or
during the Bloom filter creation. In all instances that proxy re-encryption appears in the protocol, it is
coupled with a re-randomisation of the ciphertext. Thus, proving the security of the protocol must take
this into account. We formalise this, by means of the following game.
Definition 24 (GamePREN-IND-CPAA,E (λ)).
Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,PREN) be a semantically secure homomorphic encryption that allows proxy
re-encryption of ciphertexts, λ a security parameter and A a PPT adversary for the encryption scheme.
The computational indistinguishability of proxy re-encrypted ciphertexts game under adaptive chosen
message attack, GamePREN-IND-CPAA,E (λ), is played between A and a challenger C and proceeds as follows:
1. C generates two key pairs: (pk,sk)← E.KeyGen(λ), and of which (tpk,tsk)← E.KeyGen(λ),
and hands over to A pk and tpk. The key pk will be used for encrypting messages, and tpk will
be used for proxy re-encrypting ciphertexts;
2. First learning phase: for q1 times (polynomially many times in λ), A selects (adaptively) a message
mi , encrypts it using pk, issues ci and asks a proxy re-encryption oracle O to proxy re-encrypt ci;
3. Challenge phase: A issues two ciphertexts (c0, c1);
4. C flips a random secret bit b
$← {0,1}, and using tpk proxy re-encrypts cb, and re-randomises it,
yielding c∗b;
5. A receives the proxy re-encryption of c∗b;
6. Second learning phase: for q2 times (polynomially many times in λ), A selects (adaptively) a mes-
sage mi , encrypts it using pk, issues ci and asks O for a proxy re-encryption of ci;
7. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game if and only if b = b′.
Definition 25 (Proxy Re-encryption Ciphertext Indistinguishability Under Adaptive ChosenMessage At-
tack).
A public key encryption scheme E has computationally indistinguishable proxy re-encrypted ciphertexts
under adaptive chosen message attack (or, it is PREN-IND-CPA-secure) if and only if for any PPT adver-
sary A: ProbhGamePREN-IND-CPAA,E (λ) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(λ).
Proposition 6 (Proxy-ORAM security).
Assume that the proxy and the cloud are semi-honest and not colluding, and that a Bloom filter is used for
which a false positive occurs with probability negligible in λ. Assume further that the public key encryp-
tion scheme used is semantically secure, has computationally indistinguishable blinded ciphertexts under
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{Blind(BFsharei1)}Ai=1
<latexit sha1_base64="5wvDd0qs5pDdS3pPCEQyODNlEHY=">AAAK0nicfVZbj9w0FHbLrQ2XbuGRB0ZdVSpiWM1UQi0PlcpyEagv C2Jopcl05DgnM9Y4sWU7uzO18oAQb/wEHnjnFX4M/4bjZFk2zngi7crz+Xzn8vmcOJkS3NjJ5J8bN197/Y0337p1O3n7nXffu3N09/2fjKw1gxmTQuoXGTUgeAUzy62AF0oDLTMBz7PNl37/+Tlow2X1o90pWJR0VfGCM2oRWh59lLo0Q3L+IM0Ks15OX/KP02bp+JNp89J90S yPjicnk/YZDRfTy8Xx03vpJ38QQs6Wd2//nuaS1SVUlglqzHw6UXbhqLacCWiStDagKNvQFcxxWdESzMK1lTSj+4jko0Jq/KvsqEWvMxwtjdmVGVqW1K5NuOfBfXvz2haPF45XqrZQsS5QUYuRlSMvyyjnGpgVO1xQpjnmOmJrqimzKF6S9Hx5rU1VlxloyMe6Fvj/3IM5lilW Eunr8mG/VGfAGlwH6H8phyA66CvlrRgVCwe1wfyU7VNy4/XqY5mmGxhgQDeMWzB9nFHl+6EPAtaIpmVzP8XsfTO6SnoATdDyEpt7M9DUwtjv8VcwzqHLET2i5h3hyaefhUmXtUCdpeij6E1pHhZj6qzgq1oH+tU6YG/3iLzSVK052/YVxWOW1a5cuJWQxlDNQ01ogWevcBVI5X vSZkFcrwSvVoELYVDYgC/AWqwvQNWqUELagK/48FgtzeoAga1lslQBqmmFYmgYOOCbVx3iV4Jjn+gddoBgY7PGdM2Yai0vglTOqb7gediq/tUSVLLtRrmndSatlSh1IaUtucH563ellBssywRw2x+YSQBfST3q4yAEV4YHXuZmjcfFaosvGdQppyYowcpcVnIwEVfzit4quEB9 S1rlLuU5OnApVAab0U+lS9u3TeG++wrlwwZt0qsmvE5s37L7maftVoxXxAKefnMwIGa62U80Gx4Nx3MVYakDLEwyGisr4qx4rDgrpzYeDDcP8OLhDvCe7eHgtLhnMQJON1L8VFqLV04O26jW+9OJ61wMKDxfIhy1v0zEFXgXNMGmb3W8IDoLr0L3O6pec5Vgq1Z/P34ksdzihx FjCDgHEZC8xh0eIQ0P3VNsPMqwu1pCvJBuCoeUg9OJX2nNfLoYss603O5+gK8rpnd4Yy7d8fTA/EjD24t76Ofa5v/0BL/npuHX23Axe3jy+cnke/yuOyXdc4t8SO6RB2RKHpGn5FtyRmaEkV/Jn+Qv8ncyS1zyc/JLZ3rzxiXnA9J7kt/+Bb/CLr4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KST0rMN768qUT6wMIv3SLCWc5HI=">AAAK0nicfVZbj9w0FE7LrQ23LTzywKirSkUMq5lKCHiotCwXgfqy IIZWmkxHjnMyY41jW7azO1MrDwjxxiOP/ANe4cf033CcLMvGGU+kXXk+n+9cPp8TJ1ecGTuZvLx1+5VXX3v9jTt30zffevudd4/uvfezkbWmMKOSS/0sJwY4EzCzzHJ4pjSQKufwNN985fefXoA2TIqf7E7BoiIrwUpGiUVoefRh5rIcycXDLC/Nejl9zj7KmqVjj6fNc/dlsz w6npxM2mc0XEyvFsen97OP/3h5ujtf3rv7Z1ZIWlcgLOXEmPl0ouzCEW0Z5dCkWW1AEbohK5jjUpAKzMK1lTSjB4gUo1Jq/BN21KI3GY5UxuyqHC0rYtcm3PPgvr15bcvPF44JVVsQtAtU1nxk5cjLMiqYBmr5DheEaoa5juiaaEItipemPV9eayPqKgcNxVjXHP9feLDAMvlK In1dPeqX6gxYg+sA/S/lEEQHfaW8FSV84aA2mJ+yfUphvF59LNdkAwMMyIYyC6aPU6J8P/RBwBrRtGoeZJi9b0YnpAfQBC2vsLk3A00sjP0eewHjAroc0SNq3hEef/JpmHRVc9RZ8j6K3pRmYTGmzku2qnWgX60D9naPyCtN1JrRbV9RPGYpdtXCrbg0hmgWakJKPHuFq0Aq35 M2D+J6JZhYBS64QWEDPgdrsb4AVatScWkDvmLDY7UkrwMEtpbKSgWoJgLF0DBwwDYvOsSvOMM+0TvsAE7HZo3pmjHRWl4GqVwQfcmKsFX9qyWoZNuNck/rXForUepSSlsxg/PX70opN1iWCeC2PzCTAL6WetTHgXOmDAu8zM0aj4vWFl8yqFNBTFCClYUUcjAR1/OK3gRcor4V EYXLWIEOXAbCYDP6qXRZ+7Yp3fdfo3zYoE123YQ3ie1bdj/zrN2K8cpYwLNvDwbETDf7iWbDouFYoSIsdYCFSUZj5WWcFY8VZxXExoPh5gFePNwB3pM9HJwW9yRGwOlGip9Ka/HKKWAb1Xp/OnGdywGFFUuEo/ZXibgS74Im2PStjhdEZ+FV6H5H1WuuE2zV6u/HjySWW/wwYg wOF8ADkte4wyOk4aF7io1HGXZXS4gX0k3hkHJwOvErrZlPF0PWuZbb3Y/wjaB6hzfm0h1PD8yPNKy9uId+bmz+T0/xe24afr0NF7NHJ1+cTH7A77qzpHvuJB8k95OHyTT5LDlNvkvOk1lCk9+Sv5K/k3/SWerSX9JfO9Pbt6447ye9J/39Xy26MEQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KST0rMN768qUT6wMIv3SLCWc5HI=">AAAK0nicfVZbj9w0FE7LrQ23LTzywKirSkUMq5lKCHiotCwXgfqy IIZWmkxHjnMyY41jW7azO1MrDwjxxiOP/ANe4cf033CcLMvGGU+kXXk+n+9cPp8TJ1ecGTuZvLx1+5VXX3v9jTt30zffevudd4/uvfezkbWmMKOSS/0sJwY4EzCzzHJ4pjSQKufwNN985fefXoA2TIqf7E7BoiIrwUpGiUVoefRh5rIcycXDLC/Nejl9zj7KmqVjj6fNc/dlsz w6npxM2mc0XEyvFsen97OP/3h5ujtf3rv7Z1ZIWlcgLOXEmPl0ouzCEW0Z5dCkWW1AEbohK5jjUpAKzMK1lTSjB4gUo1Jq/BN21KI3GY5UxuyqHC0rYtcm3PPgvr15bcvPF44JVVsQtAtU1nxk5cjLMiqYBmr5DheEaoa5juiaaEItipemPV9eayPqKgcNxVjXHP9feLDAMvlK In1dPeqX6gxYg+sA/S/lEEQHfaW8FSV84aA2mJ+yfUphvF59LNdkAwMMyIYyC6aPU6J8P/RBwBrRtGoeZJi9b0YnpAfQBC2vsLk3A00sjP0eewHjAroc0SNq3hEef/JpmHRVc9RZ8j6K3pRmYTGmzku2qnWgX60D9naPyCtN1JrRbV9RPGYpdtXCrbg0hmgWakJKPHuFq0Aq35 M2D+J6JZhYBS64QWEDPgdrsb4AVatScWkDvmLDY7UkrwMEtpbKSgWoJgLF0DBwwDYvOsSvOMM+0TvsAE7HZo3pmjHRWl4GqVwQfcmKsFX9qyWoZNuNck/rXForUepSSlsxg/PX70opN1iWCeC2PzCTAL6WetTHgXOmDAu8zM0aj4vWFl8yqFNBTFCClYUUcjAR1/OK3gRcor4V EYXLWIEOXAbCYDP6qXRZ+7Yp3fdfo3zYoE123YQ3ie1bdj/zrN2K8cpYwLNvDwbETDf7iWbDouFYoSIsdYCFSUZj5WWcFY8VZxXExoPh5gFePNwB3pM9HJwW9yRGwOlGip9Ka/HKKWAb1Xp/OnGdywGFFUuEo/ZXibgS74Im2PStjhdEZ+FV6H5H1WuuE2zV6u/HjySWW/wwYg wOF8ADkte4wyOk4aF7io1HGXZXS4gX0k3hkHJwOvErrZlPF0PWuZbb3Y/wjaB6hzfm0h1PD8yPNKy9uId+bmz+T0/xe24afr0NF7NHJ1+cTH7A77qzpHvuJB8k95OHyTT5LDlNvkvOk1lCk9+Sv5K/k3/SWerSX9JfO9Pbt6447ye9J/39Xy26MEQ=</latexit>
{Blind(bfpositioni)}⇠·Ai=1
<latexit sha1_base64="7O6mffDY+u0AtarQgYVGtAvP6/o=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEO6Ev8QBsoEjF4tNpCANq5lICDhEWpaAQLksiCWRxpNRu9 2eaU3b3eou787E8pEXyGtwQlw4ICF4Cx6Cd6DaHoZ1e3os7arm6/q6qr6uajvVUlgYj/++cfO11994861bt6M7b7/z7t2je+/9aFVlGL9gSirzPKWWS1HyCxAg+XNtOC1SyZ+lqy/d+rNLbqxQ5Q+w0XxW0EUpcsEoIDQ/GiV1kiI5e5ikuVZWOPiF+Chp5rV4PGle1MlaJCxTEH/RzI+Oxyfj9omHxmRr HJ/eL/45JYScz+/d/iPJFKsKXgKT1NrpZKxhVlMDgkneRElluaZsRRd8imZJC25ndVtWEz9AJItzZfCvhLhFrzNqWli7KVL0LCgsrb/mwH1r0wryz2a1KHUFvGRdoLySMajYaRRnwnAGcoMGZQYlYTFbUkMZoJJR1NvLCW/Lqki54dnIVBL/XzowwzLlQiF9WTzql1pbDhZtD/0vZR/EDfpKOS9G5azmlcX 8NPQpmXV69bHU0BUfYJyumABu+zij2nVBH+RYI7oWzYMEs3edWZfKAeiCnlts6ty4ocBHbk285KOMdznijqh5R3j88Sd+0kUlUWcl+yjupo3wi7FVmotFZTz9KuOx13tEXhiql4Kt+4riMatyU8zqhVTWUiN8TWiOZ6/R8qRyPQmpF9cpIcqFt4W0KKzHlxwA6/NQvci1VODxtRgeK9C08hC+BqYK7aGGli iG4YMNxOplhzhLCuwTs8EOkGxkl5iuHVFj1JWXyiU1VyLzW9XdM14l626Ue1qnCkCh1LlSUAiL89fvSqVWWJb14LY/MBMP3kkd93EupdBWeLtM7RKPi1WAlwzqlFHrlQAqU6UaTMRuXmMc/pJfocAFLbM6AYBmOpmhgdsB1MeTpul7iAxj1AkvLfarG9w6aS+kvP72CSqMPdwkuz69Tmxv5f3Ms3YpxMtD Ac++PhgQM13tJ9qVCIYTmQ6w9AEWJhmMleZhVjhWmJVRCAfDxQO8cLgDvKd7ODhQ9dMQAS+AZtdBeLJ8HdR6fzphnfMBRWRzhIP+20TqHF8Xfiu7acB3SOfhVOh+B9Vrdgm2avXXw0cSyi18GCGG5JdceiSncYcHSMNDdxQIRxl2V0sIF9JN4ZBycDrxq667aXzWuVHrzff8q5KZDb5U5+0dFJyf7Rfenuj XFv+nR/jJN/E/8IbGxaOTz0/G3+Gn3xnpnlvkA/IheUgm5FNySr4h5+SCMPKK/Eb+JH9FP0U/R79Ev3auN29sOe+T3hP9/i96q0Nz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AdZCVKotDWSDC+eXe+oBoUslKRc=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEHbCX2J+soEbXCyWSEEaVjORUMIhUlgIAnJZEEsijSejdr s905p2d6u7vDsTy0degNfghLhwQELwEEg8BO9AtT0M6/b0WNpVzdf1dVV9XdV2pgW3MB7/fe36Sy+/8uprN27Gr7/x5lu3jm6//b1VlaHsnCqhzLOMWCa4ZOfAQbBn2jBSZoI9zVafufWnF8xYruR3sNFsVpKF5AWnBBCaH43SOs2QnN9Ns0Iryx38nH+YNvOaP5w0z+t0zVOaK0g+beZHx+OTcfskQ2Oy NY4ffVD+8/W7fz0+m9+++XuaK1qVTAIVxNrpZKxhVhMDnArWxGllmSZ0RRZsiqYkJbOzui2rSe4gkieFMvgnIWnRq4yalNZuygw9SwJL6685cN/atILiwazmUlfAJO0CFZVIQCVOoyTnhlEQGzQINSgJTeiSGEIBlYzj3l5OeCurMmOG5SNTCfx/4cAcyxQLhfRlea9fam0ZWLQ99L+UfRA36CvlvCgRs5p VFvPT0Kfk1unVxzJDVmyAMbKiHJjt45Ro1wV9kGGN6Fo2d1LM3nVmLZUD0AU9t9jUuTFDgI3cGn/BRjnrcsQdUfOO8PCjj/2ky0qgzkr0UdxNG+4XY6us4IvKePpVxmOv94i8MEQvOV33FcVjVnJTzuqFUNYSw31NSIFnr9HypHI9CZkX1ynB5cLbQlgU1uMLBoD1eaheFFoo8PiaD48VSFZ5CFsDVaX2UE MkimHYYAO+etEhzhIc+8RssAMEHdklpmtHxBh16aVyQcwlz/1WdfeMV8m6G+We1pkCUCh1oRSU3OL89btSqRWWZT247Q/MxIN3Uid9nAnBteXeLlO7xOOiFeAlgzrlxHolgMqVVIOJ2M1rgsMv2SUKXBKZ1ykANNPJDA3cDqA+njRN34PnGKNOmbTYr25w67S9kIr6q89RYezhJt316VVieyvvZ562SyFe EQp4+sXBgJjpaj/RrngwHM91gKUPsDDJYKysCLPCscKsnEA4GC4e4IXDHeA92cPBgaqfhAh4ATS7DsKTZeug1vvTCetcDCg8nyMc9N8mUhf4uvBb2U0DvkM6D6dC9zuoXrNLsFWrvx4+klBu4cMIMQS7YMIjOY07PEAaHrqjQDjKsLtaQriQbgqHlIPTiV913U3js86MWm++ZY8lNRt8qc7bOyg4P9svvD3 Rryz+T4/xk2/if+ANjfN7J5+cjL/BT7/TqHtuRO9F70d3o0l0P3oUfRmdRecRjX6Mfo3+iP6Mf4h/in+Of+lcr1/bct6Jek/8279E1ESy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AdZCVKotDWSDC+eXe+oBoUslKRc=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEHbCX2J+soEbXCyWSEEaVjORUMIhUlgIAnJZEEsijSejdr s905p2d6u7vDsTy0degNfghLhwQELwEEg8BO9AtT0M6/b0WNpVzdf1dVV9XdV2pgW3MB7/fe36Sy+/8uprN27Gr7/x5lu3jm6//b1VlaHsnCqhzLOMWCa4ZOfAQbBn2jBSZoI9zVafufWnF8xYruR3sNFsVpKF5AWnBBCaH43SOs2QnN9Ns0Iryx38nH+YNvOaP5w0z+t0zVOaK0g+beZHx+OTcfskQ2Oy NY4ffVD+8/W7fz0+m9+++XuaK1qVTAIVxNrpZKxhVhMDnArWxGllmSZ0RRZsiqYkJbOzui2rSe4gkieFMvgnIWnRq4yalNZuygw9SwJL6685cN/atILiwazmUlfAJO0CFZVIQCVOoyTnhlEQGzQINSgJTeiSGEIBlYzj3l5OeCurMmOG5SNTCfx/4cAcyxQLhfRlea9fam0ZWLQ99L+UfRA36CvlvCgRs5p VFvPT0Kfk1unVxzJDVmyAMbKiHJjt45Ro1wV9kGGN6Fo2d1LM3nVmLZUD0AU9t9jUuTFDgI3cGn/BRjnrcsQdUfOO8PCjj/2ky0qgzkr0UdxNG+4XY6us4IvKePpVxmOv94i8MEQvOV33FcVjVnJTzuqFUNYSw31NSIFnr9HypHI9CZkX1ynB5cLbQlgU1uMLBoD1eaheFFoo8PiaD48VSFZ5CFsDVaX2UE MkimHYYAO+etEhzhIc+8RssAMEHdklpmtHxBh16aVyQcwlz/1WdfeMV8m6G+We1pkCUCh1oRSU3OL89btSqRWWZT247Q/MxIN3Uid9nAnBteXeLlO7xOOiFeAlgzrlxHolgMqVVIOJ2M1rgsMv2SUKXBKZ1ykANNPJDA3cDqA+njRN34PnGKNOmbTYr25w67S9kIr6q89RYezhJt316VVieyvvZ562SyFe EQp4+sXBgJjpaj/RrngwHM91gKUPsDDJYKysCLPCscKsnEA4GC4e4IXDHeA92cPBgaqfhAh4ATS7DsKTZeug1vvTCetcDCg8nyMc9N8mUhf4uvBb2U0DvkM6D6dC9zuoXrNLsFWrvx4+klBu4cMIMQS7YMIjOY07PEAaHrqjQDjKsLtaQriQbgqHlIPTiV913U3js86MWm++ZY8lNRt8qc7bOyg4P9svvD3 Rryz+T4/xk2/if+ANjfN7J5+cjL/BT7/TqHtuRO9F70d3o0l0P3oUfRmdRecRjX6Mfo3+iP6Mf4h/in+Of+lcr1/bct6Jek/8279E1ESy</latexit>
{Blind(bfpositioni)}⇠·Ai=1
<latexit sha1_base64="7O6mffD Y+u0AtarQgYVGtAvP6/o=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEO6Ev8QBsoEjF4tNp CANq5lICDhEWpaAQLksiCWRxpNRu92eaU3b3eou787E8pEXyGtwQlw4IC F4Cx6Cd6DaHoZ1e3os7arm6/q6qr6uajvVUlgYj/++cfO11994861bt6M 7b7/z7t2je+/9aFVlGL9gSirzPKWWS1HyCxAg+XNtOC1SyZ+lqy/d+rN LbqxQ5Q+w0XxW0EUpcsEoIDQ/GiV1kiI5e5ikuVZWOPiF+Chp5rV4PGle 1MlaJCxTEH/RzI+Oxyfj9omHxmRrHJ/eL/45JYScz+/d/iPJFKsKXgKT1 NrpZKxhVlMDgkneRElluaZsRRd8imZJC25ndVtWEz9AJItzZfCvhLhFr zNqWli7KVL0LCgsrb/mwH1r0wryz2a1KHUFvGRdoLySMajYaRRnwnAGco MGZQYlYTFbUkMZoJJR1NvLCW/Lqki54dnIVBL/XzowwzLlQiF9WTzql1p bDhZtD/0vZR/EDfpKOS9G5azmlcX8NPQpmXV69bHU0BUfYJyumABu+zi j2nVBH+RYI7oWzYMEs3edWZfKAeiCnlts6ty4ocBHbk285KOMdznijqh5 R3j88Sd+0kUlUWcl+yjupo3wi7FVmotFZTz9KuOx13tEXhiql4Kt+4riM atyU8zqhVTWUiN8TWiOZ6/R8qRyPQmpF9cpIcqFt4W0KKzHlxwA6/NQv ci1VODxtRgeK9C08hC+BqYK7aGGliiG4YMNxOplhzhLCuwTs8EOkGxkl5 iuHVFj1JWXyiU1VyLzW9XdM14l626Ue1qnCkCh1LlSUAiL89fvSqVWWJb 14LY/MBMP3kkd93EupdBWeLtM7RKPi1WAlwzqlFHrlQAqU6UaTMRuXmM c/pJfocAFLbM6AYBmOpmhgdsB1MeTpul7iAxj1AkvLfarG9w6aS+kvP72 CSqMPdwkuz69Tmxv5f3Ms3YpxMtDAc++PhgQM13tJ9qVCIYTmQ6w9AEWJ hmMleZhVjhWmJVRCAfDxQO8cLgDvKd7ODhQ9dMQAS+AZtdBeLJ8HdR6f zphnfMBRWRzhIP+20TqHF8Xfiu7acB3SOfhVOh+B9Vrdgm2avXXw0cSyi 18GCGG5JdceiSncYcHSMNDdxQIRxl2V0sIF9JN4ZBycDrxq667aXzWuVH rzff8q5KZDb5U5+0dFJyf7RfenujXFv+nR/jJN/E/8IbGxaOTz0/G3+G n3xnpnlvkA/IheUgm5FNySr4h5+SCMPKK/Eb+JH9FP0U/R79Ev3auN29s Oe+T3hP9/i96q0Nz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AdZCVKo tDWSDC+eXe+oBoUslKRc=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEHbCX2J+soEbXCyWS EEaVjORUMIhUlgIAnJZEEsijSejdrs905p2d6u7vDsTy0degNfghLhwQE LwEEg8BO9AtT0M6/b0WNpVzdf1dVV9XdV2pgW3MB7/fe36Sy+/8uprN27 Gr7/x5lu3jm6//b1VlaHsnCqhzLOMWCa4ZOfAQbBn2jBSZoI9zVafufW nF8xYruR3sNFsVpKF5AWnBBCaH43SOs2QnN9Ns0Iryx38nH+YNvOaP5w0 z+t0zVOaK0g+beZHx+OTcfskQ2OyNY4ffVD+8/W7fz0+m9+++XuaK1qVT AIVxNrpZKxhVhMDnArWxGllmSZ0RRZsiqYkJbOzui2rSe4gkieFMvgnI WnRq4yalNZuygw9SwJL6685cN/atILiwazmUlfAJO0CFZVIQCVOoyTnhl EQGzQINSgJTeiSGEIBlYzj3l5OeCurMmOG5SNTCfx/4cAcyxQLhfRlea9 fam0ZWLQ99L+UfRA36CvlvCgRs5pVFvPT0Kfk1unVxzJDVmyAMbKiHJj t45Ro1wV9kGGN6Fo2d1LM3nVmLZUD0AU9t9jUuTFDgI3cGn/BRjnrcsQd UfOO8PCjj/2ky0qgzkr0UdxNG+4XY6us4IvKePpVxmOv94i8MEQvOV33F cVjVnJTzuqFUNYSw31NSIFnr9HypHI9CZkX1ynB5cLbQlgU1uMLBoD1e aheFFoo8PiaD48VSFZ5CFsDVaX2UEMkimHYYAO+etEhzhIc+8RssAMEHd klpmtHxBh16aVyQcwlz/1WdfeMV8m6G+We1pkCUCh1oRSU3OL89btSqRW WZT247Q/MxIN3Uid9nAnBteXeLlO7xOOiFeAlgzrlxHolgMqVVIOJ2M1 rgsMv2SUKXBKZ1ykANNPJDA3cDqA+njRN34PnGKNOmbTYr25w67S9kIr6 q89RYezhJt316VVieyvvZ562SyFeEQp4+sXBgJjpaj/RrngwHM91gKUPs DDJYKysCLPCscKsnEA4GC4e4IXDHeA92cPBgaqfhAh4ATS7DsKTZeug1 vvTCetcDCg8nyMc9N8mUhf4uvBb2U0DvkM6D6dC9zuoXrNLsFWrvx4+kl Bu4cMIMQS7YMIjOY07PEAaHrqjQDjKsLtaQriQbgqHlIPTiV913U3js86 MWm++ZY8lNRt8qc7bOyg4P9svvD3Rryz+T4/xk2/if+ANjfN7J5+cjL/ BT7/TqHtuRO9F70d3o0l0P3oUfRmdRecRjX6Mfo3+iP6Mf4h/in+Of+lc r1/bct6Jek/8279E1ESy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="AdZCVKo tDWSDC+eXe+oBoUslKRc=">AAALAnicfVbNjtxEEHbCX2J+soEbXCyWS EEaVjORUMIhUlgIAnJZEEsijSejdrs905p2d6u7vDsTy0degNfghLhwQE LwEEg8BO9AtT0M6/b0WNpVzdf1dVV9XdV2pgW3MB7/fe36Sy+/8uprN27 Gr7/x5lu3jm6//b1VlaHsnCqhzLOMWCa4ZOfAQbBn2jBSZoI9zVafufW nF8xYruR3sNFsVpKF5AWnBBCaH43SOs2QnN9Ns0Iryx38nH+YNvOaP5w0 z+t0zVOaK0g+beZHx+OTcfskQ2OyNY4ffVD+8/W7fz0+m9+++XuaK1qVT AIVxNrpZKxhVhMDnArWxGllmSZ0RRZsiqYkJbOzui2rSe4gkieFMvgnI WnRq4yalNZuygw9SwJL6685cN/atILiwazmUlfAJO0CFZVIQCVOoyTnhl EQGzQINSgJTeiSGEIBlYzj3l5OeCurMmOG5SNTCfx/4cAcyxQLhfRlea9 fam0ZWLQ99L+UfRA36CvlvCgRs5pVFvPT0Kfk1unVxzJDVmyAMbKiHJj t45Ro1wV9kGGN6Fo2d1LM3nVmLZUD0AU9t9jUuTFDgI3cGn/BRjnrcsQd UfOO8PCjj/2ky0qgzkr0UdxNG+4XY6us4IvKePpVxmOv94i8MEQvOV33F cVjVnJTzuqFUNYSw31NSIFnr9HypHI9CZkX1ynB5cLbQlgU1uMLBoD1e aheFFoo8PiaD48VSFZ5CFsDVaX2UEMkimHYYAO+etEhzhIc+8RssAMEHd klpmtHxBh16aVyQcwlz/1WdfeMV8m6G+We1pkCUCh1oRSU3OL89btSqRW WZT247Q/MxIN3Uid9nAnBteXeLlO7xOOiFeAlgzrlxHolgMqVVIOJ2M1 rgsMv2SUKXBKZ1ykANNPJDA3cDqA+njRN34PnGKNOmbTYr25w67S9kIr6 q89RYezhJt316VVieyvvZ562SyFeEQp4+sXBgJjpaj/RrngwHM91gKUPs DDJYKysCLPCscKsnEA4GC4e4IXDHeA92cPBgaqfhAh4ATS7DsKTZeug1 vvTCetcDCg8nyMc9N8mUhf4uvBb2U0DvkM6D6dC9zuoXrNLsFWrvx4+kl Bu4cMIMQS7YMIjOY07PEAaHrqjQDjKsLtaQriQbgqHlIPTiV913U3js86 MWm++ZY8lNRt8qc7bOyg4P9svvD3Rryz+T4/xk2/if+ANjfN7J5+cjL/ BT7/TqHtuRO9F70d3o0l0P3oUfRmdRecRjX6Mfo3+iP6Mf4h/in+Of+lc r1/bct6Jek/8279E1ESy</latexit>
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<latexit sha1_base64="qtzyBIM67o7xR8g4uQmWk/DyTgM=">AAALT3icfVbfj9tEEN6WX20 O6LWIJ16sniohcZySSgj6UKkcUIH6ciCOVorTaL0eJ6usvdbu+C6p5f8FXuG/4Y3/hCfErB3CeZ2NpTtNvp1vZ/abmbWTUkmL4/Fft26/9fY777535+7o6P0PPrx3fP/BL1ZXRsCl0EqbVwm3oGQ BlyhRwavSAM8TBS+T1Tdu/eUVGCt18TNuSpjlfFHITAqOBM2PP47ruORiBfhaxs28lk8nzeuv58cn47Nx+0RDY7I1Tp49jD/7lTF2Mb8/OolTLaocChSKWzudjEuc1dygFAqaUVxZcHH4AqZkFjw HO6vb/JvoESFplGlDfwVGLXqTUfPc2k2ekGfOcWn9NQfuW5tWmH01q2VRVgiF6AJllYpQR06MKJUGBKoNGVwYSblGYskNF0iSjXpbOYFtUeUJGEhPTaXo/5UDUzqlWmhiL/PH/ZPWFtCS7aH/Zey DtEFfKOcluJrVUFlKr8Q+JbVOrj6WGE619DHgKyERbB8XvHRN0AeBzkiuefMopuxdB9aFdgC5kOcWmzo3MBzh1K3JN3CaQpcj7UiSd4Snn3/hJ51XimTWqo/SbqWR/mFslWRyURlPv8p47PUekRe Gl0sp1n1Fqcq62OSzeqG0tdxIXxOeUelLsjypXEti4sV1Sshi4W2hLAnr8RUg0vk8tFxkpdLo8Us5LCvypPIQWKPQeemhhhckhoHBBnL1pkOcpST1idlQByhxapeUrj3lxuhrL5Urbq5l6requ0+ 8k6y7Se5pnWhETVJnWmMuLY1fvyu1XtGxrAe3/UGZePBO6qiPg1KytNLbZWqXVC5RId0xpFPKrXcE1Kku9GAidvMa0fAXcE0C57xI6xgRm+lkRgZth1ifTJqm7yFTilHHUFjqVze4ddzeR1n9w7e kMPVwE+/69CYxoUsk3c88b5dCvCwU8Pz5wYCU6Wo/0a5kMJxMywCrPMCiJIOxkizMCscKs1KO4WC0eIAXDneA92IPhwaqfhEi0AXQ7DqIKgvroNb70wnrnA0oMp0THPTfJlJn9LrwW7n7Hth6OBW 630H1ml2CrVr99XBJQrmFixFiKLgC5ZGcxh0eIA2L7igYjjLsrpYQPkg3hUPKwemkr7fupvFZF0avNz/Bd4UwG3qpzts7KDg/2sr23T7c58ZigE6fSmZ/CSh4iHT+fE8sAv93H43os3Lif0QOjcvH Z0/Oxj/S5+U565477BP2kH3KJuxL9ox9zy7YJROsZr+x39kfoz9Hf4/+Odq63r61NT5ivefo7r8zc2GI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hDz2AeaSJD3IaAJukmpcR6JfFkU=">AAALT3icfVbNjts2EFaS/iT a/mxS9NSLkEWAAnUXdoCi7SHAdtsGLXLZBt0mgOUYFDWyCVOiQI527Qh6i75Ar+3b9JY36anoUHKdFWVawC7GH+fjDL+ZoZSUUhgcj9/cun3nnXffe//uvfDogw8/+vj4/oPfjKo0h0uupNIvE2Z AigIuUaCEl6UGlicSXiSr7+36iyvQRqjiV9yUMMvZohCZ4AwJmh9/GtdxyfgK8JWIm3ktnkyaV9/Nj0/Gp+P2iYbGZGucnD2Mv/j9zdnmYn4/PIlTxascCuSSGTOdjEuc1Uyj4BKaMK4M2DhsAVM yC5aDmdVt/k30iJA0ypSmvwKjFr3JqFluzCZPyDNnuDTumgX3rU0rzL6Z1aIoK4SCd4GySkaoIitGlAoNHOWGDMa1oFwjvmSacSTJwt5WVmBTVHkCGtKRriT9v7JgSqeUC0XsZf64f9LaABqyHfT /jF2QNugLZb04k7MaKkPpldinpMbK1ccSzaiWLgZsxQWC6eOclbYJ+iDQGck1bx7FlL3twLpQFiAX8txiU+sGmiGM7Jp4DaMUuhxpR5K8Izz58is36bySJLOSfZR2K7VwD2OqJBOLSjv6Vdphr/e IvNCsXAq+7itKVVbFJp/VC6mMYVq4mrCMSl+S5UhlWxITJ65VQhQLZwtpSFiHLwGRzueg5SIrpUKHX4phWZEllYPAGrnKSwfVrCAxNAw2EKvXHWItKahP9IY6QPKRWVK6ZsS0VtdOKldMX4vUbVV 7nzgnWXeT3NM6UYiKpM6UwlwYGr9+Vyq1omMZB277gzJx4J3UUR8HKUVphLPL1CypXLxCumNIp5QZ5wioUlWowUTs5jWi4S/gmgTOWZHWMSI208mMDNoOsT6ZNE3fQ6QUo46hMNSvdnDruL2Psvr nH0hh6uEm3vXpTWJCl0i6n3neLvl4mS/g+dODASnT1X6iWQlvOJGWHlZ5gEVJemMlmZ/lj+VnpQz9wWjxAM8f7gDv2R4ODVT9zEegC6DZdRBVFtZerfen49c5G1BEOifY679NpM7odeG2cvc9sPW wKnS/veo1uwRbtfrr/pL4cvMXw8eQcAXSIVmNO9xDGhbdUtAfZdhdLcF/kG4Kh5SD00lfb91N47IutFpvnsOPBdcbeqnO2zvIOz/KiPbdPtznxqKHTp9Ken8JKLiPdP50TywC37qHIX1WTtyPyKFx +fj029PxL/R5eR50z93gs+Bh8HkwCb4OzoKfgovgMuBBHfwR/Bn8Ff4d/hP+e7R1vX1ra3wS9J6je/8BbxVjDg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hDz2AeaSJD3IaAJukmpcR6JfFkU=">AAALT3icfVbNjts2EFaS/iT a/mxS9NSLkEWAAnUXdoCi7SHAdtsGLXLZBt0mgOUYFDWyCVOiQI527Qh6i75Ar+3b9JY36anoUHKdFWVawC7GH+fjDL+ZoZSUUhgcj9/cun3nnXffe//uvfDogw8/+vj4/oPfjKo0h0uupNIvE2Z AigIuUaCEl6UGlicSXiSr7+36iyvQRqjiV9yUMMvZohCZ4AwJmh9/GtdxyfgK8JWIm3ktnkyaV9/Nj0/Gp+P2iYbGZGucnD2Mv/j9zdnmYn4/PIlTxascCuSSGTOdjEuc1Uyj4BKaMK4M2DhsAVM yC5aDmdVt/k30iJA0ypSmvwKjFr3JqFluzCZPyDNnuDTumgX3rU0rzL6Z1aIoK4SCd4GySkaoIitGlAoNHOWGDMa1oFwjvmSacSTJwt5WVmBTVHkCGtKRriT9v7JgSqeUC0XsZf64f9LaABqyHfT /jF2QNugLZb04k7MaKkPpldinpMbK1ccSzaiWLgZsxQWC6eOclbYJ+iDQGck1bx7FlL3twLpQFiAX8txiU+sGmiGM7Jp4DaMUuhxpR5K8Izz58is36bySJLOSfZR2K7VwD2OqJBOLSjv6Vdphr/e IvNCsXAq+7itKVVbFJp/VC6mMYVq4mrCMSl+S5UhlWxITJ65VQhQLZwtpSFiHLwGRzueg5SIrpUKHX4phWZEllYPAGrnKSwfVrCAxNAw2EKvXHWItKahP9IY6QPKRWVK6ZsS0VtdOKldMX4vUbVV 7nzgnWXeT3NM6UYiKpM6UwlwYGr9+Vyq1omMZB277gzJx4J3UUR8HKUVphLPL1CypXLxCumNIp5QZ5wioUlWowUTs5jWi4S/gmgTOWZHWMSI208mMDNoOsT6ZNE3fQ6QUo46hMNSvdnDruL2Psvr nH0hh6uEm3vXpTWJCl0i6n3neLvl4mS/g+dODASnT1X6iWQlvOJGWHlZ5gEVJemMlmZ/lj+VnpQz9wWjxAM8f7gDv2R4ODVT9zEegC6DZdRBVFtZerfen49c5G1BEOifY679NpM7odeG2cvc9sPW wKnS/veo1uwRbtfrr/pL4cvMXw8eQcAXSIVmNO9xDGhbdUtAfZdhdLcF/kG4Kh5SD00lfb91N47IutFpvnsOPBdcbeqnO2zvIOz/KiPbdPtznxqKHTp9Ken8JKLiPdP50TywC37qHIX1WTtyPyKFx +fj029PxL/R5eR50z93gs+Bh8HkwCb4OzoKfgovgMuBBHfwR/Bn8Ff4d/hP+e7R1vX1ra3wS9J6je/8BbxVjDg==</latexit> 
packet0, packet1, id0fake
 
<latexit sha1_base64="7YX 0Kb8/dWtdfSpW41dLKkJb6u0=">AAALYHicfVZfj9tEEN+Wf 20C9A7e4MXiVGilcEoqIeABqTqgAvXlQBytFIfrej1OVll7r d3xXXJWvgES34VX+CI880WYtdNwXmdj6U6T385vZ+a3M2snp ZIWx+N/7tx948233n7n3v3B8N333n9wdPzBr1ZXRsCF0Eqbl wm3oGQBFyhRwcvSAM8TBS+S5bdu/cUVGCt18QuuS5jlfF7IT AqOBF0efRoryPBRXHKxBPxtPHptTUZxJtPPYiPnC3x8eXQyP h03T9Q3Jlvj5OnjP25eMcbOL48HJ3GqRZVDgUJxa6eTcYmzm huUQsFmEFcWXCg+hymZBc/BzuqmoE30kJA0yrShvwKjBr3Nq Hlu7TpPyDPnuLD+mgP3rU0rzL6a1bIoK4RCtIGySkWoI6dOl EoDAtWaDC6MpFwjseCGCyQNB52tnOK2qPIEDKQjUyn6f+XAl KpUc03sRf6kW2ltAS3ZHvo6Yx+kDbpCOS/B1ayGylJ6JXYpq XVydbHEcDpOHwO+FBLBdnHBS9cVXRCoRnLNNw9jyt61ZF1oB 5ALeW6xqXMDwxFGbk3ewCiFNkfakSRvCd98/oWfdF4pklmrLk q7lUb6xdgqyeS8Mp5+lfHYqz0izw0vF1KsuorSKetinc/qud LWciN9TXhGR1+S5UnlWhITL65TQhZzbwtlSViPrwCR6vPQcp 6VSqPHL2X/WJEnlYfACoXOSw81vCAxDPQ2kMubFnGWktQnZk 0doMTILihdO+LG6GsvlSturmXqt6q7YLxKVu0kd7RONKImqT OtMZeWxq/blVovqSzrwU1/UCYevJM66uKglCyt9HaZ2gUdl6 iQ7hjSKeXWKwF1qgvdm4jdvEY0/AVck8A5L9I6RsTNdDIjg7 ZDrE8mm03XQ6YUo46hsNSvbnDruLmPsvrH70hh6uFNvOvT28 SELpF0P/OsWQrxslDAs2cHA1Kmy/1Eu5TBcDItA6zyAIuSDM ZKsjArHCvMSjmGg9HiAV443AHe8z0cGqj6eYhAF8Bm10F0sr AKar0/nbDOWY8i00uCg/7bROqMXhd+K7efBFsPp0L7O6jeZp dgo1Z3PXwkodzChxFiKLgC5ZGcxi0eIPUP3VEwHKXfXQ0hXE g7hX3Kwemkz7n2pvFZ50av1j/D94Uwa3qpXjZ3UHB+tJXNu7 2/z63FAJ0+lcz+I6DgIdLZsz2xCPzffTCgz8qJ/xHZNy6enH 59Ov6JPi/PWPvcYx+zT9gjNmFfsqfsB3bOLphgv7M/2V/s78G /w/vDB8Pj1vXunS3nQ9Z5hh/9B95YZgo=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ctc 4+PyHr9/vaB5PriGV/330xQo=">AAALYHicfVbNjuNEEPYuf 7MJsDPLDS4Wo4VdKYySlRDLAWk1wAq0lwEx7EpxiNrtctJK2 211l2eSsfwGSFx5Ah6AK7wIZ16Eajsbxu10LM2o8nV9XVVfV 7UdF1IYHI//uXP3jTffevudo3uD4bvvvX//+OTBz0aVmsMlV 1LpVzEzIEUOlyhQwqtCA8tiCS/j1dd2/eUVaCNU/hNuCphlb JGLVHCGBM2PP4kkpPgoKhhfAf4yHr22JqMoFcmnkRaLJT6eH 5+Oz8bNE/aNydY4ffb4t5vi6I/fL+Yng9MoUbzMIEcumTHTy bjAWcU0Ci6hHkSlARuKLWBKZs4yMLOqKagOHxKShKnS9Jdj2 KC3GRXLjNlkMXlmDJfGXbPgvrVpienTWSXyokTIeRsoLWWIK rTqhInQwFFuyGBcC8o15EumGUfScNDZyipu8jKLQUMy0qWk/ 1cWTKhKuVDEXmZPupVWBtCQ7aCvM3ZB2qArlPXiTM4qKA2lV 2CXkhgrVxeLNaPjdDFgKy4QTBfnrLBd0QWBaiTXrH4YUfa2J atcWYBcyHOLTa0baIYwsmviBkYJtDnSjiR5S/jqs8/dpLNSks xKdlHardDCLcaUcSoWpXb0K7XDXu8ReaFZsRR83VWUTlnlm2 xWLaQyhmnhasJSOvqCLEcq25IYO3GtEiJfOFtIQ8I6fAmIVJ +DFou0kAodfiH6x4osLh0E1shVVjioZjmJoaG3gVjdtIi1pK A+0RvqAMlHZknpmhHTWl07qVwxfS0St1XtBeNUsm4nuaN1rB AVSZ0qhZkwNH7drlRqRWUZB276gzJx4J3UYRcHKUVhhLPL1C zpuHiJdMeQTgkzTgmoEpWr3kTs5jWk4c/hmgTOWJ5UESLW08 mMDNoOsTqd1HXXQyQUo4ogN9SvdnCrqLmP0ur7b0hh6uE62v XpbWJMl0iyn3neLPl4qS/g+fODASnT1X6iWQlvOJEUHlZxgE VJemPFqZ/lj+VnJQz9wWjxAM8f7gDvxR4ODVT1wkegC6DedR CdLKy9Wu9Px69z2qOIZE6w13+bSJXS68Jt5faTYOthVWh/e9 Wrdwk2anXX/Ufiy81/GD6GhCuQDslq3OIeUv/QLQX9Ufrd1R D8hbRT2KccnE76nGtvGpd1odV68yN8m3O9oZfqvLmDvPOjjG je7f19bi166PSppPcfAQX3kc6f74lF4P/ugwF9Vk7cj8i+cf nk7Muz8Q/0eXketM9R8FHwcfAomARfBM+C74KL4DLgwa/Bn8F fwd+Df4f3hveHJ63r3TtbzgdB5xl++B8Z42dg</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ctc 4+PyHr9/vaB5PriGV/330xQo=">AAALYHicfVbNjuNEEPYuf 7MJsDPLDS4Wo4VdKYySlRDLAWk1wAq0lwEx7EpxiNrtctJK2 211l2eSsfwGSFx5Ah6AK7wIZ16Eajsbxu10LM2o8nV9XVVfV 7UdF1IYHI//uXP3jTffevudo3uD4bvvvX//+OTBz0aVmsMlV 1LpVzEzIEUOlyhQwqtCA8tiCS/j1dd2/eUVaCNU/hNuCphlb JGLVHCGBM2PP4kkpPgoKhhfAf4yHr22JqMoFcmnkRaLJT6eH 5+Oz8bNE/aNydY4ffb4t5vi6I/fL+Yng9MoUbzMIEcumTHTy bjAWcU0Ci6hHkSlARuKLWBKZs4yMLOqKagOHxKShKnS9Jdj2 KC3GRXLjNlkMXlmDJfGXbPgvrVpienTWSXyokTIeRsoLWWIK rTqhInQwFFuyGBcC8o15EumGUfScNDZyipu8jKLQUMy0qWk/ 1cWTKhKuVDEXmZPupVWBtCQ7aCvM3ZB2qArlPXiTM4qKA2lV 2CXkhgrVxeLNaPjdDFgKy4QTBfnrLBd0QWBaiTXrH4YUfa2J atcWYBcyHOLTa0baIYwsmviBkYJtDnSjiR5S/jqs8/dpLNSks xKdlHardDCLcaUcSoWpXb0K7XDXu8ReaFZsRR83VWUTlnlm2 xWLaQyhmnhasJSOvqCLEcq25IYO3GtEiJfOFtIQ8I6fAmIVJ +DFou0kAodfiH6x4osLh0E1shVVjioZjmJoaG3gVjdtIi1pK A+0RvqAMlHZknpmhHTWl07qVwxfS0St1XtBeNUsm4nuaN1rB AVSZ0qhZkwNH7drlRqRWUZB276gzJx4J3UYRcHKUVhhLPL1C zpuHiJdMeQTgkzTgmoEpWr3kTs5jWk4c/hmgTOWJ5UESLW08 mMDNoOsTqd1HXXQyQUo4ogN9SvdnCrqLmP0ur7b0hh6uE62v XpbWJMl0iyn3neLPl4qS/g+fODASnT1X6iWQlvOJEUHlZxgE VJemPFqZ/lj+VnJQz9wWjxAM8f7gDvxR4ODVT1wkegC6DedR CdLKy9Wu9Px69z2qOIZE6w13+bSJXS68Jt5faTYOthVWh/e9 Wrdwk2anXX/Ufiy81/GD6GhCuQDslq3OIeUv/QLQX9Ufrd1R D8hbRT2KccnE76nGtvGpd1odV68yN8m3O9oZfqvLmDvPOjjG je7f19bi166PSppPcfAQX3kc6f74lF4P/ugwF9Vk7cj8i+cf nk7Muz8Q/0eXketM9R8FHwcfAomARfBM+C74KL4DLgwa/Bn8F fwd+Df4f3hveHJ63r3TtbzgdB5xl++B8Z42dg</latexit>
 
packet0, packet1, id0fake
 
<latexit sha1_base64="7YX0Kb8/dWtdfSpW41dLKkJb6u0 =">AAALYHicfVZfj9tEEN+Wf20C9A7e4MXiVGilcEoqIeABqTqgAvXlQBytFIfrej1OVll7rd3xXXJWvgES34VX+CI880WYt dNwXmdj6U6T385vZ+a3M2snpZIWx+N/7tx948233n7n3v3B8N333n9wdPzBr1ZXRsCF0Eqblwm3oGQBFyhRwcvSAM8TBS+S5 bdu/cUVGCt18QuuS5jlfF7ITAqOBF0efRoryPBRXHKxBPxtPHptTUZxJtPPYiPnC3x8eXQyPh03T9Q3Jlvj5OnjP25eMcbOL 48HJ3GqRZVDgUJxa6eTcYmzmhuUQsFmEFcWXCg+hymZBc/BzuqmoE30kJA0yrShvwKjBr3NqHlu7TpPyDPnuLD+mgP3rU0rz L6a1bIoK4RCtIGySkWoI6dOlEoDAtWaDC6MpFwjseCGCyQNB52tnOK2qPIEDKQjUyn6f+XAlKpUc03sRf6kW2ltAS3ZHvo6Y x+kDbpCOS/B1ayGylJ6JXYpqXVydbHEcDpOHwO+FBLBdnHBS9cVXRCoRnLNNw9jyt61ZF1oB5ALeW6xqXMDwxFGbk3ewCiFN kfakSRvCd98/oWfdF4pklmrLkq7lUb6xdgqyeS8Mp5+lfHYqz0izw0vF1KsuorSKetinc/qudLWciN9TXhGR1+S5UnlWhITL6 5TQhZzbwtlSViPrwCR6vPQcp6VSqPHL2X/WJEnlYfACoXOSw81vCAxDPQ2kMubFnGWktQnZk0doMTILihdO+LG6GsvlSturm Xqt6q7YLxKVu0kd7RONKImqTOtMZeWxq/blVovqSzrwU1/UCYevJM66uKglCyt9HaZ2gUdl6iQ7hjSKeXWKwF1qgvdm4jdvE Y0/AVck8A5L9I6RsTNdDIjg7ZDrE8mm03XQ6YUo46hsNSvbnDruLmPsvrH70hh6uFNvOvT28SELpF0P/OsWQrxslDAs2cHA1 Kmy/1Eu5TBcDItA6zyAIuSDMZKsjArHCvMSjmGg9HiAV443AHe8z0cGqj6eYhAF8Bm10F0srAKar0/nbDOWY8i00uCg/7bRO qMXhd+K7efBFsPp0L7O6jeZpdgo1Z3PXwkodzChxFiKLgC5ZGcxi0eIPUP3VEwHKXfXQ0hXEg7hX3Kwemkz7n2pvFZ50av1j /D94Uwa3qpXjZ3UHB+tJXNu72/z63FAJ0+lcz+I6DgIdLZsz2xCPzffTCgz8qJ/xHZNy6enH59Ov6JPi/PWPvcYx+zT9gjNmF fsqfsB3bOLphgv7M/2V/s78G/w/vDB8Pj1vXunS3nQ9Z5hh/9B95YZgo=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ctc4+PyHr9/vaB5PriGV/330xQo =">AAALYHicfVbNjuNEEPYuf7MJsDPLDS4Wo4VdKYySlRDLAWk1wAq0lwEx7EpxiNrtctJK2211l2eSsfwGSFx5Ah6AK7wIZ 16Eajsbxu10LM2o8nV9XVVfV7UdF1IYHI//uXP3jTffevudo3uD4bvvvX//+OTBz0aVmsMlV1LpVzEzIEUOlyhQwqtCA8tiC S/j1dd2/eUVaCNU/hNuCphlbJGLVHCGBM2PP4kkpPgoKhhfAf4yHr22JqMoFcmnkRaLJT6eH5+Oz8bNE/aNydY4ffb4t5vi6 I/fL+Yng9MoUbzMIEcumTHTybjAWcU0Ci6hHkSlARuKLWBKZs4yMLOqKagOHxKShKnS9Jdj2KC3GRXLjNlkMXlmDJfGXbPgv rVpienTWSXyokTIeRsoLWWIKrTqhInQwFFuyGBcC8o15EumGUfScNDZyipu8jKLQUMy0qWk/1cWTKhKuVDEXmZPupVWBtCQ7 aCvM3ZB2qArlPXiTM4qKA2lV2CXkhgrVxeLNaPjdDFgKy4QTBfnrLBd0QWBaiTXrH4YUfa2JatcWYBcyHOLTa0baIYwsmviB kYJtDnSjiR5S/jqs8/dpLNSksxKdlHardDCLcaUcSoWpXb0K7XDXu8ReaFZsRR83VWUTlnlm2xWLaQyhmnhasJSOvqCLEcq25 IYO3GtEiJfOFtIQ8I6fAmIVJ+DFou0kAodfiH6x4osLh0E1shVVjioZjmJoaG3gVjdtIi1pKA+0RvqAMlHZknpmhHTWl07qV wxfS0St1XtBeNUsm4nuaN1rBAVSZ0qhZkwNH7drlRqRWUZB276gzJx4J3UYRcHKUVhhLPL1CzpuHiJdMeQTgkzTgmoEpWr3k Ts5jWk4c/hmgTOWJ5UESLW08mMDNoOsTqd1HXXQyQUo4ogN9SvdnCrqLmP0ur7b0hh6uE62vXpbWJMl0iyn3neLPl4qS/g+f ODASnT1X6iWQlvOJEUHlZxgEVJemPFqZ/lj+VnJQz9wWjxAM8f7gDvxR4ODVT1wkegC6DedRCdLKy9Wu9Px69z2qOIZE6w13 +bSJXS68Jt5faTYOthVWh/e9Wrdwk2anXX/Ufiy81/GD6GhCuQDslq3OIeUv/QLQX9Ufrd1RD8hbRT2KccnE76nGtvGpd1od V68yN8m3O9oZfqvLmDvPOjjGje7f19bi166PSppPcfAQX3kc6f74lF4P/ugwF9Vk7cj8i+cfnk7Muz8Q/0eXketM9R8FHwcfA omARfBM+C74KL4DLgwa/Bn8Ffwd+Df4f3hveHJ63r3TtbzgdB5xl++B8Z42dg</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ctc4+PyHr9/vaB5PriGV/330xQo =">AAALYHicfVbNjuNEEPYuf7MJsDPLDS4Wo4VdKYySlRDLAWk1wAq0lwEx7EpxiNrtctJK2211l2eSsfwGSFx5Ah6AK7wIZ 16Eajsbxu10LM2o8nV9XVVfV7UdF1IYHI//uXP3jTffevudo3uD4bvvvX//+OTBz0aVmsMlV1LpVzEzIEUOlyhQwqtCA8tiC S/j1dd2/eUVaCNU/hNuCphlbJGLVHCGBM2PP4kkpPgoKhhfAf4yHr22JqMoFcmnkRaLJT6eH5+Oz8bNE/aNydY4ffb4t5vi6 I/fL+Yng9MoUbzMIEcumTHTybjAWcU0Ci6hHkSlARuKLWBKZs4yMLOqKagOHxKShKnS9Jdj2KC3GRXLjNlkMXlmDJfGXbPgv rVpienTWSXyokTIeRsoLWWIKrTqhInQwFFuyGBcC8o15EumGUfScNDZyipu8jKLQUMy0qWk/1cWTKhKuVDEXmZPupVWBtCQ7 aCvM3ZB2qArlPXiTM4qKA2lV2CXkhgrVxeLNaPjdDFgKy4QTBfnrLBd0QWBaiTXrH4YUfa2JatcWYBcyHOLTa0baIYwsmviB kYJtDnSjiR5S/jqs8/dpLNSksxKdlHardDCLcaUcSoWpXb0K7XDXu8ReaFZsRR83VWUTlnlm2xWLaQyhmnhasJSOvqCLEcq25 IYO3GtEiJfOFtIQ8I6fAmIVJ+DFou0kAodfiH6x4osLh0E1shVVjioZjmJoaG3gVjdtIi1pKA+0RvqAMlHZknpmhHTWl07qV wxfS0St1XtBeNUsm4nuaN1rBAVSZ0qhZkwNH7drlRqRWUZB276gzJx4J3UYRcHKUVhhLPL1CzpuHiJdMeQTgkzTgmoEpWr3k Ts5jWk4c/hmgTOWJ5UESLW08mMDNoOsTqd1HXXQyQUo4ogN9SvdnCrqLmP0ur7b0hh6uE62vXpbWJMl0iyn3neLPl4qS/g+f ODASnT1X6iWQlvOJEUHlZxgEVJemPFqZ/lj+VnJQz9wWjxAM8f7gDvxR4ODVT1wkegC6DedRCdLKy9Wu9Px69z2qOIZE6w13 +bSJXS68Jt5faTYOthVWh/e9Wrdwk2anXX/Ufiy81/GD6GhCuQDslq3OIeUv/QLQX9Ufrd1RD8hbRT2KccnE76nGtvGpd1od V68yN8m3O9oZfqvLmDvPOjjGje7f19bi166PSppPcfAQX3kc6f74lF4P/ugwF9Vk7cj8i+cfnk7Muz8Q/0eXketM9R8FHwcfA omARfBM+C74KL4DLgwa/Bn8Ffwd+Df4f3hveHJ63r3TtbzgdB5xl++B8Z42dg</latexit>
Figure 5.2: Overview of the information exchanged between all parties during the access proto-
col, with A= logN
 
Enctpk+pkbf(c
i
3)
 A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64="PN swAyCNmT71A4pxJF/4Ljgpo5I=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FH bLX5mhsAWJGxCKWFW0YrqaaYWAi0plgQrUmwWxtNJkOjiO M2PFiS37ZHemUR6Ep+EWHoG34BE4TpZh44wn0q48n8/nc8 7nc2wnWgoL0+nfN26+9vobb7516+3R+J3b7753dOf9X62q DOPnTEllXiTUcilKfg4CJH+hDadFIvnzJP/WzT+/4MYKVf 4CW80XBV2VIhOMAkLLo0ex5BnE9SjmJTPLOgadfx4nmc6b e2z56KW4P4qNWK0hbpa1eDxrXn4zWh4dT0+m7RcNB7Orwf GTB/dv/0YIOVveGR3HqWJVwUtgklo7n001LGpqQDDJm1Fc Wa4py+mKz3FY0oLbRd1m10R3EUmjTBn8KyFq0euMmhbWbo sELQsKa+vPOXDf3LyC7KtFLUpdASbfOcoqGYGKnFRRKgxn ILc4oMwIjDVia2ooAxR01FvKyW/Lqki44enEVBL/XzgwxS zlSiF7XTzsZ1pbDhbHHvpfxD6IC/SFclaMykXNK4vhaehT Uuvk6mOJoTkfYJzmTAC3fZxR7UqkD3LMEU2L5m6M0bv6rE vlADRByyts7sy4ocAnbk684pOUdzHiiih5R3j84As/6KKS KLOSfRRX00b4ydgqycSqMp5+lfHYmz0irwzVa8E2fUVxl1 W5LRb1SiprqRG+JjTDrdc48qRyJQmJ59cpIcqVt4S0KKzH lxwA8/NQvcq0VODxtRhuK9Ck8hC+AaYK7aGGliiG4YMFRP6 qQ9xICqwTs8UKkGxi1xiunVBj1KUXygU1lyL1S9WdNl4mm 66Te1onCkCh1JlSUAiL7devSqVyTMt6cFsfGIkH76SO+ji XUmgrvFXmdo3bxSrAMwZ1Sqn1UgCVqlINOmLXrxE2f8kvU eCClimemQDNfLbAAS4HUB/PmqZvIVL0UeMZa7FeXePWcXs eZfWP36HCWMNNvKvT68QED5F0P/O0nQrxspDD06cHHWKk+ X6izUXQnUh1gKUPsDDIoK8kC7PCvsKslELYGU4e4IXdHeA 928PBhqqfhQh4ADS7CsKd5Zug1vvDCeucDSgixas+qFV2F Uid4XXhl7LrBrxDOgunQvc7qF6zC7BVqz8f3pJQbOHNCDE kv+DSIzmNOzxAGm66o0DYy7C6WkI4ka4Lh5SD3Ylvu+6k8 VlnRm22P/Pv8RG3xUt12Z5Bwf5RVrR3+3Cda5MBunsn7t8 CdB4inT7d4wvB/81H7lk58x+Rw8H5w5OvT6Y/4fPylHTfL fIR+ZTcIzPyJXlCfiBn5Jww8jv5g/xJ/hr9M/5w/PH4k87 05o0rzgek940/+xdr92px</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="f2 0RrduXjVPzTGxPlxbHxIARxkQ=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FE 7LX5mhsAWpNyAUsaroqtPVTCsEvajULlCBerMgllZMpiPH cTJWnNiyT3ZnGuU1KvE03MIj8BY8AsfJMmyc8UTalefz+X zO+XyO7VgJbmA6/fva9bfefufd9268Pxp/cPPDjw5uffyr kZWm7IxKIfXLmBgmeMnOgINgL5VmpIgFexHn39r5F+dMGy 7LX2Cj2KIgWclTTgkgtDx4GAmWQlSPIlZSvawjUPm9KE5V 3tyly4ev+NEo0jxbQdQsa/541rx6OloeHE6Pp+0XDgezy8 Hhk/tHN3+bvzk6Xd4aHUaJpFXBSqCCGDOfTRUsaqKBU8Ga UVQZpgjNScbmOCxJwcyibrNrwjuIJGEqNf6VELboVUZNCm M2RYyWBYGVcecsuGtuXkH6zaLmpaoAk+8cpZUIQYZWqjDh mlEQGxwQqjnGGtIV0YQCCjrqLWXlN2VVxEyzZKIrgf/PLZ hgliKTyF4VD/qZ1oaBwbGD/hexC+ICfaGsFSViUbPKYHgK +pTEWLn6WKxJzgYYIznlwEwfp0TZEumDDHNE06K5E2H0tj 7rUloATdDyEptbM6YJsImd46/ZJGFdjLgiSt4RHt//yg26 qATKLEUfxdWU5m4ypopTnlXa0a/SDnu9Q+RME7XidN1XFH dZlptiUWdCGkM0dzUhKW69wpEjlS1JiB2/VgleZs4SwqCw Dl8wAMzPQVWWKiHB4Ss+3FYgceUgbA1UFspBNSlRDM0GC/D 8dYfYkeBYJ3qDFSDoxKwwXDMhWssLJ5Rzoi944paqPW2cT NZdJ/e0jiWARKlTKaHgBtuvX5VS5piWceC2PjASB95KHfZ xJgRXhjurzM0Kt4tWgGcM6pQQ46QAMpGlHHTEtl9DbP6SX aDABSkTPDMBmvlsgQNcDqA+nDVN34In6KPGM9ZgvdrGraP 2PErrH79DhbGGm2hbp1eJMR4iyW7mSTvl46U+hyfP9jrES PPdRJNzrzueKA9L7WFhkF5fcepn+X35WQkBvzOc3MPzu9v De76Dgw1VP/cR8ABothWEO8vWXq13h+PXOR1QeIJXvVer9 DKQOsXrwi1l2w14h3QWVoXut1e9Zhtgq1Z/3r8lvtj8m+F jCHbOhEOyGne4hzTcdEsBv5dhdbUEfyJdFw4pe7sT33bdS eOyTrVcb35m3+MjboOX6rI9g7z9Iw1v7/bhOlcmPXT7Tty 9BejcRzp5tsMXgv+bj+yzcuY+IoeDswfHj46nP+Hz8iTov hvBp8EXwd1gFnwdPAl+CE6Ds4AGvwd/BH8Gf43+Gd8efzb +vDO9fu2S80nQ+8Zf/gvozmuF</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="f2 0RrduXjVPzTGxPlxbHxIARxkQ=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FE 7LX5mhsAWpNyAUsaroqtPVTCsEvajULlCBerMgllZMpiPH cTJWnNiyT3ZnGuU1KvE03MIj8BY8AsfJMmyc8UTalefz+X zO+XyO7VgJbmA6/fva9bfefufd9268Pxp/cPPDjw5uffyr kZWm7IxKIfXLmBgmeMnOgINgL5VmpIgFexHn39r5F+dMGy 7LX2Cj2KIgWclTTgkgtDx4GAmWQlSPIlZSvawjUPm9KE5V 3tyly4ev+NEo0jxbQdQsa/541rx6OloeHE6Pp+0XDgezy8 Hhk/tHN3+bvzk6Xd4aHUaJpFXBSqCCGDOfTRUsaqKBU8Ga UVQZpgjNScbmOCxJwcyibrNrwjuIJGEqNf6VELboVUZNCm M2RYyWBYGVcecsuGtuXkH6zaLmpaoAk+8cpZUIQYZWqjDh mlEQGxwQqjnGGtIV0YQCCjrqLWXlN2VVxEyzZKIrgf/PLZ hgliKTyF4VD/qZ1oaBwbGD/hexC+ICfaGsFSViUbPKYHgK +pTEWLn6WKxJzgYYIznlwEwfp0TZEumDDHNE06K5E2H0tj 7rUloATdDyEptbM6YJsImd46/ZJGFdjLgiSt4RHt//yg26 qATKLEUfxdWU5m4ypopTnlXa0a/SDnu9Q+RME7XidN1XFH dZlptiUWdCGkM0dzUhKW69wpEjlS1JiB2/VgleZs4SwqCw Dl8wAMzPQVWWKiHB4Ss+3FYgceUgbA1UFspBNSlRDM0GC/D 8dYfYkeBYJ3qDFSDoxKwwXDMhWssLJ5Rzoi944paqPW2cT NZdJ/e0jiWARKlTKaHgBtuvX5VS5piWceC2PjASB95KHfZ xJgRXhjurzM0Kt4tWgGcM6pQQ46QAMpGlHHTEtl9DbP6SX aDABSkTPDMBmvlsgQNcDqA+nDVN34In6KPGM9ZgvdrGraP 2PErrH79DhbGGm2hbp1eJMR4iyW7mSTvl46U+hyfP9jrES PPdRJNzrzueKA9L7WFhkF5fcepn+X35WQkBvzOc3MPzu9v De76Dgw1VP/cR8ABothWEO8vWXq13h+PXOR1QeIJXvVer9 DKQOsXrwi1l2w14h3QWVoXut1e9Zhtgq1Z/3r8lvtj8m+F jCHbOhEOyGne4hzTcdEsBv5dhdbUEfyJdFw4pe7sT33bdS eOyTrVcb35m3+MjboOX6rI9g7z9Iw1v7/bhOlcmPXT7Tty 9BejcRzp5tsMXgv+bj+yzcuY+IoeDswfHj46nP+Hz8iTov hvBp8EXwd1gFnwdPAl+CE6Ds4AGvwd/BH8Gf43+Gd8efzb +vDO9fu2S80nQ+8Zf/gvozmuF</latexit>
 
Enctpk+pkbf(c
i
3)
 A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64="PNswAyCNmT71A4pxJF/4Ljgpo5I=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FHbLX5mhsAWJGxCKWFW0Yrqaa YWAi0plgQrUmwWxtNJkOjiOM2PFiS37ZHemUR6Ep+EWHoG34BE4TpZh44wn0q48n8/nc87nc2wnWgoL0+nfN26+9vobb7516+3R+J3b7753dOf9X62qDOPnTEllXiTUcilKfg4CJH+hDadFIvnzJP/WzT+/4MYKVf4CW80XBV2VIhOMAkLLo0ex5 BnE9SjmJTPLOgadfx4nmc6be2z56KW4P4qNWK0hbpa1eDxrXn4zWh4dT0+m7RcNB7OrwfGTB/dv/0YIOVveGR3HqWJVwUtgklo7n001LGpqQDDJm1FcWa4py+mKz3FY0oLbRd1m10R3EUmjTBn8KyFq0euMmhbWbosELQsKa+vPOXDf3LyC7KtFL UpdASbfOcoqGYGKnFRRKgxnILc4oMwIjDVia2ooAxR01FvKyW/Lqki44enEVBL/XzgwxSzlSiF7XTzsZ1pbDhbHHvpfxD6IC/SFclaMykXNK4vhaehTUuvk6mOJoTkfYJzmTAC3fZxR7UqkD3LMEU2L5m6M0bv6rEvlADRByyts7sy4ocAnbk684 pOUdzHiiih5R3j84As/6KKSKLOSfRRX00b4ydgqycSqMp5+lfHYmz0irwzVa8E2fUVxl1W5LRb1SiprqRG+JjTDrdc48qRyJQmJ59cpIcqVt4S0KKzHlxwA8/NQvcq0VODxtRhuK9Ck8hC+AaYK7aGGliiG4YMFRP6qQ9xICqwTs8UKkGxi1xiunV Bj1KUXygU1lyL1S9WdNl4mm66Te1onCkCh1JlSUAiL7devSqVyTMt6cFsfGIkH76SO+jiXUmgrvFXmdo3bxSrAMwZ1Sqn1UgCVqlINOmLXrxE2f8kvUeCClimemQDNfLbAAS4HUB/PmqZvIVL0UeMZa7FeXePWcXseZfWP36HCWMNNvKvT68QED5 F0P/O0nQrxspDD06cHHWKk+X6izUXQnUh1gKUPsDDIoK8kC7PCvsKslELYGU4e4IXdHeA928PBhqqfhQh4ADS7CsKd5Zug1vvDCeucDSgixas+qFV2FUid4XXhl7LrBrxDOgunQvc7qF6zC7BVqz8f3pJQbOHNCDEkv+DSIzmNOzxAGm66o0DYy7 C6WkI4ka4Lh5SD3Ylvu+6k8VlnRm22P/Pv8RG3xUt12Z5Bwf5RVrR3+3Cda5MBunsn7t8CdB4inT7d4wvB/81H7lk58x+Rw8H5w5OvT6Y/4fPylHTfLfIR+ZTcIzPyJXlCfiBn5Jww8jv5g/xJ/hr9M/5w/PH4k8705o0rzgek940/+xdr92px</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="f20RrduXjVPzTGxPlxbHxIARxkQ=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FE7LX5mhsAWpNyAUsaroqtPVT CsEvajULlCBerMgllZMpiPHcTJWnNiyT3ZnGuU1KvE03MIj8BY8AsfJMmyc8UTalefz+XzO+XyO7VgJbmA6/fva9bfefufd9268Pxp/cPPDjw5uffyrkZWm7IxKIfXLmBgmeMnOgINgL5VmpIgFexHn39r5F+dMGy7LX2Cj2KIgWclTTgkgtDx4G AmWQlSPIlZSvawjUPm9KE5V3tyly4ev+NEo0jxbQdQsa/541rx6OloeHE6Pp+0XDgezy8Hhk/tHN3+bvzk6Xd4aHUaJpFXBSqCCGDOfTRUsaqKBU8GaUVQZpgjNScbmOCxJwcyibrNrwjuIJGEqNf6VELboVUZNCmM2RYyWBYGVcecsuGtuXkH6z aLmpaoAk+8cpZUIQYZWqjDhmlEQGxwQqjnGGtIV0YQCCjrqLWXlN2VVxEyzZKIrgf/PLZhgliKTyF4VD/qZ1oaBwbGD/hexC+ICfaGsFSViUbPKYHgK+pTEWLn6WKxJzgYYIznlwEwfp0TZEumDDHNE06K5E2H0tj7rUloATdDyEptbM6YJsImd4 6/ZJGFdjLgiSt4RHt//yg26qATKLEUfxdWU5m4ypopTnlXa0a/SDnu9Q+RME7XidN1XFHdZlptiUWdCGkM0dzUhKW69wpEjlS1JiB2/VgleZs4SwqCwDl8wAMzPQVWWKiHB4Ss+3FYgceUgbA1UFspBNSlRDM0GC/D8dYfYkeBYJ3qDFSDoxKwwXD MhWssLJ5Rzoi944paqPW2cTNZdJ/e0jiWARKlTKaHgBtuvX5VS5piWceC2PjASB95KHfZxJgRXhjurzM0Kt4tWgGcM6pQQ46QAMpGlHHTEtl9DbP6SXaDABSkTPDMBmvlsgQNcDqA+nDVN34In6KPGM9ZgvdrGraP2PErrH79DhbGGm2hbp1eJMR 4iyW7mSTvl46U+hyfP9jrESPPdRJNzrzueKA9L7WFhkF5fcepn+X35WQkBvzOc3MPzu9vDe76Dgw1VP/cR8ABothWEO8vWXq13h+PXOR1QeIJXvVer9DKQOsXrwi1l2w14h3QWVoXut1e9Zhtgq1Z/3r8lvtj8m+FjCHbOhEOyGne4hzTcdEsBv5 dhdbUEfyJdFw4pe7sT33bdSeOyTrVcb35m3+MjboOX6rI9g7z9Iw1v7/bhOlcmPXT7Tty9BejcRzp5tsMXgv+bj+yzcuY+IoeDswfHj46nP+Hz8iTovhvBp8EXwd1gFnwdPAl+CE6Ds4AGvwd/BH8Gf43+Gd8efzb+vDO9fu2S80nQ+8Zf/gvozm uF</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="f20RrduXjVPzTGxPlxbHxIARxkQ=">AAALbXicfVbdjtw0FE7LX5mhsAWpNyAUsaroqtPVT CsEvajULlCBerMgllZMpiPHcTJWnNiyT3ZnGuU1KvE03MIj8BY8AsfJMmyc8UTalefz+XzO+XyO7VgJbmA6/fva9bfefufd9268Pxp/cPPDjw5uffyrkZWm7IxKIfXLmBgmeMnOgINgL5VmpIgFexHn39r5F+dMGy7LX2Cj2KIgWclTTgkgtDx4G AmWQlSPIlZSvawjUPm9KE5V3tyly4ev+NEo0jxbQdQsa/541rx6OloeHE6Pp+0XDgezy8Hhk/tHN3+bvzk6Xd4aHUaJpFXBSqCCGDOfTRUsaqKBU8GaUVQZpgjNScbmOCxJwcyibrNrwjuIJGEqNf6VELboVUZNCmM2RYyWBYGVcecsuGtuXkH6z aLmpaoAk+8cpZUIQYZWqjDhmlEQGxwQqjnGGtIV0YQCCjrqLWXlN2VVxEyzZKIrgf/PLZhgliKTyF4VD/qZ1oaBwbGD/hexC+ICfaGsFSViUbPKYHgK+pTEWLn6WKxJzgYYIznlwEwfp0TZEumDDHNE06K5E2H0tj7rUloATdDyEptbM6YJsImd4 6/ZJGFdjLgiSt4RHt//yg26qATKLEUfxdWU5m4ypopTnlXa0a/SDnu9Q+RME7XidN1XFHdZlptiUWdCGkM0dzUhKW69wpEjlS1JiB2/VgleZs4SwqCwDl8wAMzPQVWWKiHB4Ss+3FYgceUgbA1UFspBNSlRDM0GC/D8dYfYkeBYJ3qDFSDoxKwwXD MhWssLJ5Rzoi944paqPW2cTNZdJ/e0jiWARKlTKaHgBtuvX5VS5piWceC2PjASB95KHfZxJgRXhjurzM0Kt4tWgGcM6pQQ46QAMpGlHHTEtl9DbP6SXaDABSkTPDMBmvlsgQNcDqA+nDVN34In6KPGM9ZgvdrGraP2PErrH79DhbGGm2hbp1eJMR 4iyW7mSTvl46U+hyfP9jrESPPdRJNzrzueKA9L7WFhkF5fcepn+X35WQkBvzOc3MPzu9vDe76Dgw1VP/cR8ABothWEO8vWXq13h+PXOR1QeIJXvVer9DKQOsXrwi1l2w14h3QWVoXut1e9Zhtgq1Z/3r8lvtj8m+FjCHbOhEOyGne4hzTcdEsBv5 dhdbUEfyJdFw4pe7sT33bdSeOyTrVcb35m3+MjboOX6rI9g7z9Iw1v7/bhOlcmPXT7Tty9BejcRzp5tsMXgv+bj+yzcuY+IoeDswfHj46nP+Hz8iTovhvBp8EXwd1gFnwdPAl+CE6Ds4AGvwd/BH8Gf43+Gd8efzb+vDO9fu2S80nQ+8Zf/gvozm uF</latexit> 
Enctpk+pkbf(bfposition
i)
 ⇠·A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64="gTfc/AKu/oj7+S+XTp7qZ10bivo=">AAALgHicfVZtjxs1EHZboCWh9Aof+bLiVKkn0iOphHi RKpUrnED9ciCOVsqmwev1JtZ615Y9e5d0tf+ov4ZvCH4M42wIt944KyVxHs/jGT8z43WipbAwHv916/ad997/4O69DwfDj+5//ODo4Se/W1UZxi+Zksq8TqjlUpT8EgRI/lobTotE8ldJ/sLNv7rixgpV/gZrzWcFXZQiE4wCQvOj81jyDOJ6EPOSmXkd g86/iJNM581j96OscIZvxMkgNmKxhLiZ1+LZpHlTxysRs1RB9H0zmB8dj0/HmyfqDybbwfHzJyf3/yCEXMwfDo7jVLGq4CUwSa2dTsYaZjU1IJjkzSCuLNeU5XTBpzgsacHtrN5suIkeIZJGmTL4KSHaoDcZNS2sXRcJWhYUltafc+C+uWkF2TezWpS6A tSjdZRVMgIVOfWiVBjOQK5xQJlBaVjEltRQBqjxoLOUy4gtqyLhhqcjU0n8vnJgiruUC4XsZfG0u9PacrA49tD/IvZBXKArlLNiVM5qXlkMT0OXklonVxdLDM15D+M0ZwK47eKMalcMXZDjHtG0aB7FGL0r2bpUDkATtNxiU2fGDQU+cnPiLR+lvI0RV0 TJW8KzJ1/5QReVRJmV7KK4mjbC34ytkkwsKuPpVxmPvdoj8sJQvRRs1VUUs6zKdTGrF1JZS43wNaEZpl7jyJPKlSQknl+nhCgX3hLSorAeX3IA3J+H6kWmpQKPr0U/rUCTykP4CpgqtIcaWqIYhvcWEPnbFnEjKbBOzBorQLKRXWK4dkSNUddeKFfUXIvU L1V3AHk7WbWd3NE6UQAKpc6UgkJYbL9uVSqV47asB2/qAyPx4J3UURfnUgpthbfK1C4xXawCPGNQp5RabwugUlWqXkfs+jXC5i/5NQpc0DLFYxSgmU5mOMDlAOrjSdN0LUSKPmo8di3Wq2vcOt6cR1n98w+oMNZwE+/q9CYxwUMk3c8820yFeFnI4dn5Q YcYab6faHMRdCdSHWDpAywMMugrycKssK8wK6UQdoaTB3hhdwd4L/dwsKHqlyECHgDNroIws3wV1Hp/OGGdsx5FpPj2D2qVbQOpM3xd+KXsugHfIa2FU6H9H1Sv2QW4Uas7H05JKLZwMkIMya+49EhO4xYPkPpJdxQIe+lX14YQ3kjbhX3Kwe7E61570v isC6NW61/5j3ivW+NLdb45g4L9s73o7fF+YzJAd1fH/SlA5yHS2fkeXwj+bz5w18qJf4nsDy6fnn57Ov4Fr5dnpH3ukc/I5+QxmZCvyXPyE7kgl4SRd+RP8jf5Z3hneDL8cjhpTW/f2nI+JZ1n+N2/IiRyLw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RN/x++llJ4Ar1wlZ3jJlBZl0clM=">AAALgHicfVbdjttEFHZbfkpCYQuX3FisKnVFuk0qIVq kSmWBFag3C2JpRZxG4/E4GXnsGc0c7ya1/Bo8BU/DHYKH4YwdwnrsiaUkk2/ON+fMd84ZT6wENzCd/nXr9p133n3v/bsfjMYf3vvo46P7n/xqZKkpu6RSSP06JoYJXrBL4CDYa6UZyWPBXsXZt3b+1RXThsviF9gqtsjJquAppwQQWh6dR4KlEFWjiBVU L6sIVPZFFKcqqx/aH2m4NXzDT0aR5qs1RPWy4s9n9Zsq2vCIJhLCb+rR8uh4ejptnrA/mO0Gxy8endz7bf77ycXy/ug4SiQtc1YAFcSY+WyqYFERDZwKVo+i0jBFaEZWbI7DguTMLKpmw3X4AJEkTKXGTwFhg95kVCQ3ZpvHaJkTWBt3zoJDc/MS0qeLi heqBNSjdZSWIgQZWvXChGtGQWxxQKhGaWhI10QTCqjxqLOUzYgpyjxmmiUTXQr8vrJggrsUK4nsdf6ku9PKMDA4dtD/InZBXKArlLWiRCwqVhoMT0GXkhgrVxeLNclYD2MkoxyY6eKUKFsMXZDhHtE0rx9EGL0t2aqQFkATtNxhc2vGNAE2sXP8LZskrI 0RV0TJW8LzR1+6QeelQJml6KK4mtLc3Ywp45SvSu3oV2qHvRkQeaWJWnO66SqKWZbFNl9UKyGNIZq7mpAUU69w5EhlSxJix69VghcrZwlhUFiHLxgA7s9B1SpVQoLDV7yfViBx6SBsA1TmykE1KVAMzXoL8Oxti9iR4FgneosVIOjErDFcMyFay2snlCui r3nilqo9gJydbNpO7mgdSwCJUqdSQs4Ntl+3KqXMcFvGgZv6wEgceC912MWZEFwZ7qwyN2tMFy0BzxjUKSHG2QLIRBay1xH7fg2x+Qt2jQLnpEjwGAWo57MFDnA5gOp4VtddC56gjwqPXYP1ahu3iprzKK1+/A4Vxhquo32d3iTGeIgkw8yzZsrHS30Oz 84POsRIs2GiybjXHU+Uh6UOsDBIr6849bP8vvyshIDfGU4e4PndHeC9HOBgQ1UvfQQ8AOp9BWFm2car9XA4fp3THoUn+Pb3apXuAqlSfF24pWy7Ad8hrYVVof3vVa/eB9io1Z33p8QXmz8ZPoZgV0w4JKtxi3tI/aRbCvi99KurIfg30nZhn3KwO/G615 40LutCy832Z/Y93uu2+FJdNmeQt392F70B7zcmPXR7dRxOATr3kc7OB3wh+L/5yF4rZ+4lsj+4fHL67HT6E14vz4L2uRt8FnwePAxmwVfBi+CH4CK4DGjwR/Bn8Hfwz/jO+GT8eDxrTW/f2nE+DTrP+Ot/AZ77c0M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RN/x++llJ4Ar1wlZ3jJlBZl0clM=">AAALgHicfVbdjttEFHZbfkpCYQuX3FisKnVFuk0qIVq kSmWBFag3C2JpRZxG4/E4GXnsGc0c7ya1/Bo8BU/DHYKH4YwdwnrsiaUkk2/ON+fMd84ZT6wENzCd/nXr9p133n3v/bsfjMYf3vvo46P7n/xqZKkpu6RSSP06JoYJXrBL4CDYa6UZyWPBXsXZt3b+1RXThsviF9gqtsjJquAppwQQWh6dR4KlEFWjiBVU L6sIVPZFFKcqqx/aH2m4NXzDT0aR5qs1RPWy4s9n9Zsq2vCIJhLCb+rR8uh4ejptnrA/mO0Gxy8endz7bf77ycXy/ug4SiQtc1YAFcSY+WyqYFERDZwKVo+i0jBFaEZWbI7DguTMLKpmw3X4AJEkTKXGTwFhg95kVCQ3ZpvHaJkTWBt3zoJDc/MS0qeLi heqBNSjdZSWIgQZWvXChGtGQWxxQKhGaWhI10QTCqjxqLOUzYgpyjxmmiUTXQr8vrJggrsUK4nsdf6ku9PKMDA4dtD/InZBXKArlLWiRCwqVhoMT0GXkhgrVxeLNclYD2MkoxyY6eKUKFsMXZDhHtE0rx9EGL0t2aqQFkATtNxhc2vGNAE2sXP8LZskrI 0RV0TJW8LzR1+6QeelQJml6KK4mtLc3Ywp45SvSu3oV2qHvRkQeaWJWnO66SqKWZbFNl9UKyGNIZq7mpAUU69w5EhlSxJix69VghcrZwlhUFiHLxgA7s9B1SpVQoLDV7yfViBx6SBsA1TmykE1KVAMzXoL8Oxti9iR4FgneosVIOjErDFcMyFay2snlCui r3nilqo9gJydbNpO7mgdSwCJUqdSQs4Ntl+3KqXMcFvGgZv6wEgceC912MWZEFwZ7qwyN2tMFy0BzxjUKSHG2QLIRBay1xH7fg2x+Qt2jQLnpEjwGAWo57MFDnA5gOp4VtddC56gjwqPXYP1ahu3iprzKK1+/A4Vxhquo32d3iTGeIgkw8yzZsrHS30Oz 84POsRIs2GiybjXHU+Uh6UOsDBIr6849bP8vvyshIDfGU4e4PndHeC9HOBgQ1UvfQQ8AOp9BWFm2car9XA4fp3THoUn+Pb3apXuAqlSfF24pWy7Ad8hrYVVof3vVa/eB9io1Z33p8QXmz8ZPoZgV0w4JKtxi3tI/aRbCvi99KurIfg30nZhn3KwO/G615 40LutCy832Z/Y93uu2+FJdNmeQt392F70B7zcmPXR7dRxOATr3kc7OB3wh+L/5yF4rZ+4lsj+4fHL67HT6E14vz4L2uRt8FnwePAxmwVfBi+CH4CK4DGjwR/Bn8Hfwz/jO+GT8eDxrTW/f2nE+DTrP+Ot/AZ77c0M=</latexit>  
Enctpk(bfposition
i)
 ⇠·A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64="bO36Xtka016O/mVzLU3aHdUoSGM=">AAALenicfVbfjxs1EHbLr5JQuMIjLyuiSj 2RnpIKBDxUOg6oQH05EEcrZdPU6/VurHjXlj17l3S1/w5/Da8g8ccgMc6GcOuNs9KdnM/zeWY+z9hOtBQWJpO/79x96+133n3v3vuD4Qf3P/zo5MHHv1lVGcavmJLKvEyo5VKU/AoESP5SG06LRPIXyeo7N//imhsrVPkrbDSfFz QvRSYYBYQWJ+ex5BnE9SDmJTOLOga9ah7FSaaVFc7klTgdxEbkS4ibRS2eTptXdbwWMUsVRN82g8XJaHI22X5RfzDdDUbnj0/vvyaEXC4eDEZxqlhV8BKYpNbOphMN85oaEEzyZhBXlmvKVjTnMxyWtOB2Xm9TbaKHiKRRpgz+lR Bt0duMmhbWbooELQsKS+vPOfDQ3KyC7Ot5LUpdASrROsoqGYGKnG5RKgxnIDc4oMygNCxiS2ooA1R30FnK7YUtqyLhhqdjU0n8f+3AFLOUuUL2snjSzbS2HCyOPfS/iH0QF+gK5awYlfOaVxbD09ClpNbJ1cUSQ1e8h3G6YgK47e KMalcMXZBjjmhaNA9jjN4Va10qB6AJWu6wmTPjhgIfuznxho9T3saIK6LkLeHp4y/9oItKosxKdlFcTRvhJ2OrJBN5ZTz9KuOx1wdEzg3VS8HWXUVxl1W5KeZ1LpW11AhfE5rh1msceVK5koTE8+uUEGXuLSEtCuvxJQfA/DxU55 mWCjy+Fv1tBZpUHsLXwFShPdTQEsUwvLeAWL1pETeSAuvEbLACJBvbJYZrx9QYdeOFck3NjUj9UnVHj5fJuu3kjtaJAlAodaYUFMJi+3WrUqkVpmU9eFsfGIkH76WOujiXUmgrvFVmdonbxSrAMwZ1Sqn1UgCVqlL1OmLfrxE2f8 lvUOCClikeoADNbDrHAS4HUI+mTdO1ECn6qPHAtVivrnHreHseZfVP36PCWMNNvK/T28QED5H0MPNiOxXiZSGHF8+OOsRIV4eJdiWC7kSqAyx9hIVBBn0lWZgV9hVmpRTCznDyCC/s7gjv+QEONlT9PETAA6DZVxDuLF8HtT4cTl jnrEcRKd77Qa2yXSB1hteFX8quG/AOaS2cCu3voHrNPsCtWt358JaEYgtvRogh+TWXHslp3OIBUn/THQXCXvrVtSWEE2m7sE852p340GtPGp91adR68wv/AV90G7xUF9szKNg/u4feAe+3JgN092g8vAXoPES6eHbAF4L/mw/cs3 LqPyL7g6snZ9+cTX7G5+UFab975FPyGXlEpuQrck5+JJfkijDyO/mD/En+GvwzHA1Ph5+3pnfv7DifkM43/OJfKthwyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="c1jwyWcPCM3I18RyN4R39I4jgcY=">AAALenicfVbdjuM0FM4uf0vLwixcchNRrb QjuqN2BQIuVhoGWIH2ZkAMu6LpVo7jpFad2LJPZtqN8ho8Ak/DLUg8DBLHSSkTJ26kGbmfz+dzzudzbMdKcAOz2d937r7x5ltvv3Pv3dH4vfvvf3Dy4MNfjCw1ZVdUCqlfxsQwwQt2BRwEe6k0I3ks2It4842df3HNtOGy+Bl2ii 1zkhU85ZQAQquT80iwFKJqFLGC6lUVgdrUj6I4VdJwa/KKn44izbM1RPWq4k/n9asq2vKIJhLCr+vR6mQyO5s1X9gfzPeDyfnj0/u/Ln47vVw9GE2iRNIyZwVQQYxZzGcKlhXRwKlg9SgqDVOEbkjGFjgsSM7MsmpSrcOHiCRhKj X+FRA26G1GRXJjdnmMljmBtXHnLDg0tygh/XJZ8UKVgEq0jtJShCBDq1uYcM0oiB0OCNUoDQ3pmmhCAdUddZaye2GKMo+ZZslUlwL/X1swwSxFJpG9zp90M60MA4NjB/0vYhfEBbpCWStKxLJipcHwFHQpibFydbFYkw3rYYxsKA dmujglyhZDF2SYI5rm9cMIo7fFWhXSAmiClntsYc2YJsCmdo6/ZtOEtTHiiih5S3j6+HM36LwUKLMUXRRXU5q7yZgyTnlWake/Ujvs7YDImSZqzem2qyjusix2+bLKhDSGaO5qQlLceoUjRypbkhA7fq0SvMicJYRBYR2+YACYn4 OqLFVCgsNXvL+tQOLSQdgWqMyVg2pSoBia9Rbgm9ctYkeCY53oHVaAoFOzxnDNlGgtb5xQrom+4YlbqvbocTLZtp3c0TqWABKlTqWEnBtsv25VSrnBtIwDN/WBkTjwQeqwizMhuDLcWWVh1rhdtAQ8Y1CnhBgnBZCJLGSvIw79Gm LzF+wGBc5JkeABClAv5ksc4HIA1WRe110LnqCPCg9cg/VqG7eKmvMorX74FhXGGq6jQ53eJsZ4iCTDzItmysdLfQ4vnh11iJFuholmw73ueKI8LHWEhUF6fcWpn+X35WclBPzOcPIIz+/uCO/5AAcbqnruI+ABUB8qCHeWbb1aD4 fj1zntUXiC975Xq3QfSJXideGWsu0GvENaC6tC+9urXn0IsFGrO+/fEl9s/s3wMQS7ZsIhWY1b3EPqb7qlgN9Lv7oagj+Rtgv7lKPdiQ+99qRxWZdabnc/se/wRbfDS3XVnEHe/tk/9Aa835r00O2jcXgL0LmPdPFswBeC/5uP7L Ny7j4i+4OrJ2dfnc1+xOflRdB+94KPg0+CR8E8+CI4D74PLoOrgAa/B38EfwZ/jf4ZT8an409b07t39pyPgs43/uxfp69x3A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="c1jwyWcPCM3I18RyN4R39I4jgcY=">AAALenicfVbdjuM0FM4uf0vLwixcchNRrb QjuqN2BQIuVhoGWIH2ZkAMu6LpVo7jpFad2LJPZtqN8ho8Ak/DLUg8DBLHSSkTJ26kGbmfz+dzzudzbMdKcAOz2d937r7x5ltvv3Pv3dH4vfvvf3Dy4MNfjCw1ZVdUCqlfxsQwwQt2BRwEe6k0I3ks2It4842df3HNtOGy+Bl2ii 1zkhU85ZQAQquT80iwFKJqFLGC6lUVgdrUj6I4VdJwa/KKn44izbM1RPWq4k/n9asq2vKIJhLCr+vR6mQyO5s1X9gfzPeDyfnj0/u/Ln47vVw9GE2iRNIyZwVQQYxZzGcKlhXRwKlg9SgqDVOEbkjGFjgsSM7MsmpSrcOHiCRhKj X+FRA26G1GRXJjdnmMljmBtXHnLDg0tygh/XJZ8UKVgEq0jtJShCBDq1uYcM0oiB0OCNUoDQ3pmmhCAdUddZaye2GKMo+ZZslUlwL/X1swwSxFJpG9zp90M60MA4NjB/0vYhfEBbpCWStKxLJipcHwFHQpibFydbFYkw3rYYxsKA dmujglyhZDF2SYI5rm9cMIo7fFWhXSAmiClntsYc2YJsCmdo6/ZtOEtTHiiih5S3j6+HM36LwUKLMUXRRXU5q7yZgyTnlWake/Ujvs7YDImSZqzem2qyjusix2+bLKhDSGaO5qQlLceoUjRypbkhA7fq0SvMicJYRBYR2+YACYn4 OqLFVCgsNXvL+tQOLSQdgWqMyVg2pSoBia9Rbgm9ctYkeCY53oHVaAoFOzxnDNlGgtb5xQrom+4YlbqvbocTLZtp3c0TqWABKlTqWEnBtsv25VSrnBtIwDN/WBkTjwQeqwizMhuDLcWWVh1rhdtAQ8Y1CnhBgnBZCJLGSvIw79Gm LzF+wGBc5JkeABClAv5ksc4HIA1WRe110LnqCPCg9cg/VqG7eKmvMorX74FhXGGq6jQ53eJsZ4iCTDzItmysdLfQ4vnh11iJFuholmw73ueKI8LHWEhUF6fcWpn+X35WclBPzOcPIIz+/uCO/5AAcbqnruI+ABUB8qCHeWbb1aD4 fj1zntUXiC975Xq3QfSJXideGWsu0GvENaC6tC+9urXn0IsFGrO+/fEl9s/s3wMQS7ZsIhWY1b3EPqb7qlgN9Lv7oagj+Rtgv7lKPdiQ+99qRxWZdabnc/se/wRbfDS3XVnEHe/tk/9Aa835r00O2jcXgL0LmPdPFswBeC/5uP7L Ny7j4i+4OrJ2dfnc1+xOflRdB+94KPg0+CR8E8+CI4D74PLoOrgAa/B38EfwZ/jf4ZT8an409b07t39pyPgs43/uxfp69x3A==</latexit>
 
Enctpk(bfposition
i)
 ⇠·A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64=" bO36Xtka016O/mVzLU3aHdUoSGM=">AAALenicfVbfj xs1EHbLr5JQuMIjLyuiSj2RnpIKBDxUOg6oQH05EEcr ZdPU6/VurHjXlj17l3S1/w5/Da8g8ccgMc6GcOuNs9K dnM/zeWY+z9hOtBQWJpO/79x96+133n3v3vuD4Qf3P/ zo5MHHv1lVGcavmJLKvEyo5VKU/AoESP5SG06LRPIXy eo7N//imhsrVPkrbDSfFzQvRSYYBYQWJ+ex5BnE9SDm JTOLOga9ah7FSaaVFc7klTgdxEbkS4ibRS2eTptXdbw WMUsVRN82g8XJaHI22X5RfzDdDUbnj0/vvyaEXC4eDE ZxqlhV8BKYpNbOphMN85oaEEzyZhBXlmvKVjTnMxyWt OB2Xm9TbaKHiKRRpgz+lRBt0duMmhbWbooELQsKS+vP OfDQ3KyC7Ot5LUpdASrROsoqGYGKnG5RKgxnIDc4oMy gNCxiS2ooA1R30FnK7YUtqyLhhqdjU0n8f+3AFLOUuU L2snjSzbS2HCyOPfS/iH0QF+gK5awYlfOaVxbD09Clp NbJ1cUSQ1e8h3G6YgK47eKMalcMXZBjjmhaNA9jjN4V a10qB6AJWu6wmTPjhgIfuznxho9T3saIK6LkLeHp4y/ 9oItKosxKdlFcTRvhJ2OrJBN5ZTz9KuOx1wdEzg3VS8 HWXUVxl1W5KeZ1LpW11AhfE5rh1msceVK5koTE8+uUE GXuLSEtCuvxJQfA/DxU55mWCjy+Fv1tBZpUHsLXwFSh PdTQEsUwvLeAWL1pETeSAuvEbLACJBvbJYZrx9QYdeO Fck3NjUj9UnVHj5fJuu3kjtaJAlAodaYUFMJi+3WrUq kVpmU9eFsfGIkH76WOujiXUmgrvFVmdonbxSrAMwZ1S qn1UgCVqlL1OmLfrxE2f8lvUOCClikeoADNbDrHAS4H UI+mTdO1ECn6qPHAtVivrnHreHseZfVP36PCWMNNvK/ T28QED5H0MPNiOxXiZSGHF8+OOsRIV4eJdiWC7kSqAy x9hIVBBn0lWZgV9hVmpRTCznDyCC/s7gjv+QEONlT9P ETAA6DZVxDuLF8HtT4cTljnrEcRKd77Qa2yXSB1hteF X8quG/AOaS2cCu3voHrNPsCtWt358JaEYgtvRogh+TW XHslp3OIBUn/THQXCXvrVtSWEE2m7sE852p340GtPGp 91adR68wv/AV90G7xUF9szKNg/u4feAe+3JgN092g8v AXoPES6eHbAF4L/mw/cs3LqPyL7g6snZ9+cTX7G5+UF ab975FPyGXlEpuQrck5+JJfkijDyO/mD/En+GvwzHA1 Ph5+3pnfv7DifkM43/OJfKthwyA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64=" c1jwyWcPCM3I18RyN4R39I4jgcY=">AAALenicfVbdj uM0FM4uf0vLwixcchNRrbQjuqN2BQIuVhoGWIH2ZkAM u6LpVo7jpFad2LJPZtqN8ho8Ak/DLUg8DBLHSSkTJ26 kGbmfz+dzzudzbMdKcAOz2d937r7x5ltvv3Pv3dH4vf vvf3Dy4MNfjCw1ZVdUCqlfxsQwwQt2BRwEe6k0I3ks2 It4842df3HNtOGy+Bl2ii1zkhU85ZQAQquT80iwFKJq FLGC6lUVgdrUj6I4VdJwa/KKn44izbM1RPWq4k/n9as q2vKIJhLCr+vR6mQyO5s1X9gfzPeDyfnj0/u/Ln47vV w9GE2iRNIyZwVQQYxZzGcKlhXRwKlg9SgqDVOEbkjGF jgsSM7MsmpSrcOHiCRhKjX+FRA26G1GRXJjdnmMljmB tXHnLDg0tygh/XJZ8UKVgEq0jtJShCBDq1uYcM0oiB0 OCNUoDQ3pmmhCAdUddZaye2GKMo+ZZslUlwL/X1swwS xFJpG9zp90M60MA4NjB/0vYhfEBbpCWStKxLJipcHwF HQpibFydbFYkw3rYYxsKAdmujglyhZDF2SYI5rm9cMI o7fFWhXSAmiClntsYc2YJsCmdo6/ZtOEtTHiiih5S3j 6+HM36LwUKLMUXRRXU5q7yZgyTnlWake/Ujvs7YDImS Zqzem2qyjusix2+bLKhDSGaO5qQlLceoUjRypbkhA7f q0SvMicJYRBYR2+YACYn4OqLFVCgsNXvL+tQOLSQdgW qMyVg2pSoBia9Rbgm9ctYkeCY53oHVaAoFOzxnDNlGg tb5xQrom+4YlbqvbocTLZtp3c0TqWABKlTqWEnBtsv2 5VSrnBtIwDN/WBkTjwQeqwizMhuDLcWWVh1rhdtAQ8Y 1CnhBgnBZCJLGSvIw79GmLzF+wGBc5JkeABClAv5ksc 4HIA1WRe110LnqCPCg9cg/VqG7eKmvMorX74FhXGGq6 jQ53eJsZ4iCTDzItmysdLfQ4vnh11iJFuholmw73ueK I8LHWEhUF6fcWpn+X35WclBPzOcPIIz+/uCO/5AAcbq nruI+ABUB8qCHeWbb1aD4fj1zntUXiC975Xq3QfSJXi deGWsu0GvENaC6tC+9urXn0IsFGrO+/fEl9s/s3wMQS 7ZsIhWY1b3EPqb7qlgN9Lv7oagj+Rtgv7lKPdiQ+99q RxWZdabnc/se/wRbfDS3XVnEHe/tk/9Aa835r00O2jc XgL0LmPdPFswBeC/5uP7LNy7j4i+4OrJ2dfnc1+xOfl RdB+94KPg0+CR8E8+CI4D74PLoOrgAa/B38EfwZ/jf4 ZT8an409b07t39pyPgs43/uxfp69x3A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64=" c1jwyWcPCM3I18RyN4R39I4jgcY=">AAALenicfVbdj uM0FM4uf0vLwixcchNRrbQjuqN2BQIuVhoGWIH2ZkAM u6LpVo7jpFad2LJPZtqN8ho8Ak/DLUg8DBLHSSkTJ26 kGbmfz+dzzudzbMdKcAOz2d937r7x5ltvv3Pv3dH4vf vvf3Dy4MNfjCw1ZVdUCqlfxsQwwQt2BRwEe6k0I3ks2 It4842df3HNtOGy+Bl2ii1zkhU85ZQAQquT80iwFKJq FLGC6lUVgdrUj6I4VdJwa/KKn44izbM1RPWq4k/n9as q2vKIJhLCr+vR6mQyO5s1X9gfzPeDyfnj0/u/Ln47vV w9GE2iRNIyZwVQQYxZzGcKlhXRwKlg9SgqDVOEbkjGF jgsSM7MsmpSrcOHiCRhKjX+FRA26G1GRXJjdnmMljmB tXHnLDg0tygh/XJZ8UKVgEq0jtJShCBDq1uYcM0oiB0 OCNUoDQ3pmmhCAdUddZaye2GKMo+ZZslUlwL/X1swwS xFJpG9zp90M60MA4NjB/0vYhfEBbpCWStKxLJipcHwF HQpibFydbFYkw3rYYxsKAdmujglyhZDF2SYI5rm9cMI o7fFWhXSAmiClntsYc2YJsCmdo6/ZtOEtTHiiih5S3j 6+HM36LwUKLMUXRRXU5q7yZgyTnlWake/Ujvs7YDImS Zqzem2qyjusix2+bLKhDSGaO5qQlLceoUjRypbkhA7f q0SvMicJYRBYR2+YACYn4OqLFVCgsNXvL+tQOLSQdgW qMyVg2pSoBia9Rbgm9ctYkeCY53oHVaAoFOzxnDNlGg tb5xQrom+4YlbqvbocTLZtp3c0TqWABKlTqWEnBtsv2 5VSrnBtIwDN/WBkTjwQeqwizMhuDLcWWVh1rhdtAQ8Y 1CnhBgnBZCJLGSvIw79GmLzF+wGBc5JkeABClAv5ksc 4HIA1WRe110LnqCPCg9cg/VqG7eKmvMorX74FhXGGq6 jQ53eJsZ4iCTDzItmysdLfQ4vnh11iJFuholmw73ueK I8LHWEhUF6fcWpn+X35WclBPzOcPIIz+/uCO/5AAcbq nruI+ABUB8qCHeWbb1aD4fj1zntUXiC975Xq3QfSJXi deGWsu0GvENaC6tC+9urXn0IsFGrO+/fEl9s/s3wMQS 7ZsIhWY1b3EPqb7qlgN9Lv7oagj+Rtgv7lKPdiQ+99q RxWZdabnc/se/wRbfDS3XVnEHe/tk/9Aa835r00O2jc XgL0LmPdPFswBeC/5uP7LNy7j4i+4OrJ2dfnc1+xOfl RdB+94KPg0+CR8E8+CI4D74PLoOrgAa/B38EfwZ/jf4 ZT8an409b07t39pyPgs43/uxfp69x3A==</latexit> 
bfpositioni
 ⇠·A
i=1
<latexit sha1_base64= "6xS8gr8Q4pIP6jW4nxZsU2LUEz4=">AAALbHicfVb vjhs1EHfLv5JQuBbxqUJacSoC6XpKTkKUD5XKARWoX w7E0UrZNPV6ZxMr3vXKnr1Lutr34Gn4Cq/AU/AKjLM h3HrjrJTI+/P8PDM/z3idlEpaHI3+vnX7rbffefe9O +8Phh/c/fCjo3v3f7O6MgIuhVbavEy4BSULuESJCl 6WBnieKHiRLL9z8y+uwFipi19xXcI05/NCZlJwJGh2 dBYryDCuB3GSldpKh76Sg9jI+QLjZlbLJ+PmVR2vZC xSjdG3zWB2dDw6HW2eqD8YbwfHTx99efc1Y+xidm9w HKdaVDkUKBS3djIelTituUEpFDSDuLJQcrHkc5jQsO A52Gm9Sa6JHhKSRpk29Csw2qA3GTXPrV3nCVnmHBf Wn3PgvrlJhdnjaS2LskIoROsoq1SEOnJKRak0IFCta cCFIWVEJBbccIGk56CzlFPfFlWegIH0xFSK/q8cmFK Waq6JvcjPupnWFtDS2EP/i9gHaYGuUM5KcDWtobIUX oldSmqdXF0sMXwJPQz4UkgE28UFL10tdEGgHMk0bx 7GFL0rz7rQDiATstxiE2cGhiOcuDn5Bk5SaGOkFUny lvDk0Vd+0HmlSGatuiitVhrpJ2OrJJPzynj6VcZjr/ aIPDe8XEix6ipKu6yLdT6t50pby430NeEZbX1JI08q V5KYeH6dErKYe0soS8J6fAWIlJ+HlvOsVBo9fin724 o8qTwEVih0Xnqo4QWJYaC3gFy+aRE3UpLqxKypApQ 4sQsK155wY/S1F8oVN9cy9UvVHTZeJqu2kztaJxpRk 9SZ1phLS+3XrUqtl5SW9eBNfVAkHryTOurioJQsrfR WmdgFbZeokM4Y0inl1ksBdaoL3euIXb9G1PwFXJPAO S/SOkbEZjKe0oCWQ6yPx03TtZAp+ahjKCzVq2vcOt6 cR1n90/ekMNVwE+/q9CYxoUMk3c8830yFeFnI4fmz gw4p0uV+ol3KoDuZlgFWeYBFQQZ9JVmYFfYVZqUcw8 5o8gAv7O4A7/keDjVU/TxEoAOg2VUQ7SysglrvDyes c9ajyHRGcNB+G0id0efCL2XXDfQNaS2cCu17UL1mF+ BGre58eEtCsYU3I8RQcAXKIzmNWzxA6m+6o2DYS7+6 NoRwIm0X9ikHu5Oudu1J47MujF6tf4EfCmHW9FGdb c6gYP9s73l7vN+YDNDpqmT2bwE5D5HOn+3xReD/5gN 3rRz7l8j+4PLs9JvT0c90vTxn7XOHPWCfsS/YmH3Nn rIf2QW7ZIL9zv5gf7K/Bv8MPxk+GH7amt6+teV8zDr P8PN/AZACauU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "S+izigEdv/RB1Eh4rfW7VeT3hio=">AAALbHicfVb vjhs1EN+WfyWh9AriU4W04lREpespOQkBHyqVAypQv xyIoxXZNPJ6ZxMr3rVlz94lXe1rIJ6Gr/AKPAWvwDg bwq03zkqJvD/PzzPz84zXqZbC4mj0963bb7z51tvv3 Hl3MHzv7vv3ju5/8ItVleFwyZVU5mXKLEhRwiUKlP BSG2BFKuFFuvzGzb+4AmOFKn/GtYZpwealyAVnSNDs 6CyRkGNSD5I018oKh74Sg8SI+QKTZlaLJ+PmVZ2sRM IzhfHXzWB2dDw6HW2euD8YbwfHTx8/uvvr5LdHF7P7 g+MkU7wqoEQumbWT8UjjtGYGBZfQDJLKgmZ8yeYwoW HJCrDTepNcEz8kJItzZehXYrxBbzJqVli7LlKyLBg urD/nwH1zkwrzL6e1KHWFUPLWUV7JGFXslIozYYCjX NOAcUPK8JgvmGEcSc9BZymnvi2rIgUD2YmpJP1fOTC jLOVcEXtRnHUzrS2gpbGH/hexD9ICXaGcFWdyWkNlK TyNXUpmnVxdLDVsCT0M2JILBNvFOdOuFrogUI5kWj QPE4relWddKgeQCVlusYkzA8MQTtyceA0nGbQx0ook eUt48vhzP+iikiSzkl2UVtNG+MnYKs3FvDKefpXx2K s9Is8N0wvBV11FaZdVuS6m9Vwqa5kRviYsp63XNPKk ciWJqefXKSHKubeEtCSsx5eASPl5qJ7nWir0+Fr0tx VZWnkIrJCrQnuoYSWJYaC3gFi+bhE3koLqxKypAiQ /sQsK154wY9S1F8oVM9ci80vVHTZeJqu2kztapwpRk dS5UlgIS+3XrUqllpSW9eBNfVAkHryTOu7iIKXQVni rTOyCtotXSGcM6ZQx66WAKlOl6nXErl9jav4Srkngg pVZnSBiMxlPaUDLIdbH46bpWoiMfNQJlJbq1TVunWz Oo7z+4VtSmGq4SXZ1epOY0iGS7Weeb6ZCvDzk8PzZ QYcU6XI/0S5F0J3IdIClD7AoyKCvNA+zwr7CrIxh2B lNHuCF3R3gPd/DoYaqn4cIdAA0uwqinYVVUOv94YR1 znsUkc0IDtpvA6lz+lz4pey6gb4hrYVToX0PqtfsAt yo1Z0Pb0kotvBmhBgSrkB6JKdxiwdI/U13FAx76VfX hhBOpO3CPuVgd9LVrj1pfNaFUav1T/Bdyc2aPqqzz RkU7J/tPW+P9xuTATpdlcz+LSDnIdL5sz2+CPzffOC ulWP/EtkfXJ6dfnU6+pGul+dR+9yJHkSfRJ9F4+iL6 Gn0fXQRXUY8+j36I/oz+mvwz/Cj4YPhx63p7Vtbzod R5xl++i8M6Gv5</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "S+izigEdv/RB1Eh4rfW7VeT3hio=">AAALbHicfVb vjhs1EN+WfyWh9AriU4W04lREpespOQkBHyqVAypQv xyIoxXZNPJ6ZxMr3rVlz94lXe1rIJ6Gr/AKPAWvwDg bwq03zkqJvD/PzzPz84zXqZbC4mj0963bb7z51tvv3 Hl3MHzv7vv3ju5/8ItVleFwyZVU5mXKLEhRwiUKlP BSG2BFKuFFuvzGzb+4AmOFKn/GtYZpwealyAVnSNDs 6CyRkGNSD5I018oKh74Sg8SI+QKTZlaLJ+PmVZ2sRM IzhfHXzWB2dDw6HW2euD8YbwfHTx8/uvvr5LdHF7P7 g+MkU7wqoEQumbWT8UjjtGYGBZfQDJLKgmZ8yeYwoW HJCrDTepNcEz8kJItzZehXYrxBbzJqVli7LlKyLBg urD/nwH1zkwrzL6e1KHWFUPLWUV7JGFXslIozYYCjX NOAcUPK8JgvmGEcSc9BZymnvi2rIgUD2YmpJP1fOTC jLOVcEXtRnHUzrS2gpbGH/hexD9ICXaGcFWdyWkNlK TyNXUpmnVxdLDVsCT0M2JILBNvFOdOuFrogUI5kWj QPE4relWddKgeQCVlusYkzA8MQTtyceA0nGbQx0ook eUt48vhzP+iikiSzkl2UVtNG+MnYKs3FvDKefpXx2K s9Is8N0wvBV11FaZdVuS6m9Vwqa5kRviYsp63XNPKk ciWJqefXKSHKubeEtCSsx5eASPl5qJ7nWir0+Fr0tx VZWnkIrJCrQnuoYSWJYaC3gFi+bhE3koLqxKypAiQ /sQsK154wY9S1F8oVM9ci80vVHTZeJqu2kztapwpRk dS5UlgIS+3XrUqllpSW9eBNfVAkHryTOu7iIKXQVni rTOyCtotXSGcM6ZQx66WAKlOl6nXErl9jav4Srkngg pVZnSBiMxlPaUDLIdbH46bpWoiMfNQJlJbq1TVunWz Oo7z+4VtSmGq4SXZ1epOY0iGS7Weeb6ZCvDzk8PzZ QYcU6XI/0S5F0J3IdIClD7AoyKCvNA+zwr7CrIxh2B lNHuCF3R3gPd/DoYaqn4cIdAA0uwqinYVVUOv94YR1 znsUkc0IDtpvA6lz+lz4pey6gb4hrYVToX0PqtfsAt yo1Z0Pb0kotvBmhBgSrkB6JKdxiwdI/U13FAx76VfX hhBOpO3CPuVgd9LVrj1pfNaFUav1T/Bdyc2aPqqzz RkU7J/tPW+P9xuTATpdlcz+LSDnIdL5sz2+CPzffOC ulWP/EtkfXJ6dfnU6+pGul+dR+9yJHkSfRJ9F4+iL6 Gn0fXQRXUY8+j36I/oz+mvwz/Cj4YPhx63p7Vtbzod R5xl++i8M6Gv5</latexit>
Encpkbf0(BF)
<latexit sha1_base64= "vGnUsJ+9teqWERGC07CFi6CluPA=">AAALTXicf Vbfj9w0EHbLj5YU6JU+8hL1VFHEctqthGgfkKqln EB9ORBHK21WK8dxdq11Ysue3O02yt/SPpb/hlf+E Z4QYpwcy8VZb6Q7eT/P55n5PGM71VJYGI//vHHzv fc/+PDW7Y+iOx9/8undo3uf/WZVZRg/Z0oq8yqll ktR8nMQIPkrbTgtUslfpuvv3fzLC26sUOWvsNV8X tBlKXLBKCC0OLqf8JKZRZ2kuV5/0TxKpqdfLo6Ox yfj9ouHg8nV4PjZg+Srt4SQs8W96DjJFKsKXgKT1 NrZZKxhXlMDgkneRElluaZsTZd8hsOSFtzO6zb6J n6ISBbnyuBfCXGLXmfUtLB2W6RoWVBYWX/OgfvmZ hXkT+a1KHUFmGTnKK9kDCp2UsSZMJyB3OKAMiMw1 pitqKEMULCot5ST15ZVkXLDs5GpJP6/cGCGWcqlQ vaqeNzPtLYcLI499L+IfRAX6AvlrBiV85pXFsPT0 Kdk1snVx1JD13yAcbpmArjt44xqVwJ9kGOOaFo0Dx OM3tVfXSoHoAlaXmEzZ8YNBT5yc+I1H2W8ixFXRM k7wndff+MHXVQSZVayj+Jq2gg/GVuluVhWxtOvMh 57s0fkpaF6Jdimryjusiq3xbxeSmUtNcLXhOa49R pHnlSuJCH1/DolRLn0lpAWhfX4kgNgfh6ql7mWCj y+FsNtBZpWHsI3wFShPdTQEsUwfLCAWL/uEDeSAu vEbLECJBvZFYZrR9QYdemFckHNpcj8UnWniZfJpu vkntapAlAoda4UFMJi+/WrUqk1pmU9uK0PjMSDd1 LHfZxLKbQV3iozu8LtYhXgGYM6ZdR6KYDKVKkGHb Hr1xibv+SXKHBBy6xOAKCZTeY4wOUA6uNJ0/QtRI Y+ajxLLdara9w6ac+jvP7pOSqMNdwkuzq9TkzxEM n2M6ftVIiXhxxOTw86xEjX+4l2LYLuRKYDLH2AhU EGfaV5mBX2FWZlFMLOcPIAL+zuAO/FHg42VP0iRM ADoNlVEO4s3wS13h9OWOd8QBEZXulBrfKrQOocrw u/lF034B3SWTgVut9B9ZpdgK1a/fnwloRiC29GiC H5BZceyWnc4QHScNMdBcJehtXVEsKJdF04pBzsTny 7dSeNzzozarP9hf+Aj7UtXqqL9gwK9o+yor3bh+t cmwzQ3Xtw/xag8xBperrHF4L/m0cRPisn/iNyODh /fPL0ZPwzPi+npPtuk8/JA/KITMi35Bn5kZyRc8L Ilrwh78jv0R/RX9Hf0T+d6c0bV5z7pPfdufUv6gZ hEQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "pfiDw3U+H1YUbezVyQG0JQyQfGo=">AAALTXicf VZNj9s2EFXSj6RKPzbJMRchi6Ap6i7sAEWbQ4GF0 y5a5LItuk0AyzAoirIJUSJBjnatCPoXvffa/pte8 0d6KooOpa27okwL2AX9OI8z8zhDMlGCG5hO3966/ c67771/5+4H4b0PP/r4k6P7D34xstKUXVAppH6dE MMEL9kFcBDstdKMFIlgr5L8hZ1/dcm04bL8GWrFl gVZlzzjlABCq6OHMSupXjVxkqn80/ZpPD/7bHV0P D2Zdl80HsyuB8enj+PPf317Wp+v7ofHcSppVbASq CDGLGZTBcuGaOBUsDaMK8MUoTlZswUOS1Iws2y66 NvoCSJplEmNfyVEHXqT0ZDCmLpI0LIgsDHunAX3z S0qyL5eNrxUFWCSvaOsEhHIyEoRpVwzCqLGAaGaY 6wR3RBNKKBg4WApK68pqyJhmqUTXQn8f2nBFLMUa 4nsTfFsmGljGBgcO+h/EbsgLjAUylpRIpYNqwyGp 2BISY2Va4glmuRshDGSUw7MDHFKlC2BIcgwRzQt2i cxRm/rrymlBdAELa+xhTVjmgCb2Dn+hk1S1seIK6 LkPeGbL750gy4qgTJLMURxNaW5m4ypkoyvK+3oV2 mHvd0j8loTteF0O1QUd1mWdbFs1kIaQzR3NSEZbr 3CkSOVLUlIHL9WCV6unSWEQWEdvmAAmJ+DqnWmhA SHr/h4W4EklYOwLVBZKAfVpEQxNBstwPM3PWJHgm Od6BorQNCJ2WC4ZkK0lldOKJdEX/HULVV7mjiZbP tOHmidSACJUmdSQsENtt+wKqXMMS3jwF19YCQOvJ M6GuJMCK4Md1ZZmA1uF60AzxjUKSXGSQFkKks56o hdv0bY/CW7QoELUqZNDADtYrbEAS4H0BzP2nZowV P00eBZarBebeM2cXceZc0P36LCWMNtvKvTm8QED5 F0P3PeTfl4mc/h/OygQ4w03080Ofe646nysNQBFg bp9ZVkfpbfl5+VEvA7w8kDPL+7A7yXezjYUM1LHw EPgHZXQbizbOvVen84fp2zEYWneKV7tcquA2kyvC 7cUrbdgHdIb2FV6H971Wt3AXZqDef9W+KLzb8ZPo Zgl0w4JKtxj3tI4023FPB7GVdXR/An0nfhmHKwO/H t1p80Lutcy239E/sOH2s1Xqqr7gzy9o80vLvbx+v cmPTQ7Xtw/xagcx9pfrbHF4L/m4chPitn7iNyPLh 4dvL8ZPojPi/nQf/dDR4Fj4OnwSz4KjgNvg/Og4u ABnXwW/B78Ef4Z/hX+Hf4T296+9Y152Ew+O7d+Rc lt2KX</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "pfiDw3U+H1YUbezVyQG0JQyQfGo=">AAALTXicf VZNj9s2EFXSj6RKPzbJMRchi6Ap6i7sAEWbQ4GF0 y5a5LItuk0AyzAoirIJUSJBjnatCPoXvffa/pte8 0d6KooOpa27okwL2AX9OI8z8zhDMlGCG5hO3966/ c67771/5+4H4b0PP/r4k6P7D34xstKUXVAppH6dE MMEL9kFcBDstdKMFIlgr5L8hZ1/dcm04bL8GWrFl gVZlzzjlABCq6OHMSupXjVxkqn80/ZpPD/7bHV0P D2Zdl80HsyuB8enj+PPf317Wp+v7ofHcSppVbASq CDGLGZTBcuGaOBUsDaMK8MUoTlZswUOS1Iws2y66 NvoCSJplEmNfyVEHXqT0ZDCmLpI0LIgsDHunAX3z S0qyL5eNrxUFWCSvaOsEhHIyEoRpVwzCqLGAaGaY 6wR3RBNKKBg4WApK68pqyJhmqUTXQn8f2nBFLMUa 4nsTfFsmGljGBgcO+h/EbsgLjAUylpRIpYNqwyGp 2BISY2Va4glmuRshDGSUw7MDHFKlC2BIcgwRzQt2i cxRm/rrymlBdAELa+xhTVjmgCb2Dn+hk1S1seIK6 LkPeGbL750gy4qgTJLMURxNaW5m4ypkoyvK+3oV2 mHvd0j8loTteF0O1QUd1mWdbFs1kIaQzR3NSEZbr 3CkSOVLUlIHL9WCV6unSWEQWEdvmAAmJ+DqnWmhA SHr/h4W4EklYOwLVBZKAfVpEQxNBstwPM3PWJHgm Od6BorQNCJ2WC4ZkK0lldOKJdEX/HULVV7mjiZbP tOHmidSACJUmdSQsENtt+wKqXMMS3jwF19YCQOvJ M6GuJMCK4Md1ZZmA1uF60AzxjUKSXGSQFkKks56o hdv0bY/CW7QoELUqZNDADtYrbEAS4H0BzP2nZowV P00eBZarBebeM2cXceZc0P36LCWMNtvKvTm8QED5 F0P3PeTfl4mc/h/OygQ4w03080Ofe646nysNQBFg bp9ZVkfpbfl5+VEvA7w8kDPL+7A7yXezjYUM1LHw EPgHZXQbizbOvVen84fp2zEYWneKV7tcquA2kyvC 7cUrbdgHdIb2FV6H971Wt3AXZqDef9W+KLzb8ZPo Zgl0w4JKtxj3tI4023FPB7GVdXR/An0nfhmHKwO/H t1p80Lutcy239E/sOH2s1Xqqr7gzy9o80vLvbx+v cmPTQ7Xtw/xagcx9pfrbHF4L/m4chPitn7iNyPLh 4dvL8ZPojPi/nQf/dDR4Fj4OnwSz4KjgNvg/Og4u ABnXwW/B78Ef4Z/hX+Hf4T296+9Y152Ew+O7d+Rc lt2KX</latexit>
Encpkbf0(BF)
<latexit sha1_base64="vGnUsJ+9teqWERGC07CFi6CluPA=">AAALTXicfVbfj9w0EHbLj5YU6JU+8 hL1VFHEctqthGgfkKqlnEB9ORBHK21WK8dxdq11Ysue3O02yt/SPpb/hlf+EZ4QYpwcy8VZb6Q7eT/P55n5PGM71VJYGI//vHHzvfc/+PDW7Y+iOx9/8undo3uf/WZVZRg/Z0oq8yqllktR8nMQIPkrbTgtUslfp uvv3fzLC26sUOWvsNV8XtBlKXLBKCC0OLqf8JKZRZ2kuV5/0TxKpqdfLo6Oxyfj9ouHg8nV4PjZg+Srt4SQs8W96DjJFKsKXgKT1NrZZKxhXlMDgkneRElluaZsTZd8hsOSFtzO6zb6Jn6ISBbnyuBfCXGLXmfUt LB2W6RoWVBYWX/OgfvmZhXkT+a1KHUFmGTnKK9kDCp2UsSZMJyB3OKAMiMw1pitqKEMULCot5ST15ZVkXLDs5GpJP6/cGCGWcqlQvaqeNzPtLYcLI499L+IfRAX6AvlrBiV85pXFsPT0Kdk1snVx1JD13yAcbpmA rjt44xqVwJ9kGOOaFo0DxOM3tVfXSoHoAlaXmEzZ8YNBT5yc+I1H2W8ixFXRMk7wndff+MHXVQSZVayj+Jq2gg/GVuluVhWxtOvMh57s0fkpaF6Jdimryjusiq3xbxeSmUtNcLXhOa49RpHnlSuJCH1/DolRLn0lp AWhfX4kgNgfh6ql7mWCjy+FsNtBZpWHsI3wFShPdTQEsUwfLCAWL/uEDeSAuvEbLECJBvZFYZrR9QYdemFckHNpcj8UnWniZfJpuvkntapAlAoda4UFMJi+/WrUqk1pmU9uK0PjMSDd1LHfZxLKbQV3iozu8LtYh XgGYM6ZdR6KYDKVKkGHbHr1xibv+SXKHBBy6xOAKCZTeY4wOUA6uNJ0/QtRIY+ajxLLdara9w6ac+jvP7pOSqMNdwkuzq9TkzxEMn2M6ftVIiXhxxOTw86xEjX+4l2LYLuRKYDLH2AhUEGfaV5mBX2FWZlFMLOcP IAL+zuAO/FHg42VP0iRMADoNlVEO4s3wS13h9OWOd8QBEZXulBrfKrQOocrwu/lF034B3SWTgVut9B9ZpdgK1a/fnwloRiC29GiCH5BZceyWnc4QHScNMdBcJehtXVEsKJdF04pBzsTny7dSeNzzozarP9hf+Aj7U tXqqL9gwK9o+yor3bh+tcmwzQ3Xtw/xag8xBperrHF4L/m0cRPisn/iNyODh/fPL0ZPwzPi+npPtuk8/JA/KITMi35Bn5kZyRc8LIlrwh78jv0R/RX9Hf0T+d6c0bV5z7pPfdufUv6gZhEQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="pfiDw3U+H1YUbezVyQG0JQyQfGo=">AAALTXicfVZNj9s2EFXSj6RKPzbJM Rchi6Ap6i7sAEWbQ4GF0y5a5LItuk0AyzAoirIJUSJBjnatCPoXvffa/pte80d6KooOpa27okwL2AX9OI8z8zhDMlGCG5hO3966/c67771/5+4H4b0PP/r4k6P7D34xstKUXVAppH6dEMMEL9kFcBDstdKMFIlgr 5L8hZ1/dcm04bL8GWrFlgVZlzzjlABCq6OHMSupXjVxkqn80/ZpPD/7bHV0PD2Zdl80HsyuB8enj+PPf317Wp+v7ofHcSppVbASqCDGLGZTBcuGaOBUsDaMK8MUoTlZswUOS1Iws2y66NvoCSJplEmNfyVEHXqT0 ZDCmLpI0LIgsDHunAX3zS0qyL5eNrxUFWCSvaOsEhHIyEoRpVwzCqLGAaGaY6wR3RBNKKBg4WApK68pqyJhmqUTXQn8f2nBFLMUa4nsTfFsmGljGBgcO+h/EbsgLjAUylpRIpYNqwyGp2BISY2Va4glmuRshDGSU w7MDHFKlC2BIcgwRzQt2icxRm/rrymlBdAELa+xhTVjmgCb2Dn+hk1S1seIK6LkPeGbL750gy4qgTJLMURxNaW5m4ypkoyvK+3oV2mHvd0j8loTteF0O1QUd1mWdbFs1kIaQzR3NSEZbr3CkSOVLUlIHL9WCV6unS WEQWEdvmAAmJ+DqnWmhASHr/h4W4EklYOwLVBZKAfVpEQxNBstwPM3PWJHgmOd6BorQNCJ2WC4ZkK0lldOKJdEX/HULVV7mjiZbPtOHmidSACJUmdSQsENtt+wKqXMMS3jwF19YCQOvJM6GuJMCK4Md1ZZmA1uF6 0AzxjUKSXGSQFkKks56ohdv0bY/CW7QoELUqZNDADtYrbEAS4H0BzP2nZowVP00eBZarBebeM2cXceZc0P36LCWMNtvKvTm8QED5F0P3PeTfl4mc/h/OygQ4w03080Ofe646nysNQBFgbp9ZVkfpbfl5+VEvA7w8 kDPL+7A7yXezjYUM1LHwEPgHZXQbizbOvVen84fp2zEYWneKV7tcquA2kyvC7cUrbdgHdIb2FV6H971Wt3AXZqDef9W+KLzb8ZPoZgl0w4JKtxj3tI4023FPB7GVdXR/An0nfhmHKwO/Ht1p80Lutcy239E/sOH2s 1Xqqr7gzy9o80vLvbx+vcmPTQ7Xtw/xagcx9pfrbHF4L/m4chPitn7iNyPLh4dvL8ZPojPi/nQf/dDR4Fj4OnwSz4KjgNvg/Og4uABnXwW/B78Ef4Z/hX+Hf4T296+9Y152Ew+O7d+Rclt2KX</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="pfiDw3U+H1YUbezVyQG0JQyQfGo=">AAALTXicfVZNj9s2EFXSj6RKPzbJM Rchi6Ap6i7sAEWbQ4GF0y5a5LItuk0AyzAoirIJUSJBjnatCPoXvffa/pte80d6KooOpa27okwL2AX9OI8z8zhDMlGCG5hO3966/c67771/5+4H4b0PP/r4k6P7D34xstKUXVAppH6dEMMEL9kFcBDstdKMFIlgr 5L8hZ1/dcm04bL8GWrFlgVZlzzjlABCq6OHMSupXjVxkqn80/ZpPD/7bHV0PD2Zdl80HsyuB8enj+PPf317Wp+v7ofHcSppVbASqCDGLGZTBcuGaOBUsDaMK8MUoTlZswUOS1Iws2y66NvoCSJplEmNfyVEHXqT0 ZDCmLpI0LIgsDHunAX3zS0qyL5eNrxUFWCSvaOsEhHIyEoRpVwzCqLGAaGaY6wR3RBNKKBg4WApK68pqyJhmqUTXQn8f2nBFLMUa4nsTfFsmGljGBgcO+h/EbsgLjAUylpRIpYNqwyGp2BISY2Va4glmuRshDGSU w7MDHFKlC2BIcgwRzQt2icxRm/rrymlBdAELa+xhTVjmgCb2Dn+hk1S1seIK6LkPeGbL750gy4qgTJLMURxNaW5m4ypkoyvK+3oV2mHvd0j8loTteF0O1QUd1mWdbFs1kIaQzR3NSEZbr3CkSOVLUlIHL9WCV6unS WEQWEdvmAAmJ+DqnWmhASHr/h4W4EklYOwLVBZKAfVpEQxNBstwPM3PWJHgmOd6BorQNCJ2WC4ZkK0lldOKJdEX/HULVV7mjiZbPtOHmidSACJUmdSQsENtt+wKqXMMS3jwF19YCQOvJM6GuJMCK4Md1ZZmA1uF6 0AzxjUKSXGSQFkKks56ohdv0bY/CW7QoELUqZNDADtYrbEAS4H0BzP2nZowVP00eBZarBebeM2cXceZc0P36LCWMNtvKvTm8QED5F0P3PeTfl4mc/h/OygQ4w03080Ofe646nysNQBFgbp9ZVkfpbfl5+VEvA7w8 kDPL+7A7yXezjYUM1LHwEPgHZXQbizbOvVen84fp2zEYWneKV7tcquA2kyvC7cUrbdgHdIb2FV6H971Wt3AXZqDef9W+KLzb8ZPoZgl0w4JKtxj3tI4023FPB7GVdXR/An0nfhmHKwO/Ht1p80Lutcy239E/sOH2s 1Xqqr7gzy9o80vLvbx+vcmPTQ7Xtw/xagcx9pfrbHF4L/m4chPitn7iNyPLh4dvL8ZPojPi/nQf/dDR4Fj4OnwSz4KjgNvg/Og4uABnXwW/B78Ef4Z/hX+Hf4T296+9Y152Ew+O7d+Rclt2KX</latexit>
Figure 5.3: Overview of the Bloom filter creation for levels i − 1 and i, with A= 322l
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<latexit sha1_base64="qNZsy8iD/ uyiObI3+W8+Whcjr8g=">AAALvHicfVbfj+M0EE6PX0fL3e3BA0i8RKxO2hW9 VbuAgIcTxwIn0L0siOVOarrFcZzWihNb9qTbXpQX/kv+A/4MxslSNk7dSt16v /HnGX8zYztWghuYTP4e3Hvr7Xfefe/++8PRBw8ePjp6/OEfRpaasisqhdSvY2 KY4AW7Ag6CvVaakTwW7FWc/WDtr9ZMGy6L32Gr2Dwny4KnnBJAaHH0VyRYClH V/JwM6WJ6zcfDiBVUL6oIVPZ5xBOV1Sd0cX7NTx1TnLamL/qm1vAlGoaR5ssVn LY/Ub2o+LNpfV1Fip98f1oPF0fHk7NJ8wn7g+nt4Pj509MHfwZBcLl4PDyOEk nLnBVABTFmNp0omFdEA6eC1cOoNEwRmpElm+GwIDkz86oRqw6fIJKEqdT4LSB s0LuMiuTGbPMYZ+YEVsa1WXCfbVZC+s284oUqAYVoHaWlCEGGVvkw4ZpREFsc EKo5xhrSFdGEAuZn2FnKZtMUZR4zzZKxLgX+XVswwV2KpUT2Kj/v7rQyDAyOH fS/iF0QF+gKZWdRIuYVKw2Gp6BLSYyVq4vFmmSshzGSUQ7MdHFKlK24Lshwjz g1r59EGL0t96qQFsApOPMWm9lpTBNgY2vjb9g4YW2MuCJK3hKePf3KDTovBco sRRfF1ZTm7mZMGad8WWpHv1I77M0ekZeaqBWnm66imGVZbPN5tRTSGKK5qwlJ MfUKR45UtiQhdvxaJXixdJYQBoV1+IIB4P4cVC1TJSQ4fMX7aQUSlw7CNkBlr hxUkwLF0Ky3AM/etIgdCY51ordYAYKOzQrDNWOitbxxQlkTfcMTt1Tt4eXsZN N2ckfrWAJIlDqVEnJusP26VSllhtsyDtzUB0biwDupwy7OhODKcGeVmVlhumgJ eMagTgkxzhZAJrKQvY7Y9WuIzV+wGxQ4J0WC5ydAPZvOcYDLAVTH07ruzuAJ+ qjwvDVYr7Zxq6g5j9Lqlx9RYazhOtrV6V1ijIdIsp950Zh8vNTn8OLFQYcYab afaDLudddcOXtZ6gALg/T6ilM/y+/Lz0oI+J2h8QDP7+4A7+UeDjZU9dJHwAO g3lUQZpZtvFrvD8evc9qj8ASvfa9W6W0gVYrXhVvKthvwDmlnWBXa/73q1bsA G7W6dn9KfLH5k+FjCLZmwiFZjVvcQ+on3VLA76VfXQ3Bv5G2C/uUg92JT8X2p HFZl1putr+xn/BBt8VLddGcQd7+kYY3d3t/nTtGD92+GfenAJ37SBcv9vhC8P /pQ/usnLqPyP7g6vzs27PJr/i8vAjaz/3g0+Cz4CSYBl8Hz4Ofg8vgKqDBP4O Hg48Hn4y+G7FRNsrbqfcGt5yPgs5ntP4XusmE7g==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Lp+ef+IEc amleEN7bq7Dl0cN1ZM=">AAALvHicfVbdjuM0FE6Xv6Vll1m4AImbiNFKU9Ed tQMIuFixDLAC7c2AGHZF06kcx2mtOLFln3TajXLDQ/BuvAGPwXEylIlTT6VOP d/x53P8nXNsx0pwA9Pp34N7b7z51tvv3H93OHrvwcP3jx598LuRpabskkoh9a uYGCZ4wS6Bg2CvlGYkjwV7GWffW/vLDdOGy+I32Cm2yMmq4CmnBBBaHv0ZCZZ CVDU/J0O6nF3xyTBiBdXLKgKVfRbxRGX1CV2eXfGxY4rT1vR539QavkDDMNJ8t YZx+xPVy4o/ndVXVaT4yXfjerg8Op6eTptP2B/MbgbHz56MH/wx/2t8sXw0PI 4SScucFUAFMWY+mypYVEQDp4LVw6g0TBGakRWb47AgOTOLqhGrDh8jkoSp1Pg tIGzQ24yK5Mbs8hhn5gTWxrVZ8JBtXkL69aLihSoBhWgdpaUIQYZW+TDhmlEQ OxwQqjnGGtI10YQC5mfYWcpm0xRlHjPNkokuBf7dWDDBXYqVRPY6P+vutDIMD I4d9L+IXRAX6AplZ1EiFhUrDYanoEtJjJWri8WaZKyHMZJRDsx0cUqUrbguyH CPODWvH0cYvS33qpAWwCk48wab22lME2ATa+Ov2SRhbYy4IkreEp4++dINOi8 FyixFF8XVlObuZkwZp3xVake/Ujvs7QGRV5qoNafbrqKYZVns8kW1EtIYormr CUkx9QpHjlS2JCF2/FoleLFylhAGhXX4ggHg/hxUrVIlJDh8xftpBRKXDsK2Q GWuHFSTAsXQrLcAz163iB0JjnWid1gBgk7MGsM1E6K1vHZC2RB9zRO3VO3h5e xk23ZyR+tYAkiUOpUScm6w/bpVKWWG2zIO3NQHRuLAe6nDLs6E4MpwZ5W5WWO6 aAl4xqBOCTHOFkAmspC9jtj3a4jNX7BrFDgnRYLnJ0A9ny1wgMsBVMezuu7O4 An6qPC8NVivtnGrqDmP0urnH1BhrOE62tfpbWKMh0hymHnemHy81Ofw/PmdDj HS7DDRZNzrrrlyDrLUHSwM0usrTv0svy8/KyHgd4bGO3h+d3fwXhzgYENVL3w EPADqfQVhZtnWq/XhcPw6pz0KT/Da92qV3gRSpXhduKVsuwHvkHaGVaH936te vQ+wUatr96fEF5s/GT6GYBsmHJLVuMU9pH7SLQX8XvrV1RD8G2m7sE+5szvxq dieNC7rQsvt7lf2Iz7odnipLpszyNs/0vDmbu+vc8voods34+EUoHMf6fz5AV 8I/j99aJ+VM/cR2R9cnp1+czr9BZ+X50H7uR98EnwanASz4KvgWfBTcBFcBjT 4Z/Bw8NHg49G3IzbKRnk79d7ghvNh0PmMNv8CN6+GAg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Lp+ef+IEc amleEN7bq7Dl0cN1ZM=">AAALvHicfVbdjuM0FE6Xv6Vll1m4AImbiNFKU9Ed tQMIuFixDLAC7c2AGHZF06kcx2mtOLFln3TajXLDQ/BuvAGPwXEylIlTT6VOP d/x53P8nXNsx0pwA9Pp34N7b7z51tvv3H93OHrvwcP3jx598LuRpabskkoh9a uYGCZ4wS6Bg2CvlGYkjwV7GWffW/vLDdOGy+I32Cm2yMmq4CmnBBBaHv0ZCZZ CVDU/J0O6nF3xyTBiBdXLKgKVfRbxRGX1CV2eXfGxY4rT1vR539QavkDDMNJ8t YZx+xPVy4o/ndVXVaT4yXfjerg8Op6eTptP2B/MbgbHz56MH/wx/2t8sXw0PI 4SScucFUAFMWY+mypYVEQDp4LVw6g0TBGakRWb47AgOTOLqhGrDh8jkoSp1Pg tIGzQ24yK5Mbs8hhn5gTWxrVZ8JBtXkL69aLihSoBhWgdpaUIQYZW+TDhmlEQ OxwQqjnGGtI10YQC5mfYWcpm0xRlHjPNkokuBf7dWDDBXYqVRPY6P+vutDIMD I4d9L+IXRAX6AplZ1EiFhUrDYanoEtJjJWri8WaZKyHMZJRDsx0cUqUrbguyH CPODWvH0cYvS33qpAWwCk48wab22lME2ATa+Ov2SRhbYy4IkreEp4++dINOi8 FyixFF8XVlObuZkwZp3xVake/Ujvs7QGRV5qoNafbrqKYZVns8kW1EtIYormr CUkx9QpHjlS2JCF2/FoleLFylhAGhXX4ggHg/hxUrVIlJDh8xftpBRKXDsK2Q GWuHFSTAsXQrLcAz163iB0JjnWid1gBgk7MGsM1E6K1vHZC2RB9zRO3VO3h5e xk23ZyR+tYAkiUOpUScm6w/bpVKWWG2zIO3NQHRuLAe6nDLs6E4MpwZ5W5WWO6 aAl4xqBOCTHOFkAmspC9jtj3a4jNX7BrFDgnRYLnJ0A9ny1wgMsBVMezuu7O4 An6qPC8NVivtnGrqDmP0urnH1BhrOE62tfpbWKMh0hymHnemHy81Ofw/PmdDj HS7DDRZNzrrrlyDrLUHSwM0usrTv0svy8/KyHgd4bGO3h+d3fwXhzgYENVL3w EPADqfQVhZtnWq/XhcPw6pz0KT/Da92qV3gRSpXhduKVsuwHvkHaGVaH936te vQ+wUatr96fEF5s/GT6GYBsmHJLVuMU9pH7SLQX8XvrV1RD8G2m7sE+5szvxq dieNC7rQsvt7lf2Iz7odnipLpszyNs/0vDmbu+vc8voods34+EUoHMf6fz5AV 8I/j99aJ+VM/cR2R9cnp1+czr9BZ+X50H7uR98EnwanASz4KvgWfBTcBFcBjT 4Z/Bw8NHg49G3IzbKRnk79d7ghvNh0PmMNv8CN6+GAg==</latexit>
Figure 5.4: Overview of the level update of levels i − 1 and i, with A= 322l
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adaptive chosen query attack, and computationally indistinguishable proxy re-encrypted ciphertexts un-
der adaptive chosen plaintext attack. Then Proxy-ORAM is IND-CQA secure according to Definition 15.
Proof. Since the proxy and the cloud do not collude, we can examine each of them separately, every time
making use of Definition 15 which considers only one adversarial server. First, assume that there exists a
PPT adversary A that having control of the cloud, wins the IND-CQA game (according to Definition 15)
with a non-negligible advantage δ. We will construct a PPT algorithm B that breaks either the semantic
security, or the blinding security, or the re-encryption security of the encryption scheme. Let the cloud’s
view be the union of the contents of the proxy’s and the investigator’s, and the proxy’s and the cloud’s
communication tapes (as in Definition 30), and recall that the cloud’s view consists of the view during the
access and the view during a potential Bloom filter creation and level update. These can be of different
lengths, depending on the number of the Proxy-ORAM access we are making (for example, in the first
access no reshuﬄe is triggered) and for a summary of the partys’ views, we refer to Figures 5.2 to 5.4.
Observe however that in every access the cloud sees at least one blinded encryption of the contents of
the Bloom filter, at least one encrypted message, and at least one proxy re-encrypted message. This
observation will allow us use all of A’s capabilities.
B plays against three challengers: A BLIND-IND-CBA challenger C0, a PREN-IND-CPA challenger C1 and
an IND-CPA challenger C2. B also has access to the respective oracles, O0, O1 and O2 from which he can
ask and receive blindings, proxy re-encrypted messages and encrypted messages respectively. B plays
the role of a Proxy-ORAM client, and thus creates a plaintext version of the Proxy-ORAM structure
(i.e., both the proxy and the server) that stores N datablocks. B now encrypts all the structures, by using
O2, and keeps two versions of the Proxy-ORAM: the plaintext version, and the encrypted version of all
structures. B now starts A, who asks for the views of the Proxy-ORAM’s cloud for data request sequences
he poses. In the pre-challenge phase, B is able to perfectly simulate both the client and the server of
Proxy-ORAM by preparing the corresponding view for a data request sequence (op, id,dat), as follows:
1. For every blinding he needs, he asks O0.
2. Since B has both BFshare0 and BFshare1, he can find which positions of the Bloom filter he has
to retrieve. He uses the encrypted Bloom filter to add these to the view.
3. If a reshuﬄe is triggered, B runs it in the plaintext view, and simulates it in the encrypted version,
using O1 in order to create the proxy re-encrypted versions when needed.
4. Every time B needs to perform a re-randomisation of an encrypted packet, he uses O2.
In the challenge phase, A passes to B the tuple (DRS0,DRS1). B now randomly selects against which of the
three challengers he wants to play. Further, B picks a random bit b∗, makes two copies of the plaintext
version of the structures, and runs in the first copy DRS0 and in the second DRS1. B now forms DRSb∗
as in the pre-challenge phase with the following difference: If he chose to play against C0, he picks the
first position of the plaintext view, where View(DRS0) and View(DRS1) differ and need to be blinded, and
forms the challenge for C0 by sending all the respective encrypted messages {c j0}νj=1 and {c j1}νj=1. He then
picks random challenges to send to C1 and C2. If B chose to play against C1, he picks the first position of
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the plaintext view, where View(DRS0) and View(DRS1) differ and need to be proxy re-encrypted, and this
way, he forms the challenge for C1 in a similar way as before, while picking random challenges to send
to C0 and C2. Finally, if B chose to play against C2, he picks the first position of the plaintext view, where
View(DRS0) and View(DRS1) differ and need to be re-encrypted, and this way, he forms the challenge
for C2 as before, while picking random challenges to send to C0 and C1. The challengers respond, and B
injects C0’s response in View(DRSb∗) if he chose to play against him, and discards the other responses.
Similarly, B injects C1’s response in View(DRSb∗) if he chose to play against C1, and discards the other
responses, and injects C2’s response in View(DRSb∗) if he chose to play against him, discarding the other
responses. The rest of View(DRSb∗), B creates as in the pre-challenge phase. A now continues with the
post-challenge phase, which is ran as the pre-challenge. At some point, A returns a bit b′. B then outputs
(b′, d0, d1) if he chose to play against C0, (d0, b′, d1) if he chose to play against C1, and (d0, d1, b′) if he
chose to play against C2, where d0 and d1 are random bits.
Observe now, that if b∗ = b, then A gets a view for which his advantage of winning the IND-CQA game
applies – we will call this, the correct view. Assume further, that each time A gets an incorrect view he
outputs 0 with some probability α and 1 with probability 1−α. Calculating B’s total winning probability,
we get
Prob[B wins C0 or C1 or C2]=
1
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where the factor 13 in the above equation appears due to B’s choice of playing against one of the three
challengers C0, C1 or C2. Now, the fact that the above probability is non-negligible, is a contradiction,
which concludes the proof for the case of the cloud.
Now we examine the case of the proxy. Again observe here that the non-collusion assumption allows us
to prove Proxy-ORAM’s security against the proxy by means of Definiiton 15. Assume thus, that there
exists a PPT adversary A that controls the proxy, and can win the IND-CQA game with a non-negligible
advantage δ. We will construct a PPT algorithm B that breaks either the semantic security, or the proxy
re-encryption security of the encryption scheme. Recall that similar to the cloud’s view, the proxy’s
view consists of the view during the access and the view during a potential Bloom filter creation and
reshuﬄe. All these can be of different lengths, depending on the number of the Proxy-ORAM accesses
made. Similar to the case of the cloud, observe that in every access the proxy sees at least one encrypted
message, and at least one proxy re-encrypted message.
B plays against two challengers: A PREN-IND-CPA challenger C0 and an IND-CPA challenger C1. B also
has access to the respective oracles, O0 and O1 from which he can ask and receive proxy re-encrypted
messages and encrypted messages respectively. B plays the role of a Proxy-ORAM client, and thus cre-
ates a plaintext version of the Proxy-ORAM structure (i.e., both the proxy and the cloud) that stores N
datablocks. B now encrypts all the structures, by using O1, and keeps also an encrypted version of all
structures. B starts A, who asks for the views of the Proxy-ORAM’s proxy for data request sequences
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he poses. In the pre-challenge phase, each time that B makes a data request sequence, B prepares the
corresponding view as follows:
1. Having both BFshare0 and BFshare1, B can find which positions of the Bloom filter he has to
retrieve. He uses the encrypted Bloom filter to add these to the view.
2. If a reshuﬄe is triggered, B runs it in the plaintext view, and simulates it in the encrypted version,
using O0 in order to create the proxy re-encrypted versions when needed.
3. Every time B needs to perform a re-randomisation of an encrypted packet, he uses O1.
In the challenge phase, A passes to B the tuple (DRS0,DRS1). B selects randomly against which of the two
challengers he wants to play. B also picks a random bit b∗, makes two copies of the plaintext version of
the structures, and runs in the first copy DRS0 and in the second DRS1. If B chose to play against C0, he
prepares DRSb∗ as in the pre-challenge phase with the following difference: He picks the first position of
the plaintext view, where View(DRS0) and View(DRS1) differ and need to be proxy re-encrypted, and this
way forms the challenge for C0 by sending all the respective encrypted messages {c j0}νj=1 and {c j1}νj=1.
He then picks a random challenge to send to C1. If B chose to play against C1, he prepares DRSb∗ as in
the previous case, this time finding the messages that need to be re-randomised and sending them to C1.
He then picks a random challenge to send to C0. The challengers respond, and B injects the C0’s response
in View(DRSb∗) if he chose to play against him, discarding the other response. Similarly, B injects C1’s
response in the appropriate position of View(DRSb∗) if he chose to play against him, and discards the
other response. The rest of the View(DRSb∗), B creates as in the pre-challenge phase. A now continues
with the post-challenge phase, which is ran in a similar way as the pre-challenge. At some point, A returns
a bit b′ and B then outputs (b′, d) if he chose to play against C0, or (d, b′) if B chose to play against C1,
with d being a random bit.
Observe now, that if b∗ = b, then A gets a correct view, and can thus win the IND-CQA game with
non-negligible advantage δ. Assuming further that each time A gets an incorrect view he outputs 0 with
some probability α and 1 with probability 1−α, we calculate B’s total winning probability as
Prob[B wins C0 or C1] =
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where again (similar to the cloud’s case) the 12 factor occurs due to B’s choice to play against C0 or C1.
The fact that the above winning probability is non-negligible, is a contradiction, which concludes the
proof.
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5.5. A Concrete Instantiation
In order to achieve its design goals, Proxy-ORAM needs to utilise cryptographic building blocks that
offer specific properties. The foremost Proxy-ORAM requirement is the use of a semantically secure,
multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme that allows re-randomisation of ciphertexts and proxy
re-encryption. One such scheme is the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85], which we recall in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. We will denote the key-pair (skbf,pkbf) as the one, under which the responsible share for
the creation of the Bloom filter (i.e., c3) will be encrypted, while (skid,pkid) and (sk,pk) will be the
key-pairs under which the index (i.e., c2) and the actual datablock is encrypted, respectively. Note that
these prerequisites apply mainly for the homomorphic operations that take place regarding the c1, c2
and c3 parts of every datablock packet. For the actual data (i.e., the c4 part of the packet) the minimum
security requirement for the encryption scheme is that it is semantically secure. In fact, as we shall see
in Chapter 7, for a use-case like genomic studies, c4 has to encrypted under an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme.
Proposition 7.
Assuming that the DDH is hard for a group G, the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85] has computa-
tionally indistinguishable ciphertexts under adaptive chosen blinded attack.
Proof. The proof follows from a standard reduction to the DDH. Suppose that the ElGamal cryptosystem,
E is not IND-CBA secure, and thus there exists a PPT adversary A, that wins the IND-CBA game from
Definition 22 with probability
Prob
h
GameIND-CBAA,E (λ) = 1
i
≥ 1
2
+α
for some non-negligible function α in the security parameter of the ElGamal cryptosystem. Using A, we
will construct an efficient distinguisher D that can distinguish between tuples of the form (g, g x , g y , g x y)
and (g, g x , g y , gz), for some random z ∈ 〈g〉.
D is handed the tuple u =
 〈p, g〉, g x , g y , gz for a group generator g of order a safe prime p, and
random elements of the group, x , y . B now hands over to A the tuple
 〈p, g〉, g x which A can use to
encrypt messages of his choice in the first and second learning phases of the game. In each of these
phases, A hands over to D an encryption of a random message m which is of the form c = (g r ,mg x r),
for a random element r ∈ 〈g〉. By choosing a random element t ∈ 〈g〉, D blinds c and returns to A
c′ = (g r+t ,mg x(r+t)).
In the challenge phase, A sends to D the tuple (c0, c1) = ((g r0 ,m0g x r0), (g r1 ,m1g x r1)). D chooses a
random bit b, and returns to A a blinded version of c′b, which he computes using g x and gz as follows:
c′b = (g rb g y ,mbg x rb gz). At the end of the game, A replies with a bit b∗, and D wins if b = b∗.
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Now, if u is a tuple of the form (g, g x , g y , g x y), then D wins with the same probability that A wins, thus
Prob[D(u) = 1] = Prob
h
GameIND-CBAA,E (λ) = 1
i
≥ 1
2
+α.
If on the other hand, u is a random tuple (g, g x , g y , gz), then since we can find a unique w ∈ 〈g〉 such
that mbg x rb gz = mbgw for any element of 〈g〉, no information about b is given to A, and thus D wins
only if b∗ which is now randomly chosen, equals b, meaning that
Prob
u←(g x ,g y ,gz)[D(u) = 1] = Prob[b
∗ = b] = 1
2
.
By the above observations, we have that
 Probu←(g x ,g y ,g x y )[D(u) = 1]− Probu←(g x ,g y ,gz)[D(u) = 1]
≥ α,
which means that the advantage of D in distinguishing the two types of tuples is non-negligible in the
security parameter of E, which contradicts the the DDH assumption.
Proposition 8.
The ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85] has computationally indistinguishable proxy re-encrypted
ciphertexts under adaptive chosen plaintext attack.
Proof. The proof follows from a standard reduction to the DDH. Suppose that the ElGamal cryptosystem,
E is not PREN-IND-CPA secure, and thus there exists a PPT adversary A, that wins the PREN-IND-CPA
game from Definition 25 with probability
Prob
h
GamePREN-IND-CPAA,E (λ) = 1
i
≥ 1
2
+α
for some non-negligible function α in the security parameter of the ElGamal cryptosystem. Using A, we
will construct an efficient distinguisher D that can distinguish between tuples of the form (g, g x , g y , g x y)
and (g, g x , g y , gz).
D is handed the tuple u =
 〈p, g〉, g x , g y , gz for a group generator g of order a safe prime p, and
random elements of the group, x , y . B now hands over to A the tuple
 〈p, g〉, g x which A can use to
encrypt messages of his choice in the first and second learning phases of the game. In each of these
phases, A hands over to D an encryption of a random message m which is of the form c = (g r ,mg x r),
for a random element t ∈ 〈g〉. By choosing a random element s ∈ 〈g〉, D re-randomises c using g x
getting c′ = (g r+t ,mg x(r+t)), which he further proxy re-encrypts using the key tsk, thus getting c∗ =
(g r+t ,mg x ·tsk·(r+t)), which he returns to A.
57
In the challenge phase, A sends to D the tuple (c0, c1) = ((g r0 ,m0g x r0), (g r1 ,m1g x r1)). D chooses a
random bit b, and first re-randomises cb, getting c′b = (g rb+y ,mbg x(rb+y)). Then, using tsk, D proxy
re-encrypts c′b, and gets c∗b = (g rb+y ,mbg(x+tsk)(rb+y)), which he sends to A.
Now, if u is a tuple of the form (g, g x , g y , g x y), then D wins with the same probability that A wins, thus
Prob[D(u) = 1] = Prob
h
GamePREN-IND-CPAA,E (λ) = 1
i
≥ 1
2
+α.
If however, u a random tuple (g, g x , g y , gz), then since we can find a unique w ∈ 〈g〉 such that
mbg
x rb gz = mbgw for any element of 〈g〉, no information about b is given to A, and thus D wins
only if b∗ which is now randomly chosen, equals b, meaning that
Prob
u←(g x ,g y ,gz)[D(u) = 1] = Prob[b
∗ = b] = 1
2
.
By the above observations, we have that
 Probu←(g x ,g y ,g x y )[D(u) = 1]− Probu←(g x ,g y ,gz)[D(u) = 1]
≥ α,
which means that the advantage of D in distinguishing the two types of tuples is non-negligible in the
security parameter of E, which contradicts the the DDH assumption.
Furthermore, Proxy-ORAM needs to utilise a homomorphic, cryptographically secure hash function.
One such hash function is the Chaum-van Heisjt-Pfitzmann [CHP92] hash function, as we have seen in
Chapter 3.2.1. We instantiate the CvHP by selecting two group generators g1, g2 for the group Z∗p for
a cryptographically secure prime p. For a datablock with identifier id, we set the first index share to be
IDshare0 = g
H(l‖r(l)‖c)
1 , where l is the level to which the datablock is stored, r(l) is a counter of the
reshuﬄes done at level l thus far, and c is a counter, initiated to a random value chosen by the client and
subsequently incremented every time a reshuﬄe is performed at any level of Proxy-ORAM. The second
index share is formed as IDshare1 = g id2 and thus the index of datablock with identifier id at level l ,
after r(l) reshuﬄes at level l , and after c reshuﬄes have taken place in Proxy-ORAM in total is
index(id, r, r(l), c) = gH(l‖r(l)‖c)1 g id2 .
For creating the Bloom filter we use again the CvHP hash function, this time on two group generators g3
and g4 of the group Z∗p for a safe prime p. For the ξ keys needed for the Bloom filter, we choose random
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gH1 g
id
2 g
ki
3 g
id
4 skid sktemp skbf
′
Client • • • • • • •
Investigator • • •
Cloud •
Proxy • • • •
Table 5.2: Overview of the values known to every party, for a specific datablock, level, and after
a specific number of reshuﬄes. gH(l‖r(l)‖c)1 , g id2 : Shares for computing the current
index of the datablock, gki3 , g
id
4 : Shares for determining the Bloom filter positions for the
datablock; skid: secret key to decrypt a packet’s encrypted c2 part; skbf: secret key to
decrypt a packet’s encrypted c3 part; skbf′: secret key to decrypt encrypted Bloom filter bits;
values from the group – recall that each level has its own set of ξ keys, renewed in every reshuﬄe and
stored on the proxy. We thus form the positions of the Bloom filter that should be set to ‘1’ as
CvHP(ki, id) = g
ki
3 g
id
4 , for i ∈ {1, . . . ,ξ}.
Note that the output of the CvHP hash function is of size |p| while the Bloom filter will be much smaller.
Suppose that b(l) is the size of the Bloom filter at level i as indicated by the security parameter λ.
One way of performing the hash is by taking the first |b(l)| bits of the hash function’s output. Hence,
without loss of generality, we will abuse notation, and from now on, by CvHP(ki, id) we will mean
CvHP(ki, id) && ( ( 1 |b(l)| ) − 1).
Recalling that the two shares (one ‘responsible’ for the Bloom filter creation and the other for the index
creation), as well as the data have to be encrypted, the packet (cf. Definition 21) for a datablock with
identifier id is the following tuple: packet(index(id)) = (c1, c2, c3, c4), with
gH(r(l)||l||c)1 g id2 , Encpkid(g id2 ), Encpkbf(g id4 ), Encpk(dat)

.
In Section 5.2, we have seen an abstract exposition of the protocols used in Proxy-ORAM. Here, we
describe only the points of each protocol that need to be adjusted for the particular instantiation.
During initialisation, the client generates the encryption scheme key pairs and the parameters for the
CvHP hash function. The client then distributes the shares and the secret keys as described in Sec-
tion 5.2.1 and summarised in Table 5.2.
In Step 7 of the Access Protocol (Protocol 3), the investigator sends a blinded version of his share, g id4 .
This is done by forming g id+v4 for a randomly chosen value v. The proxy, knowing the Bloom filter
keys {ki}ξi=1 can thus form the values {gki3 g id+v4 }ξi=1, which he sends back to the investigator, along with
H(r(l)||l||c). The investigator can now remove the blindings from the values he received and thus find
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the positions of the Bloom filter that he has to check. The contents of these Bloom filter positions are sent
from the proxy to the investigator. In turn, the investigator blinds the received values (each with a different
blinding value) and sends them to the cloud who decrypts them, since he is in possession of skbf. The
cloud then encrypts these values using the public key pktemp and sends them back to the investigator.
The investigator, having the authentication token sktemp, decrypts the received values, removes the
blindings, and thus can learn if the datablock lies on that particular level. If the datablock has already
been found on a previous level, or if the datablock is not on the level currently being examined, then the
investigator computes the index of the fake packet and requests from the cloud thepacket(index(idfake)).
Otherwise, the investigator computes the index of the desired datablock and requests from the cloud the
packet(index(id)). The element c2 of the packet requested from the investigator, the cloud proxy re-
encrypts, and sends the whole packet to the investigator.
In the Bloom filter creation phase, the cloud uses proxy re-encryption in order to transform the c3 element
of every packet (step 14 of Protocol 4). For the key pair (tsk,tpk), generated by the cloud, this is done
as follows: the ‘new’ public key is set to be pkbf · tpk, and tsk is set as the re-encryption key, so that
skbf+ tsk is the new decryption key. Thus, c3 is set to be Encpk·tpk(g id4 ). Now the proxy can compute
Encpk·tpk(gki3 ) and thus form Encpk·tpk(g
ki
3 g
id
4 ), to which the proxy removes the skbf dependency by
computing Decsk(Encpk·tpk(gki3 g id4 )), and sending these values to the cloud. The cloud can now further
decrypt using his tsk
Dectsk(Enctpk(g
ki
3 g
id
4 ))) = g
ki
3 g
id
4 ,
which is a position in the Bloom filter that has to be set to ‘1’.
In the update phase, the cloud generates a new temporary ElGamal key pair (tsk,tpk) and having re-
moved the c1 part of every packet to be held by levell , he proxy re-encrypts the packet’s remaining parts
in the same way he did in the Bloom filter creation phase. The cloud sends the proxy re-encrypted parts,
as well as tpk to the proxy. The latter increases the counters c and r(l) and computes H(r(l)||l||c).
For each received element, the proxy then multiplies the packet’s c2 part Encpkid·tpk(gH(r(l)||l||c)1 ), which
results in the new correct index c1. This index however is now encrypted under pkid · tpk. The proxy
then removes the dependency on the pk from these encrypted indices by using skid as the re-encryption
key (similarly to what was done in the Bloom filter creation phase).
Extra care has to be taken also regarding the size of the Bloom filter used for an instantiation of Proxy-
ORAM. The first estimation for the false positive ratio was given by Bloom as
p =

1−

1− k
m
nk
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for a Bloom filter of size m, storing n items and using k hash functions. Recently however, it has been
shown by Bose et al. [Bos+08] that this original rate estimation was false. Christensen et al.[CRJ10]
showed that the false positive is
p =
m∑
i=1
 
P(kn,m, i)

i
m
k!
,
where P(N ,M ,K) is the probability of having exactly K Bloom filter positions set to ‘0’ when N items
are stored in a Bloom filter of size M . In order to construct a Bloom filter that has a false positive
ratio negligible in the security parameter of an encryption scheme (i.e., close to 2−120), one would have
to set the Bloom filter size polynomially larger than the amount of the stored datablocks. However,
having experimentally observed that Bloom filters of linear size still yield false positives with far smaller
probability than the one theoretically expected, we believe that for practical applications one can tolerate
smaller false positive ratios than the ones predicted, as was the case with the privacy preserving filesystem
of Williams et al. [WST12].
We close this chapter with a discussion on the creation of the last level’s Bloom filter, which will play an
important role in contruction’s practical evaluation.
The purpose of the Bloom filter is to inform the investigator whether a given packet is to be found on a
specific level or not. Since in the initialisation of Proxy-ORAM all packets are originally uploaded to the
last level, we know that any packet can surely be found on the last level before it is reshuﬄed for the first
time (which happens only after N queries). So as long as we perform less than N queries, a Bloom filter
for the last level is not needed: Every element (potentially older versions) will be found on the last level
by construction. In other words a Bloom filter would return only 1s, which makes it redundant. Thus, in
the original upload we can avoid creating the last level’s Bloom filter.
If we perform more than N queries, a reshuﬄe of the last level will automatically be triggered, which
will create a Bloom Filter for that level and make it the second last level (again, the last level then does
not need a Bloom Filter).
Note that this optimisation does not affect the ORAM’s operations as described in the previous sections:
if a packet has not been found on any of the higher levels, then this packet has never been retrieved in the
ORAM’s history and therefore it will be found in the last level. The same holds for the case of a Write
operation. The Reshuffle operation is also not affected, since before a Reshuffle begins, the Bloom
filters of both levels to be reshuﬄed are destroyed.
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Chapter 6
From one client to many: The case of
Blurry-ORAM
Our second construction addresses problems of ORAM architectures that allow multiple clients to store
their data on the same server. Here, we identify, analyse and rigorously treat this problem, having the
following question as our starting point:
Can we build an ORAM that allows multiple clients to store their private data on a remote server, while
allowing each of them to partially share any part of his data with any other client?
We answer the above question in an affirmative way by presenting the first ORAM construction that
achieves this goal with low communication complexity between the involved clients and the server under
the assumption that all involved parties are semi-honest and not colluding. At the same time, we are the
first to rigorously define privacy between clients in such a setting. Indeed, as we shall see, ORAMs in
multi-client environments have been developed in the past. However, all but one of the previous con-
structions allow only full (and not partial) sharing of data, while none of the existing solutions proposes
a concrete security model that can capture the information leakage potentially occurring between the
clients who share data. We note the importance of partial data sharing, as we believe that it is a very
realistic setting that can have applications extending from filesystem sharing and private interprocess
communication to genomic studies at mass.
Published Content
All the results from this chapter first appeared in [KPK17], which is a joint work with Andreas Peter
and Stefan Katzenbeisser. The development of the architecture was jointly done between myself,
Andreas Peter and Stefan Katzenbeisser, and the security proofs were done by myself.
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6.1. Multi-client ORAMs
The problem of constructing privacy preserving multi-client storage solutions has been explored in a
number of works [ZZQ16; Fra+12; Goo+12b; Maf+15; BMN17; Bac+16; WST12; Lor+12; BCP16].
However, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, not all constructions deal with the same problem. The
most common and very well studied setting for multi-client ORAMs is the one dealt with in [Maf+15;
BMN17; Bac+16]; there, multiple clients share the same dataset and want to access it in a way that
protects the client access patterns against the server, while at the same time the client’s identity is hidden
from the server. We will refer to this setting as ‘access pattern anonymity’. The second multi-client
ORAM setting is the one coined as ‘Parallel ORAM’, which has been extensively studied by Boyle et
al. [BCP16] and Lorch et al. [Lor+12]. In that setting, again one dataset (fully owned by every client) is
accessed obliviously by multiple clients, however this time (and as the name implies) in parallel. The
above results delivered theoretical constructions and bounds, while Williams et al. [WST12] proposed a
practical parallel ORAM construction that resulted in the first access pattern hiding filesystem.
The problem we are dealing with however is closer to the setting proposed by Franz et al. [Fra+12].
There, a client wants to give partial access of his data to other clients, making sure that the client access
patterns are hidden from the server. In this chapter, we take the setting from [Fra+12] one step further: We
consider one server and multiple clients, each of which shares only parts of his data with other clients of
his choice, while the access patterns of every client remain hidden from the server, and all other clients.
The basic architectural structure is depicted in Figure 6.2. We will call an ORAM that achieves this
property a ‘Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAMs (PSMC-ORAMs)’. Both the server and the clients are
assumed to be semi-honest and non-colluding with each other, i.e., they try to extract as much information
possible about the data belonging to other clients, but they never deviate from the protocol.
Using our new ORAM framework from Chapter 4, we define the PSMC-ORAM, and then construct
one such ORAM architecture, named Blurry-ORAM. Our construction is based on the highly efficient
Path-ORAM construction of Stefanov et al. [Ste+13a], and thus inherits from the latter its simplicity and
efficiency. In Table 6.1 we sum up the properties of existingmulti-client ORAM constructions, show their
communication complexity and recall if they allow access pattern privacy against other clients, allow for
anonymous accesses or sharing of data between the clients. To our knowledge, our construction is the
first to allow partial data sharing between clients in an ORAM, and at the same time guarantee access
pattern hiding not only against the server, but also against other clients.
6.2. Partial Sharing Multi-Client-ORAMs
We begin by forming the necessary theoretical basis with which we can describe multi-client ORAM
constructions. For this, we will make use of our new framework from Chapter 4, which we will adjust to
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A.P. A.P. A.P. Data
Solution Commun.Complexity Hiding Hiding Anonymity sharing
(Server) (Clients)
[Fra+12] O(
p
N log2 N) (amort.) Ø × × Ø
[Goo+12b] O(log2 N) Ø × × Ø
[ZZQ16] O(logN log logN) (amort.) Ø × × ×
[BMN17] O(log2 N) to O(log5 N) Ø × × Ø
[Maf+15] O(G log2 N) Ø × Ø Ø
[Bac+16] O(log2(KN)) Ø × Ø ×
Blurry-ORAM O(K log2 N log(logN)) Ø Ø × Ø
Table 6.1: Comparison of multi-client ORAM solutions; N : Number of blocks per client, G: Num-
ber of groups, K : Number of clients.
the multi-client setting. Observe here once again that it is the flexibility of our new framework that allows
us to define in a rigorous and yet practical way a more complex system such as a multi-client ORAM.
Similar to Chapter 4, we consider here all parties (i.e., the server and every client) as PPT Turing ma-
chines. All the clients communicate with the server through a tape Ξ, and every two clients share a
communication tape ξ. On a high level, a multi-client ORAM that allows partial data sharing must pro-
vide protocols that allow the initialisation of the architecture, reading and writing data on the server, as
well as protocols that allow sharing data between clients, and revoking formerly given sharing rights.
Definition 26 (Multi-Client Data Request).
Amulti-client data request mcdr is a tuple of the form (op, id,dat,Client j) where op ∈ {Read,Write,
Share,Revoke}, id is the datablock’s identifier, dat is the data to be written, and Client j is the client
with which blockid will be shared with, or from which sharing of blockid will be revoked. If op= Read,
then dat = ⊥ and Client j = ⊥. If op = Write, then Client j = ⊥. If op ∈ {Share,Revoke}, then
dat = ⊥ and Client j is the client with which the block will be shared, or from whom the sharing will
be revoked.
Definition 27.
Amulti-client data request sequence is a tuple of the form ( ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~x l), where each ~x i is a multi-client
data request. The number l of data requests in a multi-client data request sequence is called the data
request sequence’s length.
Definition 28 (Server communication transcript).
The server’s communication transcript comSt at round t of the protocol is the content of the communica-
tion channel Ξ at round t of the protocol’s execution.
Definition 29 (Client communication transcript).
The client’s communication transcript comCt at round t of the protocol is the content of the communi-
cation channel Ξ concatenated with the contents of all {Ξi}K˜i=1 at round t of the protocol’s execution,
where Ξi , i = 1, . . . , K˜ , is the content of the client’s communication tape with another client.
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In the above definition, observe that since the number of clients is finite, the same holds for the number
of communication tapes a client has, K˜ .
Similar to Definition 30, we define here the view of the client by means of a partial ordering imposed on
the communication transcript.
Definition 30 (View of the Server and view of the Client).
Let ≤ denote a partial order over the set of communication transcripts A = {com1,com2, . . . ,comT}
for an ORAM protocol of T rounds such that for any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, comz ∈ A the following hold:
1. For any comi ∈ A, comi ≤ comi .
2. For any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, if comi ≤ com j and com j ≤ comi , then comi = com j .
3. For any comi ∈ A, com j ∈ A, comz ∈ A, it holds that if comi ≤ com j and com j ≤ comz , then
comi ≤ comz .
For a PSMC-ORAM protocol of T rounds, the server’s view is the union of all server communication
transcripts from round 1 to T : ViewS = ∪Tt=1comSt , and the client’s view is the union of all client
communication transcripts ViewC = ∪Tt=1comCt
Definition 31 (Shared Block).
In a multi-client ORAM construction that allows data sharing between clients, we call a block idi shared
if at least two clients have access to it.
Definition 32 (Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM).
Let N˜ ∈ N, K ∈ N, M ≥ D and E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a secret-key encryption scheme
mapping M -bit plaintexts to B-bit ciphertexts. A Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM (PSMC-
ORAM) ORAME with parameters (D, N˜ ,K ,E) is a set of multi-party interactive randomised algorithms,
(PSMC-ORAM.Init,PSMC-ORAM.Access), run by a server S and clients Client1, . . . ,ClientK , such
that:
• PSMC-ORAM.Init(λ,N ,K)→ (Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S) in the following way:
1. λ is the security parameter, K is the number of clients, every client has N datablocks and
stores on the server N˜ > N datablocks;
2. key← KeyGen(1λ) is generated by every client Clienti for i = 1 to K;
3. S includes a database S.DB= (block1, . . . ,blockKN˜ ).
• PSMC-ORAM.Access(Client1, . . . ,ClientK ,S,mcdr) → (Client′1, · · · ,Client′K ,S′,com) in
the following way:
1. For some i = 1, . . . ,K , Clienti issues a data request mcdr;
2. Clienti and S communicate through Ξ, producing the communication’s transcript com.
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Similar to Definition 32 from Chapter 4, we need to address here the soundness of a PSMC-ORAM. We
do this in the next definition, again avoiding going into much details, but rather describing the minimal
properties, so that the ORAM ‘works’.
Definition 33 (Minimal Partial Sharing Multi-Client-ORAM Soundness Conditions).
A PSMC-ORAM construction ORAME has minimal soundness if the following hold:
1. For any (λ,N ,K), if (Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S) ← PSMC-ORAM.Init(λ,N ,K), then every
client’s Clienti secret key keyi from Definition 32 must be accessible by Clienti .
2. For any mcdr= (op, i,data,Client j), if (Client′1, · · · ,Client′K ,S′,com)←
PSMC-ORAM.Access(Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,mcdr), then:
a) for every client/secret key pair, (Clienti,keyi) with i = 1, . . . ,K , it holds that if the secret
key keyi of Clienti is accessible by Clienti , then it is also accessible by Client′i;
b) if op= Read and S.DB(u) = block, then Data(block) must be accessible by Client′i;
c) if op= Write and S′.DB(u) = block, then Data(block) = data.
d) if op = Share, and S.DB(u) = block is accessible by Clienti but not from Client j , then
it must be accessible from both Client′i and Client′j;
e) if op = Revoke and S.DB(u) = block is accessible by Clienti and from Client j , then it
must be accessible from Client′i but not from Client′j .
6.3. Security Definition in a Multi-Client Environment
In typical ORAM constructions, the model considered includes simply a client and a server, yet as we
have already seen, hiding the access patterns against the server is already a non-trivial problem. Thus, it
does not come as a surprise that when multiple clients are present and share parts of their data with each
other, the situation becomes much more involved. In this section, we analyse how a semi-honest client
can behave, and shed some light to the problem of client-to-client privacy.
We consider a semi-honest server and semi-honest clients that do not collude with each other or with the
server. Thus, all involved parties do not deviate from the protocol but try to gain as much information as
possible (e.g., which data blocks were read or written by which client, how many blocks are shared with
whom, etc.) by examining the views of the access transactions. In order to model this behaviour, we first
have to adjust Definition 14 to the new setting of the PSMC-ORAM.
Definition 34 (Access Pattern for Partial Sharing Multi-Client-ORAMs).
Given a PSMC-ORAM client C, a server S, and a multi-client data request mcdr according to Defini-
tion 26, the access pattern ap(mcdr) is the tuple
 
S.DB,com,S′.DB

, where
(Client′1, · · · ,Client′K ,S′,com)← PSMC-ORAM.Access(Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S,mcdr).
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6.3.1. Security Against the Server
We begin our analysis by first considering security against the server. We do this by defining a variant of
the IND-CQA game from Definition 15. The main difference comes from the fact that in Definition 15,
the adversary (the server) was playing against one client who could only read or write datablocks on the
server’s database. Here however the scenario is different: The adversary is playing against a multitude
of clients who store and share datablocks with each other. Thus in any point of the game (including the
challenge phase), the adversary should be allowed to ask any client to perform an operation, such as read
or write one of his datablocks, or share datablocks with other clients. Taking these observations into
account, we define the PSMC-ORAM server/client game as follows.
Definition 35 (GameServer-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ)).
Let PSMC-ORAM = (PSMC-ORAM.Init,PSMC-ORAM.Access) be a Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM
construction, λ a security parameter and A an ORAM adversary. The computational indistinguishability
of access patterns game under adaptive chosen query attack GameServer-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) is played between
A and a simulator C, who can execute any data request on behalf of any client that stores datablocks on
the PSMC-ORAM and proceeds as follows.
1. A chooses N ≤ N˜ and K ∈ N;
2. (Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S)← ORAM.Init(λ,N ,K);
3. First CQA learning phase: for i = 1, . . . ,q1 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request mcdri for some client of his choice, Clientu;
b) C simulates Clientu and executes ORAM.Access on mcdri;
c) A receives ap(mcdri);
4. Challenge phase: A chooses two data requests: mcdr0 for Clientu and mcdr1 for Clientw;
5. C chooses randomly a secret bit b
$← {0,1} and by simulating the respective client, he executes
ORAM.Access on mcdrb;
6. A receives ap(mcdrb);
7. Second CQA learning phase: for j = 1, . . . ,q2 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request mcdr j for some client of his choice, Clientu;
b) C simulates Clientu and executes ORAM.Access on mcdr j;
c) A receives ap(mcdr j);
8. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game if and only if b = b′.
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Definition 36 (Client-to-Server Privacy).
We say that a PSMC-ORAM protocol provides Client-to-Server privacy (i.e., hides the access patterns of
a client against the server), if for every PPT PSMC-ORAM adversary A:
ProbhGameServer-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(λ).
Observe that in the challenge phase, no restriction is imposed upon the choice of the client. The adversary
can choose to form his challenge on data requests performed by different clients, or by the same client.
6.3.2. Security Against Other Clients
When examining the client’s security against the server the transition from the one client to the multiple
client model seemed to be rather trivial. In fact, we simply had to adjust the game-based security Defi-
nition 15 to the Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM in order to form the new security definition. Most
importantly, we allowed the adversary to be able to ask for any operation (including share and revoke
operations) at the challenge phase. The intuition about the scheme’s security in such a setting comes from
the fact that the server sees only encrypted datablocks during each access, and thus, as long as the length
of every view remains the same, the security of the scheme can easily fall back to that of the encryption
scheme.
This however is not the case when we examine the security against other clients. In a PSMC-ORAM,
the view of a client includes also unencrypted datablocks. At first, these plain datablocks are only the
client’s datablocks. However, as the client is allowed to share datablocks with and from other clients,
the amount of plain datablocks visible by the client changes over time, since the client sees in plain not
only his datablocks, but also datablocks that belong to other clients. Now recall that (as we have seen
until now in more occasions) during every ORAM access only a small amount of datablocks are moved
in the server’s database – in the case of Path-ORAM for example, only the logN datablocks found in
the currently accessed path are (potentially) moved. In fact, even from those few blocks in the path,
only some will change position within the path, while most of them will be stagnant. This behaviour
(inherent in any ORAM construction we know) can be used in a multi-client setting by an adversary to
his advantage in attempting to break the access pattern hiding of other clients.
As a consequence of the above, suppose that we would (wrongly) define client-to-client privacy in an
(almost) identical way as we did in Definition 35, by means of the following game, played between an
adversarial client A, and a simulator C who can execute any data requests for any client except A. We call
this game the GameClient-IND-CQA-WrongA,ORAM (λ), and it would proceed as follows:
1. A chooses N ≤ N˜ and K ∈ N;
2. (Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S)← ORAM.Init(λ, (K − 1)N), except for some client Clientv who is
the adversary;
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3. First CQA learning phase: for i = 1, . . . ,q1 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request mcdri for some client of his choice, Clientu, or for himself;
b) If the data request was for another client, then C simulates Clientu and executes
ORAM.Access on mcdri; Otherwise, A executes the data request himself;
c) A receives ap(mcdri);
4. Challenge phase: A chooses two data requests: mcdr0 for Clientu and mcdr1 for Clientw, with
u 6= v and w 6= v;1
5. C chooses randomly a secret bit b
$← {0,1} and by simulating the respective client, he executes
ORAM.Access on mcdrb;
6. A receives ap(mcdrb);
7. Second CQA learning phase: for j = 1, . . . ,q2 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A chooses a data request mcdr j for some client of his choice, Clientu, or for himself;
b) If the data request was for another client, then C simulates Clientu and executes
ORAM.Access on mcdri; Otherwise, A executes the data request himself;
c) A receives ap(mcdr j);
8. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game if and only if b = b′.
Observe that an adversary A playing the above game could trivially win it by using the Share and Revoke
operations in a variety of ways.
One approach would be for A to Share a datablock from another client in the pre-challenge phase, and
form his challenge by asking a Read operation on that previously shared datablock and on another da-
tablock which is not his and he does not share. Clearly in such a case, A would trivially win the game,
since if the challenger had performed the mcdr with the shared datablock, A would see this particular
datablock in the view.
In a similar way, A could form his challenge by a Share operation on a block and a Read on another,
and then in the post-challenge phase simply ask for a Read on the datablock he wanted to share in the
challenge phase. If A could see this datablock in the view plain, then he would know that the challenger
chose the data request with the Share operation.
Yet another way for A to trivially win the above game would be to form his challenge, and at the post-
challenge phase to ask for Shareon one of the datablocks of his challenge. The reason why this attack
would be successful is the following: Suppose that the PSMC-ORAM were based on the hierarchical
solution, and in the challenge phase A asked for a (Read, i,⊥,⊥) or a (Read, j,⊥,⊥). Once one of
1 Observe that this is a minimum restriction that we have to impose, as otherwise A who is Clientv would trivially win
the game.
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these data requests is performed, either datablock i or j would be put on the top level of the hierarchi-
cal structure. Now A asks for (Share, i,⊥,A), and then performs one more (Read, i,⊥,⊥). If now A
sees datablock i on the top level, he will immediately know which data request was performed by the
challenger.
Observe that what abstractly binds together the above attacks is the fact that according to our model,
clients that share a datablock have full control over it. Furthermore, in order to address the two last
attacks, involving the information leaked during the second learning phase of the game, one would have
to make the overall scheme forward secure. We believe that this could be achieved by employing ideas
from identity based encryption, however our primary goal has been to develop the minimal basis for
research on PSMC-ORAMs, upon which more complex and secure protocols could be later developed.
Therefore, we imposed particular restrictions on the challenge phase, and changed the second learning
phase of the game, in a way that allows us to define the client-to-client access pattern hiding for a PSMC-
ORAM in an intuitive and realistic way. We do this with the following variation of the security game
from Definition 35:
Definition 37 (GameClient-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ)).
Let PSMC-ORAM = (PSMC-ORAM.Init,PSMC-ORAM.Access) be a Partial Sharing Multi-Client ORAM
construction, λ a security parameter and A an ORAM adversary. The computational indistinguishability
of client access patterns game under adaptive chosen query attack GameClient-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) is played
between a challenger C and the adversary A. The adversary is a client of the ORAM, and the challenger
is a simulator who can simulate any client present on the ORAM except for A. The game proceeds as
follows:
1. A chooses N ≤ N˜ and K ∈ N;
2. (Client1, · · · ,ClientK ,S)← PSMC-ORAM.Init(λ, (K − 1)N), except for some Clientu who is
the adversary;
3. First CQA learning phase: for i = 1, . . . ,q1 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
a) A runs a data request mcdr on his datablocks, or
b) A does the following:
i. A chooses a data request mcdri;
ii. C executes PSMC-ORAM.Access on mcdri;
iii. A receives ap(mcdri);
4. Challenge phase: A chooses two data requests mcdr0 and mcdr1 that include Read or Write
operations on datablocks that A does not have access to, and Share or Revoke operations that do
not result in A gaining or losing access to datablocks;
5. C flips a random secret bit b
$← {0,1} and executes PSMC-ORAM.Access on mcdrb;
6. A receives ap(mcdrb);
7. Second CQA learning phase: for j = 1, . . . ,q2 ∈ N, A repeats (adaptively) the following:
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a) A runs a data request mcdr on his datablocks, or
b) A does the following:
i. A chooses a data request mcdri that does not include Share or Revoke operation on the
datablocks asked in the challenge phase;
ii. C executes PSMC-ORAM.Access on mcdri;
iii. A receives ap(mcdri);
8. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins the game if and only if b = b′.
Definition 38 (Client-to-Client Privacy).
We say that a PSMC-ORAM protocol provides Client-to-Server privacy (i.e., hides the access patterns of
a client against other clients), if for every PPT PSMC-ORAM adversary A the following holds:
ProbhGameClient-IND-CQAA,ORAM (λ) = 1i− 12
≤ negl(n).
6.4. Blurry-ORAM, or the first PSMC-ORAM
In our construction, we consider K clients that store their data on an remote server. Every client’s data
is partitioned in N datablocks of fixed size B, and each datablock is identified by a unique identifier
id. Following the model from Chapter 4, we consider a datablock as a tuple (id,dat), with id being a
unique identifier and dat being the actual data. In the following we will abuse this notation, and for ease
of presentation denote by id ji the datablock with identifier idi that belongs to client j without referring
to the actual data of the datablock, unless it is crucial for the description.
For the security parameter λ and K clients, PSMC-ORAM.Init(λ,K) allocates enough space on the server
in order to store the KN real datablocks and their respective fake datablocks. Using a homomorphic,
asymmetric encryption scheme E that is semantically secure and also IK-CPA secure (according to Defi-
nition 5), for each client a public- private- key pair is generated by E.KeyGen(λ), with which every client
encrypts his real and fake datablocks and uploads them to the server, in a classical Path-ORAM of height
dlogNe and Z datablocks per node. The resulting K Path-ORAM trees are merged on each node, forming
a Path-ORAM of height dlogNe and ZK datablocks per node. At this point, in every node, datablocks
of all the clients can be found.
The read operation for a datablock id ji is a protocol run between a client Client j and the server. It returns
the datablock identified by id ji or ⊥, if the datablock was not found (for example, if a client queries for a
datablock that belongs to other clients but not to Client j).
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The write operation is a protocol executed between a client Client j and the server. It is similar to the
read operation, as it returns the datablock with identifier id ji , but overwrites its contents with new data
in case the read operation was successful.
The share operation is a protocol run between the server and clients Clienti and Client j . The goal
is to make the datablock with identifier idiu, which is accessible by client Clienti , also accessible (for
read, write, share and revoke) by client Client j . This is done by having Clienti change the private key
under which the datablock idiu is encrypted and handing over this new key to Client j .
The revoke operation is a protocol run between the server and a client Clienti . For a datablock with
identifier id that can be accessed by Clienti and Client j , the purpose of this operation is to disallow
Client j from further being able to access (read, write, share or revoke) datablock id. This is again done
by changing the key under which datablock id is encrypted, but this time not communicating this change
to Client j . Note, that the revoke operation is not recursive, and disallows only one specific client all
further access to the datablock; thus, after a revoke operation, all other clients to whom the revoked client
granted access in the past, are still allowed to read, write, share and revoke the particular datablock.
After a number of data accesses (that also include datablock sharing), the datablocks found in every node
are eventually shuﬄed, and due to the presence of shared datablocks, it can happen that some clients have
more datablocks in a node than others. Thus, we end up with a ‘blurred’ version of the originally merged
client trees. Due to this property, as well as to differentiate our construction from the simple concatenation
of Path-ORAM trees, where each client is allocated a fixed number of datablocks in every node, we will
refer to our construction as ‘Blurry-ORAM’.
6.4.1. The Protocol in Detail
Our starting point is the Path-ORAM construction of Stefanov et al. [Ste+13a], which we analysed in
Chapter 4. In our setting, we consider K clients, who store their data on a data structure residing on
a remote server. Every client stores a maximum number of N real datablocks and their corresponding
fakes, just like in Path-ORAM. How the clients’ data is laid on the remote data structure is of grave
importance: The easiest way to do this, would be to construct a tree with KN leaves and assign every
datablock to one of those leaves, as in a Path-ORAM. However, such a solution affects the stash size in a
way that renders the underlying Path-ORAM inoperable, due to an exceedingly big stash size. The reason
for this is that the client can find in every path fewer datablocks of his in a path (which are the only ones
he can change or move), and thus the client is forced to use the stash more often. Assume now that each
node of the tree can hold Z datablocks and that all clients’ datablocks are uniformly distributed in the
tree. Assume further that every client can access only those datablocks that belong to him or are shared
with him. Then, in every path, a client can only find on average Z/K log(KN) datablocks belonging
to him, as opposed to Z logN datablocks that he would find if he had stored his datablocks in a single
client Path-ORAM. This means that it will be more difficult for him to put the element he read back into
73
the path, which will eventually force him to use his stash more often. In fact, this was the first way we
structured the Blurry-ORAM tree, and our experiments verified this rapid growth of the stash.
In contrast, in Blurry-ORAM we store the clients’ datablocks differently: We let each of the K clients
store his N datablocks in a separate binary tree with N leaves, where each node holds ZK datablocks, as
can be seen in Figure 6.1. Every datablock (real or fake) is encrypted using the client’s public key, but in
such a way that the datablock can be re-randomised without knowledge of the owner’s public key (using
for example the encryption scheme proposed in [Gol+04]). Note here, that in order to achieve Client-to-
Server and Client-to-Client privacy, any datablock (real or fake) of one client must be indistinguishable
from any other datablock of every other client. To achieve this, we have to use an encryption scheme that
is also IK-CPA secure according to Definition 52 or in other words guarantees the indistinguishability
of ciphertexts under different keys. This way, the property is achieved that all datablocks (real and fake)
belonging to a client are indistinguishable for anyone but the client who can decrypt them.
As our construction is Path-ORAM based, it inherits the need of using a stash, since there is a chance that
during an access, some datablocks cannot be put back in the downloaded path. For datablocks that belong
solely to one client, each client locally maintains a stash (called ‘localstash’ in the following). The bounds
on Path-ORAM stash size apply here. However, it might happen that datablocks shared between clients
cannot be written back into the path. For this case we maintain a so-called ‘commonstash’, which will
contain all the encrypted shared datablocks that could not fit into the tree. The size of this commonstash
can be upper bounded, as we show in Section 6.4.6. The commonstash is initially filled with fake items,
encrypted under a key known to every client but not to the server. This way the server cannot observe if
shared datablocks have been added or removed, and thus the commonstash can securely remain stored
on the server; each client retrieves this stash before he performs any operation. Furthermore, we use
a dedicated private key for the fake datablocks on the commonstash, so that the clients can distinguish
between fake and real datablocks in the commonstash.
Unfortunately however, this ability of the clients can be a source of privacy leakage: Once client Clienti
notices that after a client’s Client j access, a shared datablock has been moved on the commonstash,
Clienti immediately knows that in the last accessed path, all datablocks of Client j are real. This is
because the commonstash is used only if the paths accessed are full of real datablocks. Therefore, we
must make sure that the commonstash remains as small as possible. We achieve this by changing the
way the Read operation is performed in two ways. First, the client downloads two paths per access3: One
determined by the leaf i (which we will from then on call the ‘original’ path), and a so-called ‘symmetric’
path, which is the path leading to the symmetric leaf of i, when considering as symmetry axis the line
that cuts the leaf level into two parts of equal size, as depicted in Figure 6.3. This second ‘symmetric’
path is practically used as extra storage space that lightens the usage of the nodes closer to the root.
Secondly, during the eviction, instead of using a queue which is used in the original Path-ORAM (and
2 One such scheme is the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85], which is homomorphic, semantically secure and IK-CPA
secure, as we will see in Section 6.6
3 Adopting directly the eviction from [Shi+11], which also involves reading two paths, would unnecessarily degrade the
protocol’s performance, since we would have to store smaller ORAMs of size log(KN) in every node.
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Figure 6.1: Path-ORAMs of three clients, each client assigned different colour for his datablocks
(left), concatenated together and forming the initialisation of Blurry-ORAM (middle),
and a Blurry-ORAM state after some accesses, leaving the ‘blurred’ version of the
multiple Path-ORAMs (right).
is known to be responsible for the so-called ‘stagnant’ datablocks) we use a list, which allows us to re-
arrange the order into which the datablocks are evicted, thus making sure that first the shared datablocks
are evicted, and then all the rest. Having these two heuristics in mind, the read operation proceeds as
follows: The client identifies the datablocks he has access to (real, fake and shared). This is done by
the client iterating on all the datablocks and checking if a specific condition is fulfilled (for example, by
trying to decrypt while using an encryption scheme that returns ⊥ when decrypting with the wrong key,
or by using the properties of homomorphic schemes, as we detail in Section 6.6). By construction, one of
these datablocks is guaranteed to be the datablock that the client is looking for. Consequently, the client
copies the real and shared datablocks of his in a local list, along with the datablocks in his localstash,
and replaces his real, shared and fakes in the paths, with empty placeholders. The client can now use all
the empty placeholders in the paths for his eviction. First the client evicts all shared datablocks, trying
to store them as deep down in either of the paths as possible. If a shared datablock cannot fit in any of
the paths, it replaces a fake datablock in the commonstash. Subsequently, the client evicts in a similar
manner those datablocks that are not shared. If there is not enough space in the paths, the localstash is
used. The client then fills up the remaining placeholders with fake datablocks, and finally re-randomises
all the datablocks in the paths and the commonstash. The paths and the commonstash are then sent back
to the server. Indeed, using these ideas, we observed during our experiments that the stash sizes were
very small. In particular, the commonstash had been empty during all our experiments, even when we
let Z as small as 2.
In our construction, sharing a datablock between clients is straightforward: Suppose client Clienti
wants to share datablock idu with client Client j; Clienti retrieves his datablock idu (by means of Read
operation, which changes also the datablock’s path assignment), re-encrypts the datablock with a new
key and uploads the datablock to the server. Finally, Clienti hands over to Client j the new key and the
new index of the leaf to which idu is mapped through an external communication channel. In a similar
way, revocation of access rights is performed: If Clienti wants to revoke access rights of datablock
idu from Client j , Clienti changes the key under which datablock idu is encrypted (again by reading
datablock idu, and thus changing its path assignment) and informs other clients about the change of key
and of path assignment.
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1. Clients upload their
encrypted private data
2. Clients share parts
of their data with other 
clients
3. Clients access 
shared data 
Figure 6.2: Clients upload their encrypted data on a Blurry-ORAM structure (step 1., black ar-
rows), give to other clients access to parts of it (step 2., blue arrows), which the
latter access (step 3., orange arrows).
Figure 6.3: Blurry-ORAM’s ‘Read’ operation, downloading the ‘original’ and the ‘symmetric’ paths.
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6.4.2. Storing the Position Map
In order to save space, in ORAM constructions that use a position map, such as [Ste+13a; Shi+11; SS13b;
SSS12], the position map is stored recursively on the server, in smaller ORAMs, ORAM1, . . . ,ORAMk,
where ORAM1 stores the positions of the data and ORAMk is of constant size. In a PSMC-ORAM that stores
a position map recursively, it does not seem possible to avoid the fact that at least ORAM2, . . . ,ORAMk must
be accessible by all clients. In such a case however, any client can infer that a position has been changed
in ORAM1, simply by noticing the changes in ORAM2. This way, a client could trivially break the access
pattern privacy of other clients, regardless if they share their data or not. In order to avoid this potential
leakage, in Blurry-ORAM we store the clients’ position maps in the following way: Every client stores a
position map for his own datablocks in a classic Path-ORAM on the server. Similarly, we store a position
map in a separate ORAM for every group of shared datablocks to which all the members of the group
have access. In order to further prevent the server from knowing whether a client is asking for a shared
datablock (which the server can see by observing the position maps being accessed), all clients must
access all the position maps for every access they make, even if they cannot decrypt datablocks from
certain position maps. In such a case, the client simply downloads a randomly chosen path, re-encrypts
it and uploads it back to the server.
6.4.3. Key Management
Suppose Clienti is a client in our system. Clienti has to store a key for the datablocks that he can access
exclusively and the key to encrypt/decrypt the fake datablocks in the commonstash. Once Clienti starts
sharing datablocks with Client j , Clienti creates a key, under which he can encrypt all the datablocks
shared with client Client j , thus forming groups of shared datablocks. This way, more clients can share
only one key for a whole set of datablocks (for example client Clienti wishes to share all his datablocks
with clients Client j and Clientu), and the number of keys stored by every client increases linearly in
the amount of groups of shared datablocks.
6.4.4. The Algorithm in Detail
In detail, an access to the Blurry-ORAM is described in Algorithm 6: First, the client finds the leaf to
which the datablock he is looking for is currently mapped, and remaps the datablock randomly to a new
leaf (lines 2 and 3). The client then downloads the original and its symmetric path, and stores them locally
in the listsOriPATH and SymPATH respectively (lines 4 and 5). The client starts processing the paths,
beginning with the original path, which he copies to PATH (line 6). The client reads his localstash and
the common-stash and copies them in a list L (lines 8 to 9). For every datablock in the common-stash,
the client tries all his keys, in order to decrypt it. On success, the client adds the decrypted datablock to
L (lines 10 to 14). For every datablock in every node in the path, the client tries to decrypt it, using all
the keys that he has. If this succeeds, then the client adds the decrypted datablock to L and marks the
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datablock in PATH (lines 15 to 20). Marking the datablock in PATH is crucial, because this way, the
client knows where in the PATH his datablocks currently lie, he is therefore able to replace them with
other datablocks he has access to, without moving datablocks that belong to other clients.
Once the client has found all the datablocks that belong to him, decrypted them and copied them to L,
he scans the list and reads the desired datablock, if the operation was a read or updates the datablock’s
contents if the operation was a write (lines 23 to 26). Now, if the operation is a share, then if the datablock
is already shared, then the client sends the key under which the datablock is encrypted and its current
position to Clienti; otherwise, the client creates a new key with which he encrypts the datablock and
sends this new key and the new position to which the datablock is mapped to Clienti (lines 27 to 32).
Revoking access rights for a datablock is done in a similar way, with Clienti changing the encryption
key, re-encrypting the datablock and putting it back, as if the operation was a normal write.
Now that the datablock has been found, the client continues with the eviction of the datablocks present in
his local list L: As in classical Path-ORAM, the client tries to move as many datablocks as he can closer
to the leaf level of the tree. This is done with the function PushBlock, which takes as input a datablock,
a path and a leaf and performs the classical Path-ORAM eviction algorithm. If the datablock fits in the
input path, PushBlock returns 1, otherwise it returns 0. The client first evicts the shared datablocks.
If a datablock does not fit in the path, it is added in the commonstash. This procedure is described in
lines 36 to 40. As mentioned earlier, the reason for evicting the shared datablocks first is that at this point
there is more available space in the PATH and thus the probability that the shared datablocks actually
fit in the tree is higher. This way, the probability of using the commonstash is reduced. Once the shared
datablocks are evicted, the client continues with the eviction of all other datablocks (lines 41 to 44).
The original path has now been processed, and theOriPATH is updated with the datablocks fromPATH
(line 47). Next the client must process the symmetric path (lines 45 to 51). Since the root node of the
tree is the only common node between the original and the symmetric path, and during the processing
of the original path it has changed, the root of the symmetric path is updated in line 46. The OriPATH
is updated with PATH and PATH is emptied. The symmetric path is copied to PATH and is then
processed in the same way the OriPATH was previously processed. After this is done, the symmetric
path is updated (line 52), both paths and the common-stash are re-randomised (line 53) and finally both
paths and the encrypted common-stash are sent back to the server (line 54).
6.4.5. Stash Size
As mentioned above, it is important that the commonstash remains very small. For this reason, the client
first evicts all shared datablocks found in the downloaded paths. Clearly however, this does not guarantee
that shared datablocks never need to be stored outside the tree, and intuitively, the more shared datablocks
exist, the greater the probability that the commonstash will be used.
Suppose that in a Blurry-ORAM with N leaves and K clients, each client shares at most m datablocks.
Since every client has a fixed lower bound of buckets that he can use in every node of the Blurry-ORAM,
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Algorithm 6: Blurry-ORAM(OP, id, dat, Clienti , Client j)
Z : Number of blocks in bucket;
N : Number of client blocks;
λ: Security parameter;
KeyGen(1λ): Key Generation function;
Encpk : Encryption under public key pk;
DECk: Decryption Algorithm, using key k;
PushBlock(B, PATH, x1): Path-ORAM eviction
algorithm for block B in path PATH and new
leaf position x1;
1 L← ;;
/* Find the leaf to which id is mapped
in the position map */;
2 x0 = PositionMap(id);
/* Choose new random leaf */;
3 x1
R← ZN ;
4 OriPATH[]← GetPath(x0);
5 SymPATH[]← GetSymmetricPath(x0);
6 PATH← OriPATH;
7 ProcessSymmetricPath= 0;
8 L← ReadLocalStash();
9 C← ReadCommonStash();
10 for i = 1 to C.length() do
11 for j = 1 to KZ do
12 for k in Keys do
13 if DECk(i) 6=⊥ then
14 L← L∪ DECk(i);
15 for i = 1 to PATH .length() do
16 for j = 1 to KZ do
17 for k in Keys do
18 if DECk(PATH[i][ j]) 6=⊥ then
19 L← L∪ DECk(PATH[i][ j]);
20 Mark(PATH[i][ j]);
21 for i in L do
22 if i.id == id then
23 if OP == ”R” then
24 RetBlock = i;
25 else if OP == ”W ” then
26 i.data = dat;
27 else if OP == ”Share” then
28 if i is not shared then
29 k← KeyGen(1λ) ;
30 i.data = Enck(dat);
31 Send x1 to Client j;
32 Send k to Client j;
33 else if OP == ”Revoke” then
34 k← KeyGen(1λ) ;
35 i.data = Enck(dat);
/* First evict the shared blocks */;
36 for i in L do
37 if i is shared then
38 if PushBlock(i,PATH, x1) == 0 then
/* Shared block did not fit
into the tree */;
39 C← i;
40 Remove i from L;
/* Now evict the remaining blocks */;
41 for i in L do
42 if PushBlock(i,PATH, x1) == 0 then
/* Shared block did not fit into
the tree */;
43 C← i;
44 Remove i from L;
45 if ProcessSymmetricPath== 0 then
46 SymPATH[0]← PATH[0];
47 OriPATH← PATH;
48 PATH← ;;
49 PATH← SymPATH;
50 ProcessSymmetricPath= 1;
51 Repeat Steps 8 to 44;
52 SymPATH← PATH;
53 Rerandomise(OriPATH, SymPATH, C);
54 Upload(OriPATH, SymPATH, C);
55 return RetBlock
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we could simulate every client’s data as being stored in a single Path-ORAM, in which the client stores
N +m real datablocks in a tree with N leaves. Since during eviction we let the shared datablocks take
the place of real datablocks that belong to the client and we first push these shared datablocks into the
structure, in essence we treat these m datablocks as the real datablocks and all other datablocks as fakes.
Thus, in order to examine the commonstash size, we can simulate a Blurry-ORAM by a Path-ORAM,
in which a client stores m real datablocks in a tree with N leaves. Based on the proof of [Ste+13b] we
can estimate the probability of using a stash of size O(log logN) for m= log2 N , by following the same
argument as in the classical Path-ORAM, and adjusting the number of leaves of the tree. These ideas are
summarised in the following lemmata:
Lemma 6.4.5.1.
For a data request sequence α in a Blurry-ORAM with K clients, each having N datablocks and sharing
O(log2 N) datablocks, with Z = 5 buckets per client per node, that uses a commonstash of size R, the
probability that the size of the commonstash during a data request sequence α exceeds R during one of
the requests is bounded by
Prob[Stash(Blurry-ORAMZL )[α]> R] = 14 · (0.6002)R.
Proof. (sketch) Observe that the shared datablocks are a subset of the original N real datablocks and
recall that in Blurry-ORAM the shared datablocks are the ones that are evicted first. Thus, the bounds of
Path-ORAM’s stash analysis from [Ste+13b] apply for the shared datablocks as well.
Following the argumentation line of [Ste+13b], we have that for s = O(log2 N) accesses (i.e., accessing
all shared datablocks), the probability that the commonstash grows larger than R is s · 14 · (0.6002)R,
which means that for s = poly(log2 N) accesses, the probability that the commonstash will be larger
than O(log logN) during one of the accesses to the shared datablocks is negligible in N .
6.4.6. Time and Space Requirements
Based on the observations made earlier in this section, we can now analyse the time and space require-
ments of our protocol. A client that participates in O(logN) groups needs O(logN) space for the keys
and O(logN) for the position maps (given the recursive position map storage). The client also needs to
store his private stash which follows the bounds provided in [Ste+13a], and is thus limited to O(logN).
Each time the client performs a data request, he downloads two paths of sizeO(logN), and the common-
stash, which is in the worst case of size O(log logN) ∈ O(logN). Thus, the amount of space needed
during protocol execution for the client is O(logN).
As far as the computational complexity of the client is concerned, recall that the client has to iterate
on his O(logN) keys for each of the downloaded datablocks found in the paths, thus the computational
complexity isO(log2 N). Note that since we have restricted the amount of shared datablocks toO(logN)
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per client, there is a total O(K logN) ∈ O(logN) position maps from each of which a client will read
and re-randomise a path during a query.
Suppose that a client shares N −1 datablocks of his with K clients. Instead of holding a different key for
every group, the client can share all the common datablocks with all the clients, using only one key, and
create smaller position maps only for the datablocks that are not shared with all of the clients. Thus, each
smaller position map will not exceed a size of O(logN), which means that for every query, the client
will have to dedicate O(log2 N log(logN)) time for the recursive position map accesses.
6.5. Security Analysis
In order to show that a PSMC-ORAM is secure, one has to show that it achieves client-to-server and
client-to-client privacy, by means of Definitions 35 and 37 respectively. Client-to-server privacy for
Blurry-ORAM is shown under the assumption that a homomorphic, semantically secure and IK-CPA
(according to Definition 5) encryption scheme is used. In addition to these properties, however, in order
to show client-to-client privacy for Blurry-ORAM, one has to also assume that the commonstash is used
with negligible probability. We show these properties in the following.
Proposition 9.
For a public key encryption scheme that is homomorphic, IND-CPA and IK-CPA secure, Blurry-ORAM
with at least two clients achieves client-to-server Privacy against a semi-honest adversarial server ac-
cording to Definition 35.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A that wins the Server-IND-CQA game on a Blurry-
ORAM,with non-negligible advantageδ. We show how to construct a PPT algorithm B, that breaks either
the semantic security, or the key indistinguishability property of the encryption scheme used in Blurry-
ORAM. To do this, suppose that B plays the IK-CPA and the IND-CPA game against a challenger C0 and a
challenger C1 respectively, andwins if hewins any one of them. LetE= (KeyGen(n),Encpk(·),Decsk(·))
be the public key encryption scheme used in Blurry-ORAM,with (pk, sk)← KeyGen(λ) a private/public
key pair produced for the security parameter λ.
C0 runs KeyGen(λ), issues (pki,ski) for i = 2, . . . ,K − 1 and sends {pki}K−1i=2 to B. Similarily, C1 runs
KeyGen(λ), issues (pk0,sk0), (pk1,sk1), and sends pk0 and pk1 to B. B simulates the Blurry-ORAM
server and runs Blurry-ORAM.Init(λ,N ,K) in order to create the private/public key pairs for all the
clients present on the Blurry-ORAM. B assigns each pki to Clienti for the public keys he got from C0
and C1, and B keeps two versions of Blurry-ORAM: One which will be encrypted and one plain.
On a data request mcdrfrom A, the View(mcdr) is formed by B as follows:
1. B adds to the View the two paths from the encrypted Blurry-ORAM version.
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2. B now runs the eviction algorithm on the plain Blurry-ORAM version, encrypts every client’s da-
tablock found with the respective client’s key, and updates the encrypted version.
3. B finally encrypts the commonstash and adds it to the View, along with the encrypted updated
paths from the previous step.
The result of the above operation is a view that A can process.
In the challenge phase, B receives from A a tuple of two data request sequences (mcdr0, mcdr1).
B copies the plain Blurry-ORAM, including all the position maps and stashes of the clients, in a
Blurry-ORAM-COPY and runs both of the data request sequences, on each Blurry-ORAM (for example
mcdr0 on Blurry-ORAM and mcdr1 on Blurry-ORAM-COPY) as earlier in the pre-challenge phase. B first
chooses a random bit b˜; if b˜ = 0, B will play against C0 (the IND-CPA challenger), else he plays against
C1 (the IK-CPA challenger). Now B chooses a random bit b∗ and selects the data request sequence mcdrb∗
and the Blurry-ORAM yielded thereof (either the Blurry-ORAM or the Blurry-ORAM-COPY). In the two
plain views, B finds the positions where the unencrypted views differ in the datablocks of client Clientu,
picks the corresponding (plain) data (m01,m
0
2, . . . ,m
0
q), (m
1
1,m
1
2, . . . ,m
1
q) corresponding to mcdr0 and
mcdr1 respectively and forms two pairs of challenges: the IND-CPA challenge,
{m0i }qi=1, {m1i }qi=1
along with pku and the IK-CPA challenge,
{mb∗i }qi=1,pk0,pk1. B sends the two challenges to C0 and C1
who respond by issuing {Encpku(mbi )}qi=1, and {Encpkb(mb∗i )}qi=1 respectively. In DRSb∗ , B now injects
the appropriate ciphertext: If B chose to play against C0, he injects Encpku(m
b
j ) and if he chose to play
against C1, he injects Encpkb(m
b∗
j ). Then B forms the rest of View(DRSb∗) as he did in the pre-challenge
phase, and passes the result to A.
The post-challenge phase continues exactly as the pre-challenge phase with data requests issued from A.
At the end of this phase, A outputs a bit b′, which B uses to output (b′, d) if he had chosen to play against
IND-CPA, or (d, b′), if he had chosen to play against IK-CPA, where d is a random bit.
Observe now, that if B chooses to play against IND-CPA, and if b = b∗, then A gets a well formed view
and thus by assumption, A wins with non-negligible advantage δ. In a similar manner, if B plays against
IK-CPA A gets a well formed view and thus by assumption, A wins with non-negligible advantage δ.
Suppose now, that if b˜ = 0 and b∗ 6= b, A outputs 0 with probability α0 and outputs 1 with probability
1−α0, while if b˜ = 1 and b∗ 6= b, A outputs 0 with probability α1 and outputs 1 with probability 1−α1.
Then B’s total winning probability (i.e. breaking IND-CPA or IK-CPA) is
Prob

Bwins
IND-CPA or BwinsIK-CPA

=
1
8

1
2
+δ+α0 + (1−α0) + 12 +δ+ (1−α1) +
1
2
+δ+α1 +
1
2
+δ

≥ 1
2
+
δ
2q
,
which means that with non-negligible advantage, B breaks either the semantic security or the key indis-
tinguishability property of the encryprion scheme, which is a contradiction.
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Proving that our construction achieves access pattern privacy against clients is more involved and is done
by showing that Blurry-ORAM satisfies Definition 38. To do this, however, we must first make sure that
the commonstash is rarely used. Indeed, as we saw in Lemma 6.4.5.1, the size of the commonstash is
very small with high probability.
Proposition 10.
Assume that in Blurry-ORAM the server is semi-honest, and that the clients are semi-honest and not
colludingwith each other. Assume further that the commonstash is usedwith some negligible probability ε
in Blurry-ORAM’s security parameter λ, and an asymmetric, semantically secure, homomorphic and IK-
CPA secure encryption scheme E is used. Then Blurry-ORAM achieves client-to-client privacy according
to Definition 37
The main proof idea is that we assume the existence of a PPT adversary that breaks the client-to-client
privacy, by winning the IND-CQA game with non-negligible advantage, and we then construct an algo-
rithm that, by carefully crafting the views the adversary creates, as well as the views he is given through
oracle access to other clients’ data requests, he implants the IND-CPA or the IK-CPA challenge in the
IND-CQA challenge, and can break the encryption scheme’s semantic security, or its IK-CPA property,
thus yielding a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A, that wins the Client-IND-CQA game on a Blurry-
ORAM with non-negligible advantage δ1, when the commonstash is used and wins the Client-IND-
CQA game with some non-negligible advantage δ2, when the commonstash is not used. We show how
to construct a PPT algorithm B, that breaks either the semantic security or the key indistinguishability
property of the encryption scheme used in Blurry-ORAM. To do this, suppose that B plays the IND-CPA
and the IK-CPA games against two respective challengers C0 and C1, and wins if he wins against any of
them. A will be a client in the Blurry-ORAM, who will attack the access patterns of other clients present
on the construction. B will simulate all the other clients, as well as the server, and will use A in order to
win either the IND-CPA or the IK-CPA game.
Let E= (KeyGen(λ),Encpk(·),Decsk(·)) be the public key encryption scheme used in Blurry-ORAM,
with (pk,sk)← KeyGen(λ) a private/public key pair produced for the security parameter λ. C0 and C1
run KeyGen(λ), get (cpk,csk) and send csk to B. B simulates the Blurry-ORAM server and runs the
Initalgorithm in order to create the private/public key pairs for all clients present on the Blurry-ORAM,
except for A (who is also a client in Blurry-ORAM). For one of the clients that B simulates, say client
Clienti , B uses the public key cpk that he got from his challenger C0, instead of creating a fresh one.
B keeps the Blurry-ORAM in plaintext, except for the blocks that A has access to and are not shared by
him, which B keeps encrypted on the Blurry-ORAM.
Whenever B gets a data request from A, for a block that belongs to A, B does the following:
1. B finds the paths that A asks for. The encrypted blocks found in P , B leaves as they are (since these
are the blocks that only A has access to and thus B never sees in plain), and every block in plain,
83
B encrypts using each client’s encryption key since everything in the view must be encrypted.
B encrypts the blocks in the path that A asks for using for each block the encryption key that
corresponds to the block’s owner (including the blocks that belong to client Clienti).
2. To every node of the paths, B adds A’s encrypted blocks that were found on that node. These
(encrypted) blocks, B discards from his data structure. Now the paths are encrypted and A can
proccess it.
3. B sends the encrypted paths and the commonstash to A, who runs his eviction algorithm and sends
the updated paths and the commonstash back to B.
4. B now decrypts all the blocks that he can in the paths and the commonstash he received and updates
the corresponding blocks in the plain Blurry-ORAM version. This way any possible changes that
A made on shared datablocks, are considered. The datablocks that could not be decrypted belong
to either Clienti or A. Since the datablocks accessible only by Clienti cannot have been moved
in any of the paths during A’s eviction, B replaces these encryptions with the plaintext blocks of
Clienti from the paths of his plain Blurry-ORAM.
5. B discards the version of the paths on his Blurry-ORAM structure, and sets in their place the newly
updated paths, which contain the datablocks of all clients in plain (including the ones that A shares
with other clients), except the datablocks that only A has access to, which are encrypted.
To every node of the updated paths of the plain Blurry-ORAM construction, B adds the datablocks
from the corresponding node of the path received from A, that B could not decrypt (and thus the
nodes that belonged to A).
Whenever B gets an ‘oracle’ data request from A on datablocks that do not belong to A, B runs the Blurry-
ORAM protocol and produces an unencrypted view as follows:
1. B adds to the unencrypted view the appropriate paths (which we will call the downloaded paths).
2. B updates the appropriate position map and runs the eviction algorithm, using the commonstash if
necessary.
3. B runs the eviction on the plain datablocks and adds the updated paths (which we will call the
uploaded paths) and the commonstash to the unencrypted view.
After the eviction is done, B creates the view, by encrypting it as follows: For every element found in the
view, B (who knows to which client each block belongs) encrypts it, using the appropriate client’s public
key. Finally, B adds to the downloaded paths A’s encrypted datablocks that were found on the paths, and
to the uploaded paths, a re-randomisation of these encrypted blocks. The result of this operation is a
view that A can process.
Note that in forming the view, only the downloaded, the uploaded paths and the commonstash are used.
This is because the position maps for all the blocks that are not shared or belong to A are kept encrypted
on the server (a role being played by B here) and that all other stashes are locally stored by every client.
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In the challenge phase, B receives from A, a tuple of two data request sequences (DRS0, DRS1). B copies
the Blurry-ORAM, including all the position maps, the stashes of the clients and the commonstash, in
a Blurry-ORAM-COPY and runs both of the data request sequences, on each Blurry-ORAM (for exam-
ple DRS0 on Blurry-ORAM and DRS1 on Blurry-ORAM-COPY) as earlier in the pre-challenge phase.
B first chooses a random bit b˜; if b˜ = 0, B will play the IND-CPA game, else he plays the IK-CPA
game. Now B chooses a random bit b∗ and selects the data request sequence DRSb∗ and the Blurry-
ORAM yielded thereof (either the Blurry-ORAM or the Blurry-ORAM-COPY). In the two unencrypted
views there will be at least one position in the data-blocks of client Clienti , where the unencrypted
views will differ. B finds the first position where the two plain views differ, picks all the corresponding
(plain) data after that position, {m0j }qj=1 corresponding to DRS0 and {m1j }qj=1 corresponding to DRS1, and
forms two pairs of challenges: the IND-CPA challenge,

{m0j }qj=1, {m1j }qj=1

and the IK-CPA challenge,
{mb∗j }qj=1, cpk, pk

, where cpk is client’s Clienti public key and pk is the public key of another
client. B sends the two challenges to C0 and to C1. The IND-CPA challenger responds by encrypting
{mbj }qj=1 under cpk for a random bit choice b, and the IK-CPA challenger responds by encrypting mb∗j
under pk or cpk. C0 and C1 send their responses back to B.
B now encrypts the plain view corresponding to DRSb∗ , in the same way he did in the pre-challenge phase,
with the only difference, that he implants the encryptions he was given from C0 or from C1, based on his
former choice of b˜.
The post-challenge phase continues exactly as the pre-challenge phase with data requests issued from A,
which however cannot include share and revoke operations on the blocks requested during the challenge
phase. At the end of this phase, A outputs a bit b′. B then outputs (b′, d) if he had chosen to play against
IND-CPA, or (d, b′), if he had chosen to play against IK-CPA, where d is a random bit.
Suppose now that the probability of using the commonstash while performing DRSb∗ is
Prob

B used commonstash
for DRSb∗

= ε
and observe that if B chooses to play against IND-CPA, and if b = b∗, then A gets a well formed view
and thus by assumption, A wins with non-negligible advantage δ1, thus
Prob

A wins
   commonstash used and b = b∗= 1
2
+δ2
and
Prob

A wins
   commonistash not used and b = b∗= 1
2
+δ1.
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The same applies if B chooses to play against IK-CPA. Suppose further that if b˜ = 0 and b 6= b∗, A
outputs 0 with probability α0 and 1 with probability 1−α0, and if b˜ = 1 and b 6= b∗, A outputs 0 with
probability α1 and 1 with probability α1. Then B’s total winning probability (i.e. breaking IND-CPA or
IK-CPA) is
Prob

Bwins
IND-CPA or BwinsIK-CPA
≥ 1
4
 
2+ 2δ1 + ε(δ2 −δ1)

However, we have by assumption that ε= negl(λ), thus
Prob

Bwins
IND-CPA or BwinsIK-CPA
≥ 1
2
+
δ1
2q
,
which means that with non-negligible advantage, B breaks either the semantic security or the key indis-
tinguishability property of the encryprion scheme, which is a contradiction.
6.6. A Concrete Instantiation
Recalling the description of the Blurry-ORAM architecture (see Section 6.4), we note that the main
cryptographic building block upon Blurry-ORAM is based, is the encryption scheme, that has to fulfil
the following properties. Firstly, the encryption scheme has to be semantically secure. This is a typical
requirement for any ORAM construction, as the server should not be able to distinguish between encryp-
tions of the same datablock. Secondly, the encryption scheme has to be asymmetric. Although this is
not a typical requirement in most ORAM constructions (in fact one tries to avoid usage of heavy Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI)), it seems that in a multi-client setting such a requirement is a necessity. The
reason for this, is the fact that every client should be in position to re-randomise any datablock he sees
without knowing the secret key with which the datablock is encrypted. Thirdly the encryption scheme
has to provide indistinguishability of keys under which the datablocks are encrypted, a property achieved
by IK-CPA secure encryption schemes. The reason for this, as we saw, is that the server (or other clients)
should not be in position to associate datablocks with specific clients. Lastly, for a practical instantiation
of the protocol, the encryption scheme has to allow re-randomisation of ciphertexts without knowledge
of the public key. Otherwise, the efficiency of the scheme would be severely hindered by the amount
of public keys that every client should store, and by the effort needed for every client to associate each
datablock with the respective public key under which it is encrypted.
An encryption scheme that supports all the requirements stated above, is the ElGamal encryption scheme
(see Section 3.2.1). First the ElGamal cryptosystem is asymmetric, semantically secure and IK-CPA
secure as shown in the following.
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Proposition 11.
The ElGamal encryption scheme is IK-CPA secure
Proof. Theorem 3.1 of [Bel+01b].
Achieving the last requirement for the encryption scheme (i.e., re-randomisation without knowledge of
the public key) is done by taking advantage of the cryptosystem’s homomorphic properties and com-
bining them with ideas from [Gol+04]. For a given datablock block, we store as its encryption the
tuple (c0, c1, c2, c3), where (c0, c1) = Enck(block) and (c2, c3) = Enck(1) for an ElGamal public key
k. Re-randomisation is done as follows: First one re-randomises the (c2, c3) part by choosing a random
value r and obtaining (c′2, c′3) = (c r2, c r3), and then re-randomising (c0, c1) is simply done by setting
(c′0 = c0c′2, c′1 = c1c′3).
It is important to note, that the way we described above to store the encryption of a datablock, solves
simultaneously two additional issues. For one, suppose that we have an ElGamal encrypted message
m, Enck(m) = (g r ,mg rs) for a private-, public-key pair (s, k) and a group generator g . Observe that
decrypting using a wrong private key s′, still yields a group element, since for any r ′ ∈ 〈g〉, there always
exists a unique z ∈ 〈g〉, such that z = mg rsg rs′ . This means that a client decrypting with the wrong key,
will not be in the position to tell that he got a wrong decryption. However, using the above structure of
the encrypted datablock, a client that has a secret key s, simply needs to verify if cs2 = c3 in order to know
if he has the correct decryption key or not. At the same time, this is a far more efficient way for a client to
check if a datablock belongs to him or not, since this procedure involves only one exponentiation instead
of a complete and costly decryption.
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Chapter 7
Application to Genomic Studies
Now that we have proposed ORAM constructions that allow multiple clients to store and process their
data, we need to show that these constructions can be used in realistic data-intensive problems.
Can the proposed ORAM architectures of Proxy-ORAM (Chapter 5) and Blurry-ORAM (Chapter 6) be
deployed in realistic applications?
We answer the above question in a positive way by using our two architectures for privacy preserving
processing of genomic data. We couple Proxy-ORAM with Yao’s garbled circuit solution for Secure
Two-Party Computation (Section 3.3.3), and show that this way Proxy-ORAM can be used for a vari-
ety of genomic tests, offering a high degree of privacy, since the data retrieved and processed is always
encrypted and only the end result is announced. However, using Proxy-ORAM for Genome Wide Asso-
ciation Studies (GWAS) cannot guarantee access pattern privacy between the clients. For this case, we
use Blurry-ORAM in a multi-client setting, where clients store their encrypted DNA data on a remote
server and give partial access to their data to multiple investigators. This way, the latter can retrieve DNA
data of multiple clients and use it in a privacy preserving manner as the investigator sees only the DNA
parts that are of interest for him.
Published Content
The results from this chapter appeared in [Kar+14] and in [KPK17]. Both protocols have been imple-
mented and tested by myself, while the definition of the experimental framework was done together
with Kay Hammacher, Andreas Peter and Stefan Katzenbeisser in [Kar+14], and with Andreas Peter
and Stefan Katzenbeisser in [KPK17].
7.1. Privacy-Preserving Genomic Tests
Personalised medicine based on genomic data will result in a need to store genetic data as part of a pa-
tient’s electronic health record. However, the great benefits of biostatistical analysis and large collections
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of genomic data for public health will put pressure on the traditional understanding of privacy. Techni-
cally, the major roadblock for this development is already removed: the costs to sequence an individual’s
genome dropped well below $400. Thus, the great benefits and ever sinking costs lead us to expect a
sharp increase in the volume of stored genomic data in the coming years.
Unfortunately, the availability of a large set of genetic data incurs great privacy problems; genetic data
can arguably be seen as one of the most sensitive forms of medical data. Furthermore, our knowledge on
the human genome increases over time; at present, it is impossible to estimate the future consequences
in case a breach of genomic data occurs. Thus, genomic databases should be protected with strong PETs
early on. The most promising approach to protect genomic data is the use of cryptographic techniques
from secure computation such as Secure Two Party Computation, since these techniques provide strong
cryptographic security, both during storage and processing. In this approach, genomic data is stored in
encrypted form and the evaluation is performed directly on encrypted data. This both protects the raw
genomic data and allows to control the types of queries that can be performed.
However, STC techniques, unless they touch all the data, do not provide privacy during accessing the
outsourced data, which in the scenario of genomic processing can be a source for significant private
information leakage. Indeed, when running genomic tests, only a small part of the outsourced data is used,
and thus merely observing which parts of it are being accessed can lead to knowledge of the test being
run. Using Proxy-ORAM, we can synergistically combine ORAM techniques with secure two-party
computation solutions in order to offer privacy preserving computations on outsourced, fully sequenced
DNA, while at the same time offering full query flexibility. Our starting point is storing a client’s fully
sequenced DNA in small datablocks and outsourcing it to a remote server, in a way that the client’s
access patterns are hidden. Using secure computation techniques on the retrieved DNA datablocks, the
computation can be performed in an oblivious manner. Decoupling the data retrieval and computation
process, we obtain full flexibility to adapt to future queries.
As we have seen in Chapter 5, Proxy-ORAM employs two separate servers (the ‘cloud’ and ‘proxy’)
which jointly operate an ORAM that (in our scenario here) will store encrypted genetic data. A client
can subsequently authorise a different party, called ‘investigator’ to perform a query on the data in two
steps: In the first step, the investigator retrieves the required encrypted genetic data from the ORAM
in a way that does not require the client to be constantly online. Here, in a second step we will couple
Proxy-ORAM with STC techniques, so that for a specific computation on the retrieved datablocks, the
investigator can obtain the result of the computation by running any secure computation protocol between
the cloud and the proxy. This solution provides the flexibility to perform any genetic test securely. Further,
this solution can be extended to a setting where the remote server stores data of multiple users in one or
more different ORAMs, thus allowing the investigator to compute on different users’ encrypted data stored
on the server’s database. Finally, we demonstrate the practical feasibility of the approach by implementing
three analysis techniques, operating on (simulated) fully sequenced genomes. Note here however, that in
such a scenario using Proxy-ORAM as the underlying ORAM architecture, no client-to-client privacy as
in Definition 38 can be achieved.
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Figure 7.1: Overview of the Proxy-ORAM architecture coupled with Yao’s Garbled Circuit solu-
tion. In steps 1 and 2, the client authorises the investigator to access his encrypted
data. In step 3, the investigator retrieves the client’s datablocks using the ORAM in-
terface. In steps 4 and 5, the investigator asks the cloud and the proxy to run Yao’s
garbled circuit protocol on the datablocks retrieved from step 3, and in step 6 the
investigator attains the result of the computation.
Upon acquisition of genetic data, a client uploads his DNA in small encrypted blocks to the cloud. Sub-
sequent access to the data is illustrated in Figure 7.1: Whenever the investigator wants to access certain
DNA datablocks of a client, he first asks the client for authorisation (steps 1–2) and retrieves the required
blocks from the cloud in a private manner (step 3) through the Proxy-ORAM protocol. Once all data
is retrieved, the investigator asks the cloud and the proxy to jointly compute a certain function (e.g., a
medical test or study) on the retrieved encrypted blocks, in a secure and private way (steps 4–5). To do
this, the cloud and the proxy run Yao’s garbled circuit protocol, with the (encrypted and blinded) inputs
and circuit provided by the investigator. Throughout these steps, all private data from the client remains
encrypted and only the result of the computation is revealed to the investigator (step 6). Neither the cloud
nor the proxy learns anything about the stored data, including the investigator’s access patterns (except
for the number of blocks accessed). This architecture can be generalised in a straightforward way to tests
that operate on multiple genomes: in the first step, all required encrypted data blocks are fetched from
the cloud given the consent of all involved users. Note that in such a multi-client setting, DNA data of
multiple clients can be stored in one ORAM database; alternatively one ORAM can be used per client.
The retrieved DNA blocks are homomorphically encrypted and subsequently converted to shares, which
are given to the cloud and the proxy, along with a Boolean circuit representation of the functionality the
investigator wants to evaluate. This transformation allows full flexibility of queries as the cloud and the
proxy can run Yao’s garbled circuit for Secure Two-Party Computation for any desired functionality.
Let {Encpk(dati)}ki=1 be the blocks that the investigator retrieved from the cloud during this first step. In
order to evaluate a specific functionality f on these blocks, the investigator first converts the encryption
into shares as follows: he blinds the retrieved encrypted data with a random value and sends it to the
proxy, while the blinding values are sent to the cloud. Recall that in Proxy-ORAM, the proxy and the
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cloud are both semi honest and do not collude. Recall further, that the proxy sees either blinded or proxy
re-encrypted versions of encrypted datablocks. Thus, we can give the client’s private key to the proxy
without affecting Proxy-ORAM’s security. In such a case, the proxy can decrypt the obtained blocks
and is left with blinded versions of the required data items. Since the cloud now has the blindings, this
means that the proxy and the cloud have an additive linear secret sharing of the data contained in the
blocks. Subsequently, the investigator creates the circuit corresponding to the functionality f he wants
to compute (which needs to include the necessary data unblinding step) and sends it to the proxy who
performs the circuit garbling. The cloud and the proxy can now evaluate the desired function on the
secret shared blocks together, using any garbled circuit framework. Finally, the result of the computation
is returned to the investigator.
7.1.1. Genetic Tests Using our Framework
As we have seen in Chapter 2.2, a sequenced human genome is a set of approximately 3.3 billion char-
acters, out of which only around 1% seem to be relevant for humans. This specific part of the genome is
typically stored in the form of SNPs, which are the positions in the sequenced genome of an individual
which differ from what is known as the reference genome – and what is believed to be a representative
example of a human genome. Once a client’s SNPs have been determined, they are stored in biobanks,
alongside those of other individuals, and can be used for various tests. We illustrate this general proce-
dure, as well as the flexibility and potential of our framework by three specific use cases which are often
performed in the area of genetic analysis.
Pattern Matching in SNPs
In our architecture it is straightforward to search for a specific mutation in a block of sequenced DNA;
this conforms to the present practice of finding markers via the SNPs. Here, the investigator first retrieves
the encrypted block that contains the SNP to be analysed. Subsequently, the investigator runs a simple
comparison protocol, illustrated in Figure 7.2 that compares the SNP part of the block to the desired
mutation. Technically, the circuit for this operation needs to unblind the retrieved encrypted datablock,
extract some nucleotides and perform the comparison operation. We used the compiler from [Hol+12].
Representing each nucleotide by two bits in a DNA block, we produced the corresponding circuit, which
consists of 20,490 gates. Using a framework like [Bel+13], which evaluates a gate per 7.25 ns, this
circuit can be evaluated in approximately 5270 µs on a Gigabit network.
DNA Fingerprints in Forensics
Usage of genomic data in criminal forensics has become a wide-spread tool [Roe13]. It is based on the
identification of STRs which are highly polymorphic regions of short repeated sequences of DNA – each
around four nucleotides long. Typically, investigators focus on several loci1 in the genome, looking for
several STRs. Then, the number of repeated copies is extracted and used as a ‘description vector’ for an
1 For instance, the US Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) maintained by the FBI uses 13 such loci.
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individual or a probe found at a crime scene. We stress that there is conclusive evidence that STRs reveal
information about family members and kinship [BBL06].
Note that this procedure is related but substantially different from the above SNP pattern matching for
the following reasons: Firstly, the output is a vector of integers representing the amount of copies of
individual STRs, and secondly the loci are not necessarily in vicinity but scattered through the entire
genome.
Initialising the parameters of our system as will be discussed in Section 7.1.2 and thus storing 128
character long DNA blocks, we implemented the above approach using [Hol+12]. The resulting cir-
cuit that outputs the ‘description vector’ is of size 1,697,280 gates, which again using the framework
from [Bel+13] can be evaluated in roughly 1 second.
Statistical Queries
In this setting, the sequenced genome of multiple clients is examined, and associations between specific
parts of the human genome and various diseases are made. To do this, a biostatistician (the investigator)
examines parts of the genome of multiple DNA samples that are suspected to be associated with a specific
disease. Further, the investigator consults a table indicating whether a client suffers from the disease or
not, and thus can extract the probability that a particular DNA region (or SNP) is correlated with the
disease.
To this end, one can perform statistical analyses: Consider the events A ∈ {0,1} stating that the patient
suffers (A = 1) or does not suffer (A = 0) from a particular disease, and Bpi ∈ {0,1} stating that a
distinctive pattern p occurs in DNA block indexed by i. Note, that p and i do not necessarily contain
all possible and thus combinatorially many patterns of nucleotides or DNA fragments, but rather a small
and well understood subset.
A biostatistician knows the disease classifications and wants to train a statistical model for future pre-
diction of disease prevalence. He can thus compute the prior probabilities Prob(Bpi |A) for a given set
of stored genomes – taken as a training set. Furthermore, he can compute the prior probability distri-
bution Prob(A) on the prevalence of the disease in the sample. Using our architecture, the investigator
can obtain all probabilities Prob(Bpi ) for B
p
i ∈ {0,1} – without revealing the individual genomes. Now,
using Bayesian estimation, a medical practitioner who was provided with the biostatistician’s model can
diagnose a patient by computing the probability Prob(A|Bpi ) = Prob(B
p
i |A)·Prob(A)
Prob(Bpi )
given a genome of a
patient. Note, that updates on the model can be performed as well: whenever new genomes enter the
pool of genomic data in the cloud (preferably many), the biostatistician can use Bayesian updating to
accommodate the new data and modify the effective model Prob(A|Bpi ).
In order to estimate the complexity of this approach, we implemented the computation of the above-
mentioned probabilities on 1000 retrieved encrypted DNA data blocks using fixed point arithmetic with
10 bit precision. The resulting circuit consists of 21,989 gates for one block, out of which 21,590 gates
were used to perform the unblinding of the 2048 bit long blinded block. Since the circuit creation scales
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#define k // position of the character in the datablock
// INPUT_A_x: The blinded encrypted DNA datablock given to the cloud
// INPUT_B_y: The blinding value given to the proxy
void findCharacter(INPUT_A_x, INPUT_B_y){
int TEST;
int z;
int recoveredBlock;
recoveredBlock = (INPUT_A_x + INPUT_B_y);
z = (recoveredBlock >> 2k) && 3;
if (z == TEST)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
Figure 7.2: Search for specific value in an encrypted datablock
linearly, the resulting circuit for 1000 DNA blocks has a size of about 21,000,000 gates, which can
be evaluated in 5.4 seconds using the framework from [Bel+13] over a Gigabit network. Note that this
number amounts for the time required to perform computations on the retrieved blocks; timings for the
data retrieval part are given in the next section.
7.1.2. Proxy-ORAM Experimental Setup and Results
Aswe have seen, once the datablocks have been retrieved from the server in a privacy-preserving manner,
performing any function evaluation on them using Yao’s garbled circuit method for secure computation
can be done in a very efficient way. Therefore, observing that the real bottleneck of our framework’s
efficiency is Proxy-ORAM, we focused our experimental evaluation on the performance of Proxy-ORAM
when initiated with a fully sequenced genome.
We follow the recommendations of Ecrypt II [Blu], which are slightly more conservative than those of
NIST. Thus we choose for the ElGamal group a safe prime p = 2qr+1 of length 1024 bits with q and r
primes and set the discrete logarithm key of size q, to 160 bits. In order then for the CvHP hash function
to be compatible with the ElGamal encryption we choose the element α (as mentioned in Section 3.2.1)
to be a generator of the subgroup Z∗q and the generator β to be a multiple of α. The block ids are drawn
uniformly and at random from Z∗q, making sure that every block (fake and real) is assigned a different id.
We choose the BCP keys to be of size 4096 bits, thus having the underlying prime factors of size 1024
bits. Regarding our Bloom filters and in order to minimise the disk seeks during the queries, we set the
number of Bloom filter keys to 5, randomly chosen from Z∗q. For each level, the Bloom filter is of size
50 times the size of the level, and we use 5 keys for the hash function, thus achieving a theoretical false
positive ratio smaller than 2−18, using the results from [CRJ10] 2.
2 Note here that the probability of a false positive does not affect the correct retrieval of a block, as pointed out in Sec-
tions 5.2.2 and 5.4
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Figure 7.3: Average time (10 repetitions) of 2100 queries on a database with 225 real packets.
We implemented our mechanism on an IBM System x3550 M3 server equiped with 32GB of RAM and
two Intel Xeon X5650 2.67GHz processors running Ubuntu Server 11.10. Our system was implemented
in C++ and compiled using g++ from theGNUCompiler Collection version 4.6.1. For the cryptographic
operations, we used theCrypto++ library in version 5.6.1. We usedMySQL version 5.1.69 as the storage
backend.
Needing only two bits to encode a nucleotide, in order to store the entire genome’s approximately 3.3
billion characters, we would need approximately 232 bits. Using the BCP parameters described above
which support plaintext blocks of size at most 2048 bits, we could store a fully sequenced human genome
in less than 225=33,554,432 blocks of 128 characters each. We simulated the client’s DNA, by storing
random numbers representing the various DNA blocks. We argue that in a person’s lifetime no more than
225 queries over his DNA are expected to be performed, thus we implemented the optimization described
in Section 5.5 regarding the generation of the last level’s Bloom filter: We did not create a Bloom filter
for the ORAM’s last level during the initial data upload.
Our tests showed that the system’s bottleneck is its initialization: we measured the initialization of
databases of various sizes and observed that it scales linearly: a 217=131,072 blocks database needed
approximately 2 hours and 36 minutes, a 224=16,777,216 blocks database needed approximately 7 days
and the largest database, corresponding to a fully sequenced genome, holding all 225 blocks, needed ap-
proximately 14 days to be populated. Nevertheless, as this is an operation that is only performed once
during the lifetime of a client, these durations seem justified.
In order to test the efficiency of the block retrieval from the database, we set up two databases of different
size: a database containing 217 blocks and the large database containing 225 blocks. In both databases
we performed 10 rounds of 2100 queries. In Figure 7.3, we show the average timings for the 10 rounds
of queries on the large database: We see that the majority of queries run in less than 100 seconds. Note
that this scenario resembles the case of storing a full genome. The peaks in this graph occur whenever a
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Figure 7.4: Average time (10 repetitions) of 2100 queries on a database the two databases hold-
ing 217 and 225 real packets respectively.
reshuﬄe is performed. Observe the periodicity of the data: The time needed for a reshuﬄe of a higher
level amounts to twice that of the previous level. However since the elapsed time between two reshuﬄes
increases exponentially, a low amortised time of approximately 12.39 s seconds per query is achieved.
In Figure 7.4 we compare the average time needed for 10 repetitions of the 2100 queries in the two
databases. From the results we see that the query time is roughly independent of the size of the database
and depends only on the number of the queries performed so far. This is expected, as at any given time,
not all the ORAM levels are full.
Tomeasure the traffic exchanged between the parties, we performed 2100 queries locally on the loopback
interface. We used iptables for traffic accounting, thus the numbers also include all TCP and IPv4 headers
and not just the application layer payload. Figure 7.5 depicts the summed traffic between the cloud and
the proxy, which shows certain ‘jumps’. These occur whenever a reshuﬄe is performed and as in the time
measurement results, each jump’s height is twice that of the previous one, with an exponential amount
of queries being performed from one jump to the next. During the 2048-th query, 318MB are sent from
the proxy to the cloud and on average only 1.202MB are transferred per query between the proxy and
the cloud. Figure 7.6 shows the traffic between the investigator and the other parties, with an average of
133 kB per query. Note that (like in the case of the time measurements) the traffic is only affected by the
number of queries performed and not by the number of items in the database. The results clearly indicate
that the investigator is almost not burdened by the query, as required by the problem domain.
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1. Clients upload their
encrypted sequenced DNA
3. Investigators access 
parts of clients' data
2. Clients give access to
specific parts of their data 
to investigators
Figure 7.7: Clients upload their encrypted genome on a Blurry-ORAM structure (step 1.), give to
investigators access to parts of it (step 2.), which the latter access (step 3.)
7.2. Privacy-Preserving GWAS
In all but the last of the applications described in Section 7.1.2, we have assumed that one client stores
his encrypted genetic data on the remote server. In the case of the ‘Statistical Queries’, we assumed the
existence ofmultiple clients without taking into consideration the information leakage that can potentially
appear in such a setting, as we have seen in Chapter 6. In fact, Proxy-ORAM was not designed with such
security guarantees in mind. Therefore, in order to be able to perform ‘Statistical Queries’ with higher
levels of client privacy, it seems straightforward to turn to Blurry-ORAM.
Typically, what we described earlier as ‘Statistical Queries’, falls into the category of Genome Wide As-
sociation Studies (GWAS), where an investigator examines whether a set of genetic variants in a number
of clients is associated with a specific disease. Due to the large data sizes involved, storing a client’s
genomic data is typically done by storing the client’s SNPs. Once all the clients’ SNPs are stored on the
remote server (the biobank), the clients give selectively access to a subset of their data, to multiple inves-
tigators (aka the biostatisticians), in the form of what we described as shared blocks in Chapter 6. Thus,
in this case, we do not have only multiple clients, but also multiple investigators; an overview of this
scheme is depicted in Figure 7.7. As we have seen in Blurry-ORAM’s security analysis, Blurry-ORAM
guarantees that the existence of the shared blocks does not leak any information about the rest of the
blocks, while (as was the case in Proxy-ORAM as well) the client and the investigator are not required
to be constantly (or even simultaneously) online.
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7.2.1. Experimental Setup
We implemented Blurry-ORAM on a virtual machine running Ubuntu Version 16.10 with 8 cores and
16GB of RAM, hosted on a 2x Xeon E5 2620v2 server with 12 Cores (24HT) and 64GB of RAM, using
VMWare ESXi 6 for the virtualization. For the client we used a desktop PC equipped with an AMD
FX(tm)-8350 Eight-Core Processor and 24GB of RAM, running on Ubuntu Desktop Version 16.04. As
backend on the server, we used MySQL version 5.7.16. The code was compiled using g++ version
6.2.0, for the cryptographic backend we used the OpenSSL library, version 1.0.2, and the experiments
were ran on a 1Gbit LAN network. Note that using as many cores as possible is crucial in boosting the
efficiency of our construction: After the client has identified the blocks he can decrypt, he can perform
the eviction in parallel, with re-randomising all other blocks using all available cores.
7.2.2. Experiments
Using the techniques proposed in [BWB09], one can efficiently store a patient’s genome by using roughly
217 SNPs. Using an elliptic curve over a prime field G(p) with p of size 256 bits (cf. section 3.2), we
can map a SNP to a single point of the elliptic curve. Typically for elliptic curve cryptography, mapping
a plaintext to a point of the elliptic curve is not a trivial task. This is usually solved by concatenating
random noise to the plaintext so that it can be mapped to a point of the elliptic curve. Indeed, doing this
and using 16 bits of randomness for every block, we were able to map all the plaintexts we had, to points
of the elliptic curve. Observe also, that for every SNP, we needed maximally 17 bits to represent the
identifier and 16 bits of randomness to do the mapping to the elliptic curve. This left us with 223 bits,
which provide adequate space to store the SNP, using the techniques described in [BWB09].
With the above in mind, we stored in our simulations the SNPs of 100 clients, resulting in a database
holding a total of 223 blocks (217 SNPs per client, enough to hold a human genome stored in the form
of SNPs as described in [BWB09]). We then allowed multiple investigators to access specific parts of
the stored genomic data. We assume that every client distributed a different key to every investigator, so
that neither other clients, nor investigators could learn anything about blocks they would not have access
to. Figure 7.8 shows the performance of our construction: we performed 10 rounds of 1000 queries
and measured the time needed for every query, depending on the number of keys a client has access to.
The time needed for each query is affected by the number of investigators present (since decryption is
attempted with all the client’s keys), and varies from 6.48 s on average, when only one investigator is
present, to 63.01 s when 100 investigators are present.
In a similar setting, we varied the number of clients storing their data (again we use 217 SNPs per client),
while 100 investigators were present, each one of them using a different key. We performed 10 rounds
of 1000 queries. The results are presented in Figure 7.9, where we observe that when 10 clients were
present, the average time for a query was 6.9 s, when 50 clients were present the average time was
31.40 s, and when 100 clients were present the average time for a query was 63.01 s.
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In Figure 7.10 we examined how the number of blocks affects the performance of our construction. We
instantiated our construction with 50 clients and 10 investigators (i.e., 10 keys per client) and stored 215,
216 and 217 blocks per client. We performed again 10 rounds of 1000 queries and measured an average
query time of 6.92 s, 7.42 s and 7.71 s, when each client stored 215, 216 and 217 blocks, respectively.
As we have seen in the security analysis of Blurry-ORAM (see Section 6.5), the occupancy of the com-
monstash plays a very important role for Client-to-Client privacy. To experimentally assess the size of
both the local- and commonstash, we performed 10 rounds of 217 queries (i.e., access of all blocks) in
the database of 100 clients with 217 blocks, 1000 keys each, and set Z = 2, i.e., 2 blocks per client
per node. We examined the sizes of the localstash and the commonstash. The results are shown in
Figure 7.11, where we see that the commonstash was never used. On the other hand, the localstash at-
tained once a maximum occupancy of 20 blocks, which is less than the theoretical approximations of the
original Path-ORAM scheme [Ste+13b].
The previous experiments focused on storing all SNPs, which store only the positions where a human’s
genome differs from the reference genome. Having in mind that it still remains to be answered what
information is hidden in the 90% of an organism’s genome (which today seems irrelevant for GWAS),
we the consider the case where one would choose to store an individual’s whole genome. Using elliptic
curves as described above, we can store the approximately 3× 109 characters, using 223 blocks per client,
with each block storing approximately 128 characters3. We ran a series of 10 rounds of 1000 queries in
a database with 2, 4 and 8 clients that share 10 blocks. The results are shown in Figure 7.12, where we
see that the average query time was 50 s, 55 s, 60 s respectively. In a similar manner, we ran 10 rounds of
1000 queries in a database storing the whole genome of 8 clients, that share 10, 50 and 100 blocks and
the results. Figure 7.13 shows that the average query time was 4.11 s, 6.98 s and 11.26 s respectively,
thus yielding a practical solution.
3 Note that since the genome’s alphabet consists only of the four letters A, T, G, C, we only need 2 bits to represent each
letter of the alphabet.
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Figure 7.8: Performance of Blurry-ORAM, when varying the number of keys in the scenario of
storing the SNPs.
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Figure 7.9: Performance of Blurry-ORAM, when varying the number the number of clients in the
scenario of storing the SNPs.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this work we addressed the problem of constructing PETs for data intensive problems in a two-fold way.
Our first goal was to construct new ORAM solutions that allow for a multitude of entities to participate
in the protocol. Our first construction, Proxy-ORAM, presented in Chapter 5, allowed a client to store
encrypted data on a remote untrusted server. Subsequently, the client could access his data in a privacy
preserving way, and give temporary access to it to a third party, who would see only encrypted data
during the course of the protocol. Furthermore, the client was not involved in any of the communication
and computationally intense steps of ORAM.
In our second construction, Blurry-ORAM, presented in Chapter 6, we introduced the notion of PSMC-
ORAMs. These are ORAM architectures that allow multiple clients to store their encrypted data on a
remote server, and at the same time share with each other parts of their data. We identified the pri-
vacy leakage that can occur in such settings, and provided the necessary theoretical framework that
allows for the security evaluation of such schemes. Based on one of the currently most efficient ORAM
constructions, we developed the first PSMC-ORAM, and evaluated its security.
Arguing about the security guarantees of such complex ORAM architectures would not have been an
easy task without the new versatile ORAM security framework which we developed in Chapter 4. Our
new framework closes the gap between the austere ORAM formalisation of Goldreich and Ostrovsky, and
the high-level security proofs that have predominated the existing ORAM works. The potential of our
new framework is shown not only in the development of rigorous security proofs for existing schemes,
but mainly in its agility to extend these schemes into new and more complex ones, such as the newly
introduced PSMC-ORAM framework.
In order to further argue about the practicability of our proposed solutions, we tested our new construc-
tions on a data intensive problem that we believe will play a focal role in the way privacy and freedomwill
further develop in our society. Coupling Proxy-ORAM with ideas from STC, we tested the applicability
of our solution for privacy preserving genome processing. In another setting, yet still regarding genomic
processing, we used Blurry-ORAM to instantiate a scenario where multiple clients store their genomic
data on remote servers and share with each other (or with other parties such as biostaticians and other
biobanks) parts of their data.
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Our results have shown that our solutions are practical. Yet, there is much space for further research. In
Proxy-ORAM, the existence of the Bloom filter affects the soundness and the security of the protocol in a
sympathetic way: A small (and thus a more efficient instantiation of the protocol) Bloom filter increases
the probability of a false positive. Given that the datablocks that the investigator sees at the end are
encrypted, this can have a serious effect in the correctness of the computation’s result. At the same time,
a high false positive probability means that the ORAM guarantees can be easily compromised. To avoid
these obstacles, we had to employ a Bloom filter of large size, which meant a serious compromise of
efficiency. Therefore, finding a substitution of the Bloom filter is a major and interesting challenge for
this solution.
Blurry-ORAM is the first functional PSMC-ORAM. Knowing that the databases storing genomic data for
multiple clients would quickly grow, we based our construction on the most efficient ORAM construction
to-date. This came at the cost of having to use the so-called commonstash, which in turn can seriously
affect the protocol’s security guarantees. Therefore, building a PSMC-ORAM that avoids the use of such
a data structure, while relying on other ORAM constructions such as distributed ORAM is an open and
interesting problem.
It is still an open problem, how our constructions can be further refined, in order to address the problem
of client anonymity. It is also of great interest (that will have an important impact on the applicability
of our solutions) to extend them in a setting that guarantees security against malicious servers. Further,
an important question that needs to be answered in future work, is how the PSMC-ORAM model can be
modified in order to provide security against malicious and colluding clients.
In this work, our main ORAM focus was in the client/ server model, and for our developed solutions we
were motivated by the problem of secure genomic processing. Due to the sensitivity of genomic data,
it is of great importance to provide long-term security. One way of doing this, is by showing that our
constructions are post- or even fully-quantum secure. In [GKK17], we showed that it is possible to extend
ORAM security in both post- and fully-quantum settings. This result, gives us a strong intuition on how
our ORAM constructions can be extended and proven secure in such settings. Further, it is interesting to
examine if Yao’s Garbled Circuit solution can also be extended in the post-quantum setting, and which
of its numerous optimisations can still be proven secure against post-quantum adversaries.
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